Controlling or coercive behaviour: “substantial adverse effect” does not require disruption of an established routine

Introduction

In R v Keay [2026] EWCA Crim 850, the Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) refused an application for leave to appeal against conviction arising from a Preston Crown Court trial. The applicant had been convicted of (i) controlling or coercive behaviour in an intimate or family relationship contrary to section 76 of the Serious Crime Act 2015 and (ii) controlling prostitution for gain.

The appeal focused on a single legal issue: whether there was sufficient evidence, at the close of the prosecution case, of the statutory “serious effect” limb in s.76(4)(b)—namely that the conduct caused the complainant serious alarm or distress which had a substantial adverse effect on the complainant’s usual day-to-day activities (described by the court as the “additional requirement”).

The applicant’s submission below (renewed on appeal) was that—even if serious alarm/distress was proved—there was no evidence of a sufficiently “substantial” adverse effect on “usual day-to-day activities”, and (in essence) that the statute required evidence of disruption to some identifiable daily routine.

Summary of the Judgment

The Court of Appeal (Edis LJ, Cavanagh J, Eyre J) held that:

  • No “routine disruption” requirement exists: s.76(4)(b) does not demand evidence that an established daily routine was interrupted or altered.
  • “Usual day-to-day activities” is fact-sensitive and inclusive: a complainant may have a chaotic lifestyle with no stable routine, yet still suffer a substantial adverse effect.
  • In controlling/coercive behaviour cases the “additional requirement” is often inherent in the nature of the conduct: control typically limits a victim’s autonomy and thus substantially affects how they live.
  • On the facts, there was in any event overwhelming evidence capable of proving the additional requirement, including the complainant’s evidence that she lost her home due to financial control and was driven into sex work with the applicant taking the proceeds.

The court distinguished R v Tanner [2024] EWCA Crim 1576 (aggravated stalking), and declined to decide a broader temporal question (whether the adverse effect must be experienced during the charged period or can be appreciated only later), as it did not arise on the facts.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

1) R v Tanner [2024] EWCA Crim 1576

The applicant relied on R v Tanner [2024] EWCA Crim 1576, a case addressing the same statutory phrase (“substantial adverse effect on [the complainant’s] usual day-to-day activities”) but in the context of aggravated stalking under section 4A of the Protection from Harassment Act 1997. In Tanner, tracking devices had been placed on the complainant’s car, but she was unaware until after the conduct had ended; the court held there had been no adverse impact on day-to-day activities because the complainant did not know about the stalking while it occurred.

In Keay, the Court of Appeal treated Tanner as offering limited assistance because:

  • Different offence dynamics: stalking can be covert and unknown to the victim, whereas controlling/coercive behaviour typically operates through lived restriction, fear, dependency, and domination.
  • Different role of the “additional requirement”: in stalking it may do significant work (excluding unknown or non-impacting conduct), while in coercive control it is frequently implicit in the control itself.

The court therefore did not import Tanner as a restrictive template for what counts as a substantial adverse effect under s.76(4)(b).

Legal Reasoning

1) The “additional requirement” is not a demand for evidence of a disrupted routine

The Court of Appeal endorsed the trial judge’s approach: the statute does not require the prosecution to prove that the complainant had an established “normal” routine and that it was demonstrably interrupted in a granular way (e.g., changed commute patterns, altered shopping habits, specific diary evidence).

The court’s reasoning is practical and protective:

  • Some victims—particularly those experiencing instability, substance dependence, homelessness, or economic vulnerability—may have no stable routine against which disruption can be measured.
  • Parliament cannot rationally have intended that such victims fall outside the protection of the offence merely because their “usual day-to-day activities” are not easily describable as a structured routine.

2) In coercive control, “substantial adverse effect” is commonly inherent

The court articulated an important proposition about the structure of s.76: where repeated/continuous controlling or coercive behaviour is proved and it causes serious alarm or distress, it will generally follow that the victim’s day-to-day life has been substantially adversely affected, because:

  • Control is about constraining choice—limiting where a person can go, what they can do, how they relate to others, and how they access money or housing.
  • If the behaviour does not substantially affect day-to-day living, it may often not amount (in reality) to “controlling or coercive behaviour” of the statutory kind.

This is not a legal presumption that removes the need for proof, but it is clear guidance that courts should not over-formalise the “substantial adverse effect” inquiry in coercive control prosecutions.

3) Evidence capable of satisfying the “substantial adverse effect” threshold

Even if a more concrete demonstration were required, the court held the evidence here plainly met it. The judgment highlights:

  • Homelessness: evidence that financial control (taking/withholding the complainant’s money and card) led to rent arrears and the loss of her home. The court described this as, by itself, sufficient: few things affect day-to-day activities more than being made homeless and living rough.
  • Exploitation and compelled means of subsistence: evidence that the complainant was driven into sex work, with the applicant controlling and taking the proceeds. Dictating how someone “earns their living” and appropriating their income was treated as a paradigmatic day-to-day impact.
  • Isolation and relocation: evidence of isolation from family support and subsequent relocation to refuge/supported housing away from the city where the complainant had lived for years.

Because this was a no case to answer issue, the question was whether the evidence, taken at its highest, was capable of proving the element for the jury. The court held it clearly was.

Impact

Although framed as a refusal of leave, the decision provides much-needed appellate guidance on the interpretation of s.76(4)(b):

  • Lower risk of misconceived submissions that the prosecution must prove disruption to a stable “routine” or produce quasi-schedule evidence of daily life changes.
  • Victim-inclusive interpretation: confirms the offence is apt to protect victims whose circumstances are unstable and whose “usual” activities may be irregular.
  • Prosecutorial focus on lived consequences: homelessness, financial deprivation, compelled economic activity, isolation, and displacement are all squarely within “day-to-day activities”.
  • Doctrinal separation from stalking: cautions against mechanically transferring analysis of identical wording from aggravated stalking into coercive control without regard to the different ways harm manifests.

The judgment also leaves open (for a future case) the temporal question: whether the “substantial adverse effect” must be experienced contemporaneously with the charged conduct, or whether later realisation can suffice—an issue that may matter in cases involving delayed recognition of coercive control.

Complex Concepts Simplified

  • “No case to answer”: a mid-trial ruling request that the judge stop the case because the prosecution evidence is legally insufficient for a jury to convict, even if the jury accepted it.
  • “Serious effect” under s.76: proved either by (a) fear of violence on at least two occasions, or (b) serious alarm/distress with a substantial adverse effect on usual day-to-day activities. This case concerns route (b).
  • “Substantial adverse effect on usual day-to-day activities”: a significant negative impact on how the complainant lives day to day (housing, finances, autonomy, work, relationships, movement, and personal security), not a technical requirement to show disruption to a neat routine.
  • Why the same words can mean different things in practice: in stalking, the victim may be unaware during the offending (so no immediate impact); in coercive control, the offending typically operates through ongoing restriction and dependency that directly shapes daily life.

Conclusion

R v Keay [2026] EWCA Crim 850 confirms a principled and practical interpretation of s.76(4)(b) of the Serious Crime Act 2015: the prosecution need not prove disruption to an established routine to demonstrate a “substantial adverse effect on usual day-to-day activities”. In coercive control cases, substantial adverse effect will often be inherent in the controlling nature of the conduct, and may be proved through broad, real-world consequences such as homelessness, economic exploitation, isolation, and displacement.