Asylum Credibility Assessments Must Contain Clear Findings on Core Risk Issues: Global Credibility Is Not a Substitute for Determinations on the “Indicia of Risk”

1. Introduction

AM & Anor v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2026] EWCA Civ 159 is a Court of Appeal judgment concerning the adequacy of reasoning in protection appeals where credibility is disputed. The appellants, AM (an Iraqi Kurdish woman) and her daughter FM, claimed asylum on the basis of a risk of honour-based violence from AM’s maternal cousin (A), allegedly connected to the Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP).

The First-tier Tribunal (FTT) dismissed the appeal largely through adverse credibility reasoning. The Upper Tribunal (UT) upheld the FTT. The Court of Appeal allowed AM and FM’s appeal on two grounds: (1) the FTT failed to make intelligible findings on the core “pre-flight” events said to generate the risk on return, and (2) the FTT failed to explain what it made of the evidence of AM’s husband (D), a key witness to those events.

The case is significant because it clarifies, in practical terms, what “global credibility” requires in asylum adjudication: an overall credibility conclusion cannot lawfully “float free” from findings on the determinative factual building blocks of risk.

2. Summary of the Judgment

The Court of Appeal (Cobb LJ, with Elisabeth Laing LJ and another concurring) held that the FTT’s determination contained a material error of law. Although the FTT judge addressed various alleged inconsistencies and purported credibility problems, the reasoning did not enable a reader to identify:

  • which key elements of AM’s account were accepted or rejected (including the alleged threats and armed incident), and
  • how any adverse view on peripheral or post-flight matters translated into rejection of the core risk narrative to the applicable low standard of proof.

The Court also found the FTT’s treatment of D’s evidence to be inadequate: given his first-hand evidence about events in Iraq, the determination did not reveal what weight (if any) was attached to it on the central issues.

The appeal was allowed and the case was remitted to the FTT for a rehearing before a different tribunal.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited

SB (Sri Lanka) v SSHD [2019] EWCA Civ 160

The Court relied on SB (Sri Lanka) v SSHD [2019] EWCA Civ 160 for two connected propositions. First, on a second appeal, the Court of Appeal’s practical task is to examine whether the UT was right to conclude there was no material error of law in the FTT’s decision; if the FTT erred materially, the UT necessarily erred in dismissing the appeal (see the Court’s summary at paragraph 25(i)). Second, SB was cited (at paragraph 28) for the principle that it is not inherently wrong for a tribunal to use conclusions on matters that may be “remote” from the indicia of risk (for example, documentation issues) when assessing credibility overall.

Importantly, the Court used SB to draw a boundary: tribunals may take peripheral matters into account, but they must still articulate what they decide on the determinative risk facts, and why.

MAH (Egypt) v SSHD [2023] EWCA Civ 216

MAH (Egypt) v SSHD [2023] EWCA Civ 216 was cited as authority for the restraint appellate courts show before interfering with FTT findings of fact, and for the asylum standard of proof: a claimant need show only a “reasonable degree of likelihood” of persecution (paragraph 25(ii) and (iv)). The Court of Appeal’s critique in AM is framed through this lens: where the standard is low, unclear findings on central allegations are especially problematic because the accepted elements (if any) might already meet the threshold.

JT (Cameroon) v SSHD [2009] 1 WLR 141; MA (Somalia) v SSHD [2010] UKSC 49

These authorities were cited for the orthodox proposition that credibility is a global assessment, taken “in the round,” and must include all material considerations (paragraph 25(iii)). The Court did not treat “global” credibility as a licence to avoid core findings. Rather, JT (Cameroon) and MA (Somalia) supply the methodological requirement that all relevant evidence be evaluated cohesively—something the FTT failed to demonstrate because it did not connect credibility concerns to determinations on the crucial risk narrative.

SSHD v TC [2023] UKUT 164 (IAC)

SSHD v TC [2023] UKUT 164 (IAC) provided the central procedural and reasoning framework applied in the “Discussion” section. The Court adopted TC as guidance that the FTT must:

  • identify the “principal important controversial issues,”
  • marshal the evidence relevant to them, and
  • give intelligible reasons for accepting or rejecting determinative evidence (paragraph 26).

The Court held that the “important controversial issue” was risk of honour-based violence on return, which required findings on the key pre-flight elements summarised at paragraph 6 of the judgment (paragraphs 27–30). The FTT’s repeated conditional language (“should I accept…”, “if I accept…”, “if the essential facts were accepted…”) exemplified the failure to make those findings.

Volpi v Volpi [2022] EWCA Civ 464; [2022] 4 WLR 48

The Court cited Volpi v Volpi [2022] EWCA Civ 464 for the proposition that judges are not obliged to refer to every piece of evidence. However, it distinguished the present situation: where a witness (D) gives first-hand evidence on central disputed facts, sparse and equivocal reference can render the reasoning unintelligible (paragraph 32). In other words, Volpi does not protect an absence of reasoning on evidence that is central to the dispositive issue.

3.2 Legal Reasoning

(a) Global credibility must be tethered to core factual findings

The Court accepted that credibility can properly be assessed by looking at the whole picture, including “post-flight” matters (e.g. travel route, documents), and that such matters may sometimes undermine a claimant’s account of risk on return (paragraph 28). The legal error was not “taking peripheral matters into account,” but failing to convert the credibility assessment into clear findings on the risk-generating events.

The Court’s core criticism is the missing link in the reasoning chain: the FTT acknowledged (explicitly or implicitly) that some parts of AM’s narrative might be true, yet it did not say which parts, nor explain why—if any of the central allegations were accepted to the low standard—the claim still failed (paragraphs 29–30).

(b) The tribunal must identify what it accepts and rejects on “indicia of risk”

The Court identified the determinative allegations requiring findings: the alleged arranged marriage, A’s return and threats, the armed incident, police inaction due to KDP links, and related matters (paragraph 20 and paragraph 27). The FTT’s reasoning left the “well-informed reader” unable to tell what was decided on these matters (paragraph 30). That lack of intelligibility constituted an error of law because it prevented meaningful understanding and appellate supervision of whether the legal test (“reasonable degree of likelihood” of persecution) had been applied.

(c) Counsel’s “credibility only” framing does not relieve the judge of responsibility

A particularly important practical point is at paragraph 31. The Court noted the hearing transcript indicated both advocates agreed “credibility” was the only issue. The Court held this was “not helpful,” but emphasized that the ultimate responsibility remains with the judge to identify the issues correctly, marshal the evidence, and make findings on the crucial matters.

The Court even suggested a best practice: the judge should test a “credibility-only” characterisation by asking counsel to identify the factual findings to which credibility most critically relates, and then address those findings in the written decision (paragraph 31).

(d) Treatment of corroborative/other witness evidence must be intelligible on the central issues

Ground 2 succeeded because the determination gave no clear account of what the FTT made of D’s evidence on the events in Iraq. The only notable reference to D concerned identity documents (“to some extent” not supporting AM), which did not resolve what was decided about D’s evidence on threats, violence, police response, or political protection (paragraph 32). The error was not “failing to mention every detail,” but failing to show whether and how a central witness’s evidence was weighed on the determinative issues.

3.3 Impact

(a) Reasoned findings on core risk facts will be harder to avoid in asylum determinations

This judgment reinforces that a protection appeal cannot lawfully be disposed of by a generalised credibility conclusion where the decision does not reveal findings on the factual components that generate (or negate) risk on return. Tribunals must show, in a way the reader can follow, whether key allegations are accepted to the low standard and how that maps onto the risk test.

(b) “Peripheral” credibility points must be connected to dispositive risk reasoning

The Court did not prohibit reliance on post-flight matters (such as documentation or travel route) but it required that, where such matters are used, the reasoning must still disclose what happens to the pre-flight allegations. This is likely to increase scrutiny of determinations that:

  • catalogue inconsistencies but never state what is found to have happened, or
  • use formulaic phrases (“taking everything in the round”) without articulating the key accepted/rejected propositions.

(c) More disciplined treatment of supporting witnesses

The decision is also a reminder that in asylum cases the evidence of spouses/partners or other first-hand witnesses is often central. While no rule demands corroboration, a tribunal must show what it made of such evidence where it bears directly on the dispositive facts.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • “Reasonable degree of likelihood”: the lower standard of proof in asylum cases. The claimant does not need to prove events “more likely than not,” only that there is a real possibility they occurred and that persecution is a real possibility on return.
  • “Global credibility assessment”: the tribunal evaluates credibility by looking at all relevant factors together (internal consistency, plausibility, documents, conduct, other witnesses). But it still must state what it finds on the key facts that determine risk.
  • “Indicia of risk”: the main factual indicators that someone will face harm if returned (here: the alleged threats, violence, political connections, police response).
  • s.8 of the Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants etc) Act 2004: a provision requiring decision-makers to consider certain behaviours (e.g. delay in claiming asylum, travel through safe countries) as potentially damaging credibility. It does not automatically defeat a claim; it is a factor in the overall assessment.
  • “Material error of law”: a legal mistake significant enough to affect the outcome or render the decision unsafe—such as inadequate reasoning preventing understanding of why the claim failed.
  • “Remittal”: sending the case back to be reheard. Here, the Court ordered a new hearing before a differently constituted FTT.

5. Conclusion

AM & Anor v SSHD [2026] EWCA Civ 159 stands as a clear appellate warning against asylum decisions that treat “global credibility” as an endpoint rather than a method. The new practical rule is that tribunals must make, and clearly express, findings on the core risk-generating facts and must explain how any credibility concerns (including post-flight matters) lead to the conclusion that risk is not shown even to the low asylum standard.

The judgment also underscores that where a key witness provides first-hand evidence on the central allegations, the tribunal must make its evaluative treatment of that evidence intelligible. The result is a firmer requirement for structured reasoning in protection claims: identify the real controversial issues, marshal the evidence, decide what happened (to the relevant standard), and explain why that does or does not establish a well-founded fear of persecution.