Fraud Sentencing: Misrepresented Mooring Rights, “Nil Value” Assets, and Totality for Bail Offending

Case: Djurberg, R. v
Neutral citation: [2026] EWCA Crim 566
Court: England and Wales Court of Appeal (Criminal Division)
Date: 1 April 2026
Procedural posture: Renewed (non-counsel) application for leave to appeal against sentence (refused)

1. Introduction

The Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) refused a renewed application for leave to appeal against sentence brought by the applicant following jury convictions for four counts of fraud by false representation under sections 1 and 2 of the Fraud Act 2006. The offending concerned the sale of high-value houseboats (and, on one count, a “houseboat” marketed as office space) said to come with permanent residential or commercial mooring rights at a West London boatyard.

The core issue for sentencing—and for the attempted appeal—was how the court should assess “loss” and harm under the Sentencing Council Fraud guideline where the physical asset was delivered, but the fundamental represented right (lawful residential/commercial mooring) did not exist and could not be obtained due to planning restrictions. The application also raised familiar mitigation points: delay, age, and health.

2. Summary of the Judgment

• The renewed application for leave to appeal against sentence was refused.
• The Court held the sentencing approach was orthodox: high culpability, substantial losses, serious victim impact, and proper use of consecutive sentencing for an offence committed on bail, tempered by totality.
• The argument that victims received value because they obtained houseboats was rejected: the represented mooring rights were fundamental, and in practical terms the “value” to victims could be nil where the boats could not lawfully be used as sold and could not be moved economically.
• Delay, age, and medical conditions did not provide arguable mitigation on the facts, particularly in the absence of medical evidence and where the judge found the applicant used the period to continue hostility towards victims.

3. The Sentences Under Challenge (in Outline)

The Crown Court imposed a total of 12 years’ imprisonment:

4. Analysis

4.1 Precedents and Authorities Cited (and Their Role)

The judgment is primarily a guideline-application decision rather than one turning on contested appellate authority. Its reasoning is anchored in:

• Fraud Act 2006, sections 1 and 2 (the offence framework: fraud by false representation).
• Sentencing Council guideline for Fraud (culpability levels; harm categories by loss; uplifts for “high impact” victim harm).
• The totality principle (structuring concurrent and consecutive terms to reflect overall criminality without disproportion).
• Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986 (a relevant antecedent used as aggravation: managing a company while disqualified).
• Parallel civil proceedings (the Court referenced a High Court conclusion that the misrepresentation was fundamental and that no “value” credit was appropriate in damages assessment; while not treated as a binding sentencing authority, it reinforced the factual and evaluative premise that the represented right was central).

Notably, no prior criminal case authorities are quoted by name in this transcript; the Court’s approach reflects standard appellate restraint on renewed leave applications where the sentencing exercise is well within guideline method and evaluative discretion.

4.2 Legal Reasoning

(a) “Value delivered” vs “loss caused”: when the asset is functionally worthless to the victim

The applicant’s principal point was that the complainants got what they paid for (a houseboat) and that the boats had increased in value. The Court treated this as unarguable because the sentencing judge was entitled to find (and did find) that what was sold was not merely a chattel, but a lawful residential/commercial lifestyle package anchored in permanent mooring rights at a specific marina.

Two features mattered:

• Fundamentality of the represented right: residential/commercial mooring rights were integral to the bargain; without them, the “houseboat” was not what the purchasers thought they were acquiring.
• Practical inability to mitigate by relocation: the Court accepted the judge’s account that boats remained in storage mooring and could not be moved upstream/downstream (or by land) at commercially viable cost; another was moved only after costly reconstruction to navigate a lock. This practical reality supported the assessment that the victim’s “value” could be nil or heavily discounted despite physical delivery.

In effect, the decision illustrates how “loss” for guideline purposes may properly reflect the economic reality of a fraud transaction: where the represented legal entitlement is absent and cannot realistically be substituted, the delivered object may carry little or no effective value to the victim. The Court treated the judge’s loss assessments as properly rooted in evidence and practicalities, not mere formal title to a boat.

(b) Guideline application: culpability, harm, and “high impact” uplift

The sentencing judge assessed each count as high culpability (Level A), emphasising sustained, planned, and sophisticated conduct over years. Harm was assessed by loss, with additional movement to higher categories where victim impact was “high”.

• For counts within the £100,000–£500,000 bracket, the judge treated them as category 2 by loss; count 1 was elevated due to very grave victim impact.
• For the lead count (loss £1.25m), the judge concluded that “high impact” harm justified a sentence above the guideline range, imposing 9 years.

The Court endorsed this as a classic evaluative sentencing decision: (i) identify culpability and loss; (ii) consider high-impact harm; (iii) justify any movement within or above range; and (iv) ensure totality across counts.

(c) Offending on bail: consecutive sentence moderated by totality

Count 5 was committed after police interviews and while the applicant was on bail. The Court agreed that this “amply justified” a consecutive term, reflecting escalation and persistence in dishonesty despite active criminal investigation.

Equally, the Court approved the judge’s totality adjustment: reducing what was said to be an otherwise appropriate term on count 5 to arrive at an overall sentence (12 years) proportionate to total criminality (multiple victims; approximately £3 million). This demonstrates orthodox structuring: consecutive to mark distinct wrongdoing, but reduced to avoid double-counting and excess.

(d) Aggravation: antecedents, blame-shifting, lack of remorse, and victim harassment

The applicant had a relevant prior conviction for managing a company whilst disqualified, temporally close to the start of the fraud period. The judge also treated as aggravating:

• Persistent blame-shifting;
• An “absolute lack” of remorse;
• Continuing harassment and hostility towards victims.

These factors supported both culpability and the rejection of mitigation arguments based on the passage of time.

(e) Mitigation claims rejected: delay, age, and medical conditions

• Delay: the judge considered it but found it did not mitigate because the applicant used the time to continue a “vendetta” against complainants; additionally, later offending contributed to the procedural timeline.
• Age: mid-60s at sentence was not “advanced age” justifying reduction.
• Health: no medical evidence; the Court noted nothing in a prosecution psychiatric report provided mitigation. Complaints about defence material not being before the judge did not convert into arguable sentencing mitigation.

4.3 Impact

Although decided on a renewed leave application (and therefore not framed as broad doctrinal development), the judgment provides practical guidance for fraud sentencing in transactions involving assets tied to legal rights or regulatory permissions:

• Rights-based frauds: where the misrepresentation concerns a legal entitlement essential to the transaction (here, permanent mooring rights), the court may treat the “asset delivered” as having no or minimal value to the victim for loss/harm purposes if lawful use is impossible and relocation is not a realistic substitute.
• Victim impact matters: serious emotional/financial consequences can elevate harm (“high impact”) and justify moving to a higher category or beyond-range sentence where reasoned.
• Bail offending will bite: later dishonest conduct committed on bail is a strong driver towards consecutivity, with totality providing the control mechanism.
• Mitigation requires evidence and causation: age and health must be evidenced; delay will not mitigate where the offender’s own conduct aggravates its impact or where the offender continues harmful behaviour during the period.

5. Complex Concepts Simplified

• Fraud by false representation: dishonestly making a false statement (express or implied) intending to gain or cause loss/risk of loss.
• Guideline culpability (Level A): the highest culpability band, typically involving planning, sophistication, and sustained offending.
• Harm categories by “loss”: guideline harm is often anchored to money lost (or intended loss), but can be adjusted for additional harm.
• “High impact” harm: an uplift where victims suffer particularly severe effects (financial ruin, serious mental/physical consequences), not merely routine distress.
• Concurrent vs consecutive sentences: concurrent run together; consecutive add on. Courts often use a lead count with concurrent terms, adding a consecutive element for distinct further wrongdoing.
• Totality: a cross-check to ensure the final overall sentence is proportionate to the combined offending.

6. Conclusion

The Court of Appeal’s refusal of leave in [2026] EWCA Crim 566 confirms a robust, reality-based approach to loss and harm in fraud sentencing: delivering a physical asset will not reduce loss where the essence of the bargain was a represented legal right that does not exist and cannot practically be substituted. The decision also reinforces orthodox principles on consecutivity for bail offending, the controlling function of totality, and the limited weight of delay, age, or ill health in the absence of evidence and genuine mitigating context.