Bad Character Evidence: Prior Perverting-the-Course-of-Justice Conviction Admissible Where the Defendant Alleges Investigative/Prosecutorial Misconduct

1) Introduction

In Oppong, R. v [2026] EWCA Crim 1051 (24 July 2026), the Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) (Lady Justice Andrews, Sir Robin Spencer, and HHJ Karu) refused a renewed application for leave to appeal against conviction and refused renewed leave to appeal against sentence, arising from a trial at the Crown Court at Woolwich before Bennathan J.

The applicant was convicted of (i) murder following a planned shooting outside a social gathering at “Hills House” in Essex, (ii) possession of a firearm with intent to endanger life, (iii) section 18 wounding with intent (a bystander struck by a ricochet), and (iv) possession of a prohibited firearm (a Glock) based on EncroChat messages. The prosecution case relied heavily on circumstantial telecommunications evidence (including “burner” phones), vehicle movements, and EncroChat material.

The renewed conviction appeal turned on a single legal issue: whether the trial judge was wrong to admit, as “bad character” evidence under section 101 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003, the applicant’s prior conviction (from 2012) for perverting the course of justice, and whether (even if admissible) it should have been excluded for unfairness under section 101(3).

The renewed sentence application challenged the length of the minimum term attached to the mandatory life sentence for murder.

2) Summary of the Judgment

  • Extension of time: the Court granted an extension of time (if required) for renewing the sentence application, where delay appeared attributable to solicitor confusion rather than the applicant.
  • Conviction: the Court refused leave. It held the trial judge’s ruling admitting the prior conviction was “fair and balanced” and that the jury directions were sufficient to prevent unfair prejudice. The conviction was safe.
  • Sentence: the Court refused leave. The minimum term (38 years before remand credit; expressed as 36 years and 111 days after credit) was not arguably manifestly excessive given the “archetypal” planning, sophistication, use of multiple vehicles/phones, bystander injuries, and broader criminality.

3) Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

The transcript does not identify by name any decided cases relied upon by the parties or applied by the Court. The decision proceeds by applying the statutory framework in the Criminal Justice Act 2003 (bad character) and established sentencing principles (including totality and avoidance of double counting), rather than by engaging with specific reported authorities.

B. Legal Reasoning

(i) Bad character evidence: why the prior conviction became admissible

The applicant’s earlier conviction arose from lies told to police after a separate fatal shooting incident; those lies led to a perverting-the-course-of-justice conviction after he was “disbelieved on oath”. At the current trial, the Crown twice failed to admit the conviction earlier (at the outset and at the close of the prosecution case). The judge left open the possibility of admission depending on how the defence case developed—especially the applicant’s own evidence.

The key turning point identified by the trial judge (and accepted on appeal) was the nature of the applicant’s testimony. In the judge’s assessment, the applicant did not merely highlight inaccuracies; he repeatedly and calmly asserted that material (phone/EncroChat records and related documents) had been deliberately edited or withheld to make him look guilty—effectively allegations of misconduct by “unidentified police or prosecutors”. As the defence case evolved, it also implied an associate was the user of the relevant burner phone and, by implication, the gunman.

Against that evidential backdrop, the Court held the trial judge was entitled to conclude that the statutory gateways were met—particularly gateway (g) (bad character admissible where the defendant has made an attack on another person’s character). The Court emphasised:

  • Trial judge advantage: the judge was best placed to assess the “impression” created by the applicant’s evidence (including that comments appeared planned and directed to the jury).
  • Gateway (g) not confined to calling a named witness a liar: the ruling treated allegations of deliberate manipulation/withholding of evidence (and implication of another person’s culpability) as sufficient to amount to an “attack” for gateway (g) purposes.
  • Multiple gateways: while gateway (g) was sufficient, the Court was “fully satisfied” the judge was also entitled to admit the evidence under gateways (d) and (f) in the circumstances (without needing to rely on them exclusively).

(ii) Controlling unfairness: minimal admission and strong directions

A core appellate complaint was that admission was unfair because it was difficult to “repair” the damage in re-examination without exposing the jury to the prejudicial details of the earlier incident. The Court rejected that argument for two connected reasons:

  • Minimal scope: the trial judge carefully confined what could be led. Although his ruling would have permitted some background, the Crown ultimately introduced only (a) the fact of the conviction and (b) that the applicant had stood trial and been disbelieved on oath.
  • Careful legal directions: the judge explicitly directed the jury on the limited permitted uses (including assessment of allegations made against police/prosecutors and an associate; assessment of claimed ignorance of process given prior experience; and general credibility), and—critically—gave repeated and clear warnings against propensity reasoning and against convicting “wholly or mainly” on previous convictions.

The Court considered those directions “ample to cure” any prejudice that might otherwise have arisen, and described the judge’s overall handling as “impeccable”. The conviction was therefore safe.

(iii) Sentence: minimum term methodology and proportionality

The Court upheld the minimum term by focusing on structure and principle rather than re-tabulating the tariff:

  • Starting point and double counting: the judge took a 30-year starting point for the murder minimum term and was “scrupulous” not to double count the use of a firearm (given separate firearms offending and the tariff structure).
  • Uplift and the “two-thirds” equivalence: the judge increased the minimum term to the equivalent of 38 years before credit for time served, and the Court noted that in tariff setting the minimum term equates to roughly two-thirds of a notional determinate sentence—so an eight-year uplift on the minimum term approximated a larger determinate uplift. The Court nevertheless found no arguable excess.
  • Aggravation driving the uplift: significant planning/premeditation (including earlier aborted attempts), multiple participants and vehicles, burner phones, false plates, secure communications, intelligence gathering on the deceased’s movements, and post-offence clean-up/destroyed evidence.
  • Wider harm: bystanders struck by bullets; trauma to those present; fear inhibiting witness participation.
  • Criminal context and record: wholesale drug supply and firearms availability formed relevant context; antecedents suggested dangerous criminality.
  • Mitigation given limited weight: prison conduct, family circumstances and age (mid-40s) were acknowledged but could not materially shift the overall sentence; arguments that it was akin to a whole life term were rejected as logically unsustainable.

C. Impact

Although fact-specific, the decision provides practical guidance on when a prior conviction for perverting the course of justice may be admitted in a later serious trial: where the defendant’s own evidence moves beyond disputing accuracy into alleging deliberate manipulation or misconduct by investigators/prosecutors (or by implicating another person), gateway (g) may be engaged. The Court also signals strong appellate deference to the trial judge’s evaluation of how the defendant presented those allegations to the jury.

The case further illustrates a disciplined approach to safeguarding fairness: admission can be justified yet tightly controlled by (i) restricting the evidence to the minimum necessary, and (ii) clear, tailored jury directions preventing propensity reasoning.

On sentencing, the judgment reinforces that in exceptionally planned and sophisticated firearms murders involving multiple participants and bystander harm, a substantial uplift from the starting point may be sustainable—particularly where the judge demonstrably avoids double counting and reflects totality across concurrent serious offences.

4) Complex Concepts Simplified

  • “Bad character” evidence: evidence of misconduct (including prior convictions) used for limited legally permitted purposes, not simply to show the defendant is a “bad person”.
  • Section 101 gateways (CJA 2003): statutory “routes” by which bad character becomes admissible. In this case, the focus was:
    • (g): the defendant has attacked another person’s character (here, by alleging deliberate manipulation/withholding of evidence and later implicating an associate).
    • (f): to correct a false impression given by the defendant (used here in connection with claimed ignorance of process/blaming lawyers, given prior trial experience).
    • (d): important explanatory evidence (accepted as available on the facts, though (g) was central).
  • Section 101(3) exclusion: even if a gateway applies, the judge must exclude bad character evidence if admitting it would have such an adverse effect on fairness that it ought not be admitted.
  • Minimum term for murder: the period that must be served before the Parole Board can consider release; it is not a fixed release date.
  • Totality and double counting: sentencing must reflect the overall criminality across multiple offences without punishing the same feature twice (e.g., “use of a firearm” both within the murder tariff and again as a separate aggravating factor).

5) Conclusion

[2026] EWCA Crim 1051 is a clear example of the Court of Appeal upholding a carefully calibrated trial ruling on bad character evidence. Where a defendant, in evidence, advances allegations amounting to misconduct by investigators/prosecutors (and/or attacks or implicates others), a prior conviction for perverting the course of justice may properly be admitted under the statutory gateways—provided the judge tightly limits scope and directs the jury with precision. The decision also affirms that, for a heavily premeditated, sophisticated firearms murder with wider public harm, a substantial minimum-term uplift from the starting point will not be interfered with absent a real indication of manifest excess or structural error.