Date: Mar 6, 2026

Closing Speeches Are Not Evidence: No Duty to Rehearse Defence Submissions When Jury Requests Copies

1) Introduction

Case: Mohammed, R. v [2026] EWCA Crim 340 (CA (Crim Div))
Date: 5 March 2026
Court: England and Wales Court of Appeal (Criminal Division)
Judge giving judgment: Lord Justice Dingemans (Senior President of Tribunals)

The appellant, Mr Riaz Mohammed, was convicted after trial in the Crown Court at Birmingham of two counts of conspiracy to supply Class A drugs (cocaine and heroin). The prosecution case was circumstantial: Mr Mohammed was said to have acted as a driver facilitating a drug supply operation linked to a Birmingham address associated with drug preparation and packaging, and his phone was said to co-locate with a drugs line. He was never seen entering the “drug house” and did not give evidence at trial.

The appeal was narrowly focused. It did not challenge the sufficiency of evidence as such, but alleged that the trial judge’s response to a jury question rendered the convictions unsafe. During deliberations, the jury asked whether they could “hear and/or have copies of the closing statements” for two defendants (including Mr Mohammed). The judge refused on the basis that speeches are not evidence and indicated he could remind the jury of evidence. The appellant contended that, given the time gap between speeches and the question, the judge should have summarised the “headlines” of the defence closing.

2) Summary of the Judgment

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal against conviction. It held:

The judge was right to refuse to provide the jury with defence closing speeches because closing speeches are not evidence.
Although some judges might have offered a brief reminder of defence points, there was no duty to do so in response to the jury’s request.
The convictions were not unsafe: the jury had demonstrated they would ask for evidential reminders when needed; the judge’s answer signposted that he could remind them about evidence; and the summing-up fairly covered the defence case, including points advanced by counsel for Mr Mohammed.

3) Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited

The judgment, as provided, does not cite any prior authorities by name. The Court’s conclusion is reached by applying orthodox, foundational trial principles: (i) the demarcation between evidence and advocates’ submissions; (ii) the breadth of a trial judge’s discretion in managing jury requests during deliberations; and (iii) the appellate test of whether a conviction is unsafe.

The absence of cited authorities is itself instructive: the Court treated the matter as one of clear trial fundamentals rather than a contested doctrinal frontier requiring reliance on earlier appellate guidance.

3.2 Legal Reasoning

The Court’s reasoning proceeds in three linked steps.

(a) The legal status of closing speeches

The Court affirmed a basic procedural boundary: closing speeches are not evidence. They are counsel’s submissions about what inferences should (or should not) be drawn from the evidence. That distinction matters because juries are permitted to be assisted by reminders of evidence, but should not be furnished with materials that risk elevating argument into a quasi-evidential document or giving one side’s forensic rhetoric undue prominence in the jury room.

(b) No duty to summarise defence submissions simply because the jury asked for them

The Court accepted that a judge could, as a matter of style, have provided a very short reminder of the essential defence points. But it rejected the submission that the jury’s request triggered an obligation to rehash defence submissions.

Two practical fairness considerations sit beneath this conclusion:

Even-handedness: if a judge begins re-summarising one side’s closing, questions arise as to whether the judge must also summarise other defendants’ closings and the prosecution’s closing, risking imbalance and potentially creating a “second closing” delivered by the judge.
Role clarity: the judge’s proper function during deliberations is to assist on law and evidence (including reading back testimony/exhibits where appropriate), not to re-argue the case.

(c) Safety of the conviction: why no unfairness was shown

The Court found no “unsafe” conviction because the record showed multiple protections against the feared unfairness:

Jury behaviour during deliberations: the jury had previously sent notes seeking reminders of evidence. This indicated they understood and used the channel for evidential clarification when needed.
The judge’s answer signposted the correct route: by stating “I can remind you about evidence,” the judge implicitly invited a follow-up request for any specific evidence the jury wished to revisit.
A fair summing-up already captured the defence case: the judge had summarised the defence position and referred expressly to points made by Ms Greenhalgh (e.g., “just by association,” “scraping the barrel,” absence of fingerprints, the innocent-driver hypothesis). The Court treated that as materially reducing any risk that the jury had “forgotten” the defence themes.
No subsequent jury request about Mr Mohammed’s evidence: after the judge’s direction, the jury did not ask for additional evidence reminders relating to Mr Mohammed, which undermined the contention that the jury were left unable to evaluate the defence case.

In short, the Court treated the complaint as an attempt to convert a proper refusal (no speeches) into a requirement for a supplementary defence-oriented judicial recap, and found that the trial process, viewed holistically, remained fair.

3.3 Impact

The decision consolidates practical guidance for trial judges and practitioners when juries request counsel’s speeches:

Firm line: judges are entitled to refuse requests for copies or re-playing/reading of closings on the basis that they are not evidence.
Discretion, not duty: a judge may give a brief neutral steer, but is not required to summarise defence submissions in response to such a request.
Best practice signal: the “safe” and appellate-proof response is to (i) refuse speeches; (ii) remind the jury they may ask for evidence to be read or identified; and (iii) ensure the summing-up has fairly captured the parties’ cases.

For appeals, the case illustrates that the Court will focus on overall fairness and safety, including whether the summing-up already set out the defence themes and whether the jury were given an effective route to revisit the evidence.

4) Complex Concepts Simplified

Closing speech / closing statement: the advocate’s final address arguing how the jury should interpret the evidence. It is argument, not evidence.
Summing-up: the judge’s directions on law and a review of the evidence and parties’ cases to assist the jury before deliberation.
Unsafe conviction: the appellate test in criminal cases—whether, in light of an identified error or irregularity (or new material), the conviction cannot be regarded as safe.
Majority direction: after sufficient time deliberating, the judge may permit the jury to return a verdict agreed by a specified majority rather than unanimity (subject to legal rules and safeguards).
Circumstantial case: a case proved by inference from facts (e.g., patterns of travel, phone data, associations) rather than direct observation of the defendant committing the alleged acts.
Qualifying curfew (contextual): reference to extensive pre-sentence curfew time; it explains why the appellant’s sentence posture was unusual, but it did not drive the legal issue on appeal.

5) Conclusion

Mohammed, R. v [2026] EWCA Crim 340 confirms a clear procedural rule with practical appellate significance: juries are not entitled to receive or rehear counsel’s closing speeches because they are not evidence, and a trial judge is not obliged to compensate by re-summarising defence submissions when such a request is made. The Court emphasised that the proper safeguard is to enable juries to request reminders of evidence, coupled with a fair summing-up that accurately presents the defence case. On that basis, the convictions were held to be safe and the appeal was dismissed.