Exploitation of a Child to Commit and Conceal Domestic Murder Justifies Uplift Beyond the 30‑Year Starting Point

1. Introduction

This was a reference by the Solicitor General under section 36 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988, arguing that the minimum term set for a murder conviction was unduly lenient. The offender murdered the victim (“A”), in the family home, after the marital relationship had ended. Two children were involved: an older child (“C1”), and a younger sibling (“C2”).

The central legal issue was not whether a life sentence was required (it was), but whether the minimum term set under Schedule 21 to the Sentencing Act 2020 adequately reflected the seriousness of a murder carried out through the recruitment, injury, and prolonged manipulation of the offender’s own child, and a long-running cover-up involving perjury and perverting the course of justice.

Reporting restrictions and anonymity

The Court emphasised strict reporting restrictions, including an order under s.45A Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999 protecting C1 for life and protections for C2 while under 18, expressly to reduce “jigsaw identification”. The offender and the deceased were anonymised in the judgment for that purpose.

2. Summary of the Judgment

• The sentencing judge correctly selected the 30-year starting point (murder of “particularly high seriousness”) under Schedule 21.
• However, the final minimum term (after remand deduction) of 27 years and 321 days did not sufficiently reflect the full extent of harm caused by the offender’s exploitation and abuse of C1 and impact on both children.
• The Court held the minimum term was unduly lenient and increased it to 31 years and 321 days (a net uplift of four years).

3. Detailed Analysis

3.1 Precedents cited and their role

(a) Attorney General’s Reference (No 4 of 1989) [1990] 1 WLR 41

This is the leading authority on the “unduly lenient” test for s.36 references. The Court reiterated that it is not enough that the appellate court would have imposed a higher sentence; intervention is justified only where the sentence:

• falls outside the range reasonably available to the sentencing judge; and
• is therefore “unduly lenient”, recognising sentencing as an “art rather than a science”.

This framed the Court’s task as correcting a serious sentencing error (not fine-tuning).

(b) Attorney General's Reference (No 132 of 2001) (R v Johnson) [2003] 1 Cr App R(S) 41

The Court used R v Johnson to situate the constitutional purpose of s.36: avoiding gross error, allaying public concern, and preserving confidence where there is a substantial departure from sentencing norms.

(c) R v Peters and others [2005] EWCA Crim 605; [2005] 2 Cr App R(S) 101

Peters was cited for the approach to appellate review of minimum terms: the Court looks at the end result overall and will not interfere unless it is “manifestly excessive or wrong in principle” (adapted in a reference context to “unduly lenient”). This discouraged purely arithmetical challenges and emphasised deference to trial judges—while leaving room for intervention where the outcome is out of range.

(d) R v Jones and others [2005] EWCA Crim 3115; [2006] 2 Cr App R (S) 19

Jones provided critical guidance on Schedule 21 starting points:

• Starting points (15 years / 30 years / whole life) are a broad framework and must not be applied mechanistically.
• There are “huge gaps” between starting points; it can be impossible to separate selecting a starting point from weighing aggravation/mitigation.
• Where a factor is used to move to a higher starting point, the judge must avoid double counting it again on uplift.

In this case, the offender argued (by analogy with Jones) that an uplift beyond the 30-year starting point would double count the same features already used to justify the 30-year category.

3.2 The Court’s legal reasoning

(a) The correct starting point was not the dispute

The sentencing judge had already treated the case as one of “particularly high seriousness” and applied the 30-year starting point, listing extensive features including premeditation, domestic context, involvement of C1, injuries, manipulation of A, drug use, and the perjury/perversion that delayed justice for years. The Solicitor General’s primary complaint was that the judge then set a minimum term below 30 years (29 years and 6 months before remand deduction), and did not sufficiently reflect the additional criminality and harm.

(b) Why the Court nevertheless found “undue leniency”

The Court’s key move was to identify a qualitative underweighting of a feature it considered extraordinary and central: the offender’s “callous, selfish manipulation and abuse” of a vulnerable child to facilitate murder and to sustain a false narrative for many years.

Although involvement of C1 had been part of the judge’s reasoning, the Court held it was not sufficiently reflected in the end minimum term. In particular, the Court emphasised:

• The offender not only enlisted C1 in the killing, but injured C1 with the same knife to fabricate self-defence.
• The offender used ongoing contact to pressure C1 to “stick to the plan”, creating prolonged coercion and psychological harm.
• C2 was also drawn into the false narrative and witnessed the aftermath.
• The perjury and perversion were not merely “add-ons”; they were part of the same “heinous plan” to kill and evade justice.

(c) Double counting addressed by focusing on insufficiency of reflection, not mere repetition

The offender’s “double counting” argument relied on Jones. The Court’s answer was practical rather than formulaic: even accepting the need to avoid double counting, the end term still failed to “truly reflect the seriousness” of the case. In effect, the Court treated the child-exploitation element as so grave that—despite already justifying the 30-year framework—it still warranted additional uplift within the overall Schedule 21 exercise to bring the outcome back into range.

(d) Outcome

Applying the s.36 test (from Attorney General’s Reference (No 4 of 1989)) and the minimum-term review approach (from Peters and Jones), the Court concluded the original minimum term was outside the reasonable range and therefore unduly lenient. It substituted a higher minimum term: 31 years and 321 days.

3.3 Impact and significance

• Schedule 21 seriousness calibration: The decision underscores that where a murder involves instrumentalising a child—including causing injury, coercing false accounts, and sustaining deception through multiple proceedings—courts may treat that as warranting an uplift beyond the 30-year starting point even if those features helped justify entry into the 30-year category.
• Domestic murder with child exploitation: The case provides appellate affirmation that “domestic context” is not merely a background factor: where children are used as tools in the killing and cover-up, this can elevate seriousness markedly.
• s.36 references: It illustrates the Court’s readiness to intervene where the final minimum term does not adequately embody the gravity of harm—particularly harm to children—despite otherwise careful sentencing remarks.
• Reporting restriction practice: The judgment demonstrates robust use of s.45A YJCEA 1999 to prevent “jigsaw identification”, including restricting publication that might otherwise be permissible (such as names/locations) where it risks identifying protected children.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

• Unduly lenient (s.36 CJA 1988): Not “a bit low”, but outside the range of reasonable sentences—serious enough to justify appellate increase.
• Life sentence and “minimum term”: Murder always results in a life sentence; the court sets a minimum period to be served before the Parole Board can consider release.
• Schedule 21 “starting points”: Statutory anchors (often 15 years, 30 years, or whole life) used as a framework; judges then adjust for aggravating/mitigating features to reach a just minimum term.
• Double counting: Using the same fact twice—first to select a higher starting point and then again to increase the term further. Jones warns against this, but it does not prevent further uplift where the final term still fails to reflect seriousness.
• Perverting the course of justice / perjury: Serious offences involving interference with justice (e.g., fabricating a false self-defence narrative) and lying on oath in court proceedings.
• ABE interview: “Achieving Best Evidence” interview—structured evidence-gathering from children/vulnerable witnesses.
• Jigsaw identification: Even if a name is withheld, a combination of details can identify a protected person; courts may restrict publication of otherwise “neutral” details to prevent that.

5. Conclusion

In CHA, R. v [2026] EWCA Crim 932, the Court of Appeal held that a minimum term for murder can be unduly lenient where it fails to capture the exceptional gravity of an offender’s recruitment, injury, and long-term coercive manipulation of their own child to commit and conceal a domestic murder. While the 30-year starting point under Schedule 21 was correct, the Court ruled that the exploitation of both children and the integrated, years-long deception required a further uplift, increasing the minimum term to 31 years and 321 days.