Appeal “Brought” on Delivery of Appellant’s Notice Despite Non‑Payment of Fee (External Statutory Appeals)
1) Introduction
This appeal concerned the technical—but practically critical—question of when a statutory appeal is “brought” for the purpose of a rigid statutory time limit.
Dr Amy Eskander, a Specialist Registrar in Neurology, sought to appeal a Medical Practitioners Tribunal (“Tribunal”) decision suspending her registration for 12 months.
Under s.40(4) of the Medical Act 1983, she had 28 days from deemed service of notification to appeal to the High Court.
On the final day (23 September 2025) Dr Eskander emailed her appellant’s notice and supporting documents to the Administrative Court Office (“ACO”),
but did not pay the fee until 17 October 2025. The General Medical Council (“GMC”) applied to strike out her appeal as out of time.
Mansfield J struck it out on paper, holding the appeal was not brought within 28 days because the fee did not accompany the notice and time should not be extended.
While Dr Eskander’s permission application was pending, the Court of Appeal decided Siniakovich v Hassan-Soudey [2026] EWCA Civ 215,
holding (for limitation purposes) that an action is “brought” when the claim form is delivered to the court office even if the correct fee was not paid.
Dr Eskander amended her grounds to argue the same logic applied to her statutory appeal—so it was in time from the moment of delivery by email.
Core issues:
- Was the appeal “brought” within the 28-day statutory period despite no fee being paid when the appellant’s notice was delivered?
- If not, could time be extended (notwithstanding no express statutory/CPR power) to avoid breach of Article 6 ECHR?
- Should fresh evidence (communications with counsel) be admitted on the appeal from Mansfield J’s strike-out order?
Key procedural timeline
| Date | Event | Significance |
|---|
| 26 Aug 2025 |
Notification deemed served |
28-day appeal clock starts (Medical Act 1983, s.40(4)) |
| 23 Sep 2025 |
Dr Eskander emails appellant’s notice + documents to ACO |
Last day for appealing; no fee paid |
| 14 Oct 2025 |
ACO requests fee (£294) and correction |
Fee issue crystallises |
| 17 Oct 2025 |
Fee paid at court counter |
Fee paid after 28 days |
| 21 Oct 2025 |
Appellant’s notice sealed; “Date filed” shown as 23 Sep 2025 |
Issued after fee; evidences court-office filing date |
| 14 Nov 2025 |
Mansfield J strikes out as out of time; refuses extension |
Appeal terminated at first instance |
| 31 Mar 2026 |
Court of Appeal allows appeal |
Appeal held brought in time (applying Siniakovich) |
2) Summary of the Judgment
The Court of Appeal allowed Dr Eskander’s appeal, holding that her statutory appeal was brought in time when she
delivered (emailed) the appellant’s notice to the ACO on 23 September 2025, even though she paid no fee until later.
The court treated Siniakovich v Hassan-Soudey [2026] EWCA Civ 215 as controlling by analogy: “brought” turns on delivery of the originating process to the court office,
not on whether the fee condition for issue was met by the deadline.
The court rejected three suggested distinctions:
(i) underpayment vs non-payment; (ii) limitation “action” vs statutory “appeal”; and (iii) email filing where a fee is payable.
It also admitted fresh evidence under Ladd v Marshall [1954] 1 WLR 1489, and stated (obiter, given its ruling on timeliness) that if the appeal had been out of time,
it would have extended time to avoid impairment of Article 6 access to an appeal.
Outcome: Mansfield J’s strike-out order was overturned; Dr Eskander’s statutory appeal was reinstated to proceed in the High Court.
It was common ground that her suspension ceased to have effect pending determination of the statutory appeal.
3) Analysis
A. Precedents Cited (and their influence)
1) Siniakovich v Hassan-Soudey [2026] EWCA Civ 215 (decisive)
Siniakovich held that, for the Limitation Act 1980, an action is “brought” when the claim form is first delivered to the court office,
even if the court legitimately refuses to issue it because the correct fee was not paid.
Andrews LJ’s reasoning stressed: (a) a bright-line rule; (b) focus on what the litigant did (delivery), not mental state; and
(c) fee payment is a purely administrative act not affecting the substantive claim, while administrative delays should not arbitrarily decide time-bar outcomes.
In Eskander, the Court of Appeal treated those principles as applying to an “external” statutory appeal commenced by appellant’s notice:
the statutory word “brought” (used in Schedule 4 and conceptually aligned to s.40) is satisfied by delivery of the initiating document to the court office.
2) Gupta v GMC [2020] EWHC 38 (Admin) and Rakoczy v GMC [2022] EWHC 890 (Admin) (explained, then overtaken)
Mansfield J relied on Gupta (Julian Knowles J) and Rakoczy (Fordham J) for the proposition that an appellant’s notice must be accompanied by the fee
(Practice Direction 52B para 4.1), and that failure to do so means the statutory appeal is not brought in time.
The Court of Appeal considered Mansfield J “plainly right” to follow those authorities as the law then stood.
However, Siniakovich supplied a higher authority analysis of “brought” that the court held could not logically be confined to limitation claims,
and therefore displaced the earlier approach in this specific respect.
3) Article 6 access / out-of-time appeals: Tolstoy Miloslavsky v United Kingdom (1995) 20 EHRR 442, Pomiechowski v District Court of Legnica, Poland [2012] UKSC 20, Adesina v Nursing and Midwifery Council [2013] EWCA Civ 818, Stuewe v Health and Care Professions Council [2022] EWCA Civ 1605 (obiter “safety net”)
Although unnecessary to the final outcome (because the appeal was held in time), the court addressed the established line that, despite
fixed statutory appeal periods and no general CPR power to extend, a court must read such limits compatibly with Article 6 ECHR in
“exceptional circumstances” to preserve effective access to an appeal (Pomiechowski, applied to professional discipline in Adesina;
and Fordham J’s synthesis approved in Stuewe).
