Extended Sentences and “Dangerousness”: Reasons and Evidential Foundation Required Where No PSR and Mental Health Risk-Management Evidence Is Incomplete

Case: Blake & Ors, R. v
Neutral citation: [2026] EWCA Crim 452
Court: Court of Appeal (Criminal Division), England and Wales
Date: 20 March 2026
Coram: Lady Justice Andrews, Mr Justice Bennathan, The Recorder of Norwich (HHJ Alice Robinson)

1. Introduction

This judgment concerns sentencing appeals arising from a large-scale drugs enterprise (cannabis production/supply and cocaine supply) alongside serious firearms offending. Three defendants were sentenced in the Crown Court at Nottingham:

  • the appellant (B), who pleaded guilty on a written basis and received an extended determinate sentence for an offence under section 16 of the Firearms Act 1968 (possession of a firearm with intent to endanger life);
  • the appellant (W), who received consecutive terms for firearms offences (including a section 16 offence involving the same firearm) and a drugs sentence for being concerned in supplying cannabis;
  • the applicant (J), sentenced to an overall term of 25 years for cocaine, cannabis and firearms offending, who renewed an application for leave to appeal.

The central appellate issue with wider significance was whether the sentencing judge was entitled to find B “dangerous” so as to justify an extended sentence, particularly where there was no pre-sentence report and where later psychiatric material provided a fuller picture of risk and management in the community.

2. Summary of the Judgment

  • B: Appeal allowed. The Court of Appeal held the finding of dangerousness was made in error (inadequate reasons; absence of a PSR; incomplete/dated psychiatric picture at sentence). The extended sentence was quashed and replaced with a determinate sentence of 6 years’ imprisonment (the custodial term the judge had selected).
  • W: Appeal dismissed. While the Court noted the sentencing remarks on the cannabis count could have been clearer, it concluded the overall total sentence of 8 years was not wrong in principle or manifestly excessive, particularly given the seriousness of the firearms offending and the likelihood that any reduction on the drugs count would have been offset elsewhere.
  • J: Renewed application for leave to appeal refused. The judge was entitled to find a leading role in the cocaine offending, and the overall sentence properly reflected totality.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited

The judgment does not cite earlier authorities by name. Its reasoning is driven instead by (i) the statutory logic of extended sentences and (ii) orthodox sentencing practice: a dangerousness finding must be rationally supported by evidence and explained, and totality requires the court to “stand back” and test overall proportionality.

3.2 Legal Reasoning

A. Dangerousness and extended sentences: reasons and evidential basis

The Court of Appeal accepted it is “unusual” to interfere with a trial judge’s dangerousness assessment, but held intervention was justified here because the process by which the conclusion was reached was deficient:

  • Inadequate reasons: the sentencing judge stated he was satisfied there was a “real and ongoing risk” of further specified offences and extended the licence, but provided no further explanation for that key conclusion.
  • No pre-sentence report: the Court emphasised that where dangerousness is under consideration, it is “often the practice” to obtain professional risk input from probation (and, where relevant, medical evidence) so that the court can assess both risk and how it can be managed.
  • Mental health and vulnerability context: B had documented schizophrenia and vulnerability to exploitation. The Court considered updated psychiatric evidence (available to the appellate court) indicating improved engagement with supervision and treatment. The sentencing judge lacked that “seen in the round” picture.
  • Protective purpose of an extended sentence: the Court restated the core justification for extension: public protection against the risk of further similar offending. That protective aim requires an evidential foundation showing why ordinary determinate sentencing/licence arrangements are insufficient.

Practical rule emerging: Where an extended sentence depends on a dangerousness finding, the sentencing judge must (1) give adequate reasons and (2) have a proper evidential platform—particularly where mental disorder/vulnerability and risk management are central. If PSR/updated psychiatric material is absent, the finding may be unsafe.

B. “Totality” as the appellate lens for multi-count sentencing (W and J)

For W, the complaint was that the judge appeared to give no meaningful credit for powerful mitigation (coercion/control, domestic violence evidence, caring responsibilities, previous good character) when calculating the notional post-trial sentence for the cannabis count.

  • The Court accepted clearer reasoning on the cannabis count would have been preferable.
  • However, it treated the sentencing exercise as an overall package: the same mitigation had already driven a significant reduction in the firearms sentence to the statutory minimum, and any reduction on the drugs count was likely to have been balanced by a longer firearms term.
  • The final question was whether the overall 8-year sentence was manifestly excessive or wrong in principle; the Court held it was not.

For J, the Court stressed the advantage held by the trial judge who had presided over the trial in evaluating role and culpability. It rejected:

  • Role challenge: the judge was entitled to find a leading role in cocaine supply (high purity, high value, packaging suggesting proximity to source).
  • Totality challenge: stepping back, the overall 25-year sentence remained just and proportionate given the breadth of criminality (drugs enterprise plus firearms), and the judge’s reduction for totality was not erroneous.

3.3 Impact

  • Sentencing courts: the decision is a caution against making a dangerousness finding (and imposing an extended sentence) on a thin record. Where the offender has complex mental health or vulnerability features, courts should ordinarily ensure they have current risk and management material (often via PSR and/or psychiatric input) before extending licence.
  • Practitioners: the judgment underlines the forensic importance of (i) requesting a PSR when dangerousness is in play, (ii) adducing up-to-date psychiatric evidence where mental disorder affects risk, and (iii) insisting on explicit reasons addressing why extension is necessary for public protection.
  • Appellate approach: while deference to the sentencing judge remains the norm, the Court will intervene where the reasoning/evidential basis for dangerousness is materially inadequate.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Extended determinate sentence (EDS): a prison term plus an additional “extension period” on licence after release, used for certain serious offences where the court finds the offender presents a significant risk of serious harm (i.e., “dangerousness”).
  • Dangerousness finding: a judicial conclusion about ongoing risk of serious harm from future specified offending; it is not a label of moral blame but a risk-based gateway to enhanced public protection measures.
  • Pre-sentence report (PSR): a probation report assessing background, risk, and suitability for interventions; often critical where the court must assess future risk and how it can be managed.
  • Totality: the principle that when sentencing for multiple offences, the overall sentence must be proportionate to the overall criminality—courts “stand back” to ensure the final figure is just.
  • Role and harm categories (Guidelines): drug and firearms guidelines typically combine (i) the offender’s role (leading/significant/lesser) and (ii) harm indicators (quantity, seriousness, sophistication) to generate a starting point and range.

5. Conclusion

[2026] EWCA Crim 452 is most significant for its treatment of extended sentencing: a dangerousness finding must be explained and grounded in a proper evidential assessment, especially where mental disorder and vulnerability affect both risk and the means of controlling it. The Court’s substitution of a determinate sentence for B—while leaving intact the sentences for W and J—illustrates a principled distinction between (i) correcting an unsafe public-protection rationale and (ii) respecting multi-count sentencing outcomes that are, overall, proportionate under the totality principle.