On the fresh evidence, the court would have held Dr Eskander did all she reasonably could (in reliance on direct access counsel),
so refusal to extend would have impaired the essence of the Article 6 right of access to the appellate process.
Applying CPR r 52.21(2)(b), the court admitted fresh evidence (emails with counsel and narrative account), guided by the Ladd v Marshall criteria
(availability with reasonable diligence; importance; apparent credibility), as reaffirmed in Terluk v Berezovsky.
The court found the evidence apparently credible and important to the (alternative) time-extension analysis, and that reasonable diligence
did not require a litigant-in-person to anticipate the need to waive privilege and “turn on” counsel before Mansfield J.
The court distinguished cases applying the general rule that a party is bound by their lawyers’ conduct (Gopakumar), identifying its agency rationale
and explaining why it was inapt where the barrister was not conducting litigation and the appellant was acting in person.
The terminology “surrogacy principle” was traced to FP (Iran), with a note of its different usage in Horvath.
6) Other cited authorities (contextual)
B. Legal Reasoning (how the court reached its decision)
1) The new rule: “brought” turns on delivery of the originating process
The court’s central move was interpretive: the meaning of “brought” in a statutory time-bar is not dictated by procedural requirements
for issue (e.g., payment of fees) but by the litigant’s act of delivering the initiating document to the court office.
Applying Siniakovich, the court held:
- There must be a bright-line test.
- The test cannot sensibly depend on partial compliance (e.g., paying “something” vs “nothing”), because that would introduce arbitrary threshold disputes and invite inquiries into intention.
- Fee-payment rules are important to process and case-management, but they are ancillary to the statutory act of “bringing” proceedings.
2) Underpayment vs non-payment: no defensible middle category
The GMC relied on Siniakovich having left open the scenario where no fee is paid at all. The court nonetheless rejected
non-payment as a meaningful distinction. If “brought” is satisfied by delivery even where the required fee was underpaid,
it cannot logically switch to a different meaning when the shortfall is 100%.
3) Limitation “action” vs Medical Act “appeal”: consistency across statutory time-bars
The GMC argued statutory appeal schemes should be construed independently, particularly given Schedule 4 paragraph 10’s machinery for when sanctions take effect.
The court accepted a potential lacuna if an appellant delivers a notice but never pays, so the appeal is never issued and never “withdrawn” or “dismissed”.
However, it concluded that:
- Schedule 4 itself uses “brought”, aligning the scheme with the concept in limitation statutes.
- Divergent meanings of “brought” across numerous statutory appeals would be “a recipe for chaos”.
- The statutory aim (a defined period to initiate court proceedings) is common to limitation and statutory appeal contexts.
4) Email filing and PD 5B: acceptance vs refusal
The GMC argued Practice Direction 5B para 2.2 barred emailing documents where a fee is payable.
The court held PD 5B para 2.4 makes refusal discretionary, and on the facts the ACO did not refuse;
instead it engaged with the filing, requested corrections, requested the fee, and ultimately sealed the notice.
It was therefore “too late” to rely on an argument that the court could have rejected the emailed notice.
5) Managing abuse and the “lacuna” (guidance, not a final ruling)
The court accepted the public-interest concern: a practitioner should not be able to delay an erasure/suspension indefinitely by delivering a notice and never paying.
While not deciding the point, it suggested a pragmatic route: the court can require payment within a stated time and, if not paid,
treat the appellant as not proceeding—potentially treating the appeal as withdrawn—allowing Schedule 4 paragraph 10 to operate.
C. Impact (why this matters)
1) Immediate procedural impact in statutory professional discipline appeals
- Doctors’ statutory appeals: Under the Medical Act 1983, delivering an appellant’s notice to the court office within 28 days can satisfy the time limit even if the fee is paid later (and, on this decision, even if no fee was paid by the deadline), provided the notice is not rejected.
- Recalibration of prior “fee-with-notice” timeliness objections: Arguments grounded solely on PD 52B para 4.1 (fee must accompany) are less likely to succeed as “time-bar” points, though they remain relevant to issuance, acceptance, and sanctions/case-management.
2) Wider significance beyond the Medical Act
The reasoning is framed broadly: where a statute imposes a hard deadline to “bring” proceedings and the originating process is delivered within time,
the proceedings may be “brought” notwithstanding fee non-payment. This invites reliance in other “external” statutory appeals commenced by a notice.
3) Administrative court practice pressures
The decision increases the importance of court-office choices under PD 5B para 2.4 (whether to refuse acceptance) and of prompt case-management directions
where fees are unpaid, to avoid uncertainty about the status and regulatory consequences of “pending” appeals.
4) Article 6 remains a backstop—but is no longer the only route
Before Siniakovich/Eskander, appellants commonly had to argue for the narrow Article 6 “exceptional circumstances” extension.
Post-Eskander, some cases may be resolved more cleanly at the threshold: the appeal was in time because it was “brought” on delivery.
4) Complex Concepts Simplified
- “Brought” (proceedings): A statutory concept indicating when a party has initiated court proceedings for time-limit purposes. Here, it means delivery of the initiating document to the court office.
- Filed vs issued/sealed: “Filed” refers to delivery/receipt by the court office; “issued” (often evidenced by sealing) is the court’s formal administrative step. Time-limits may attach to “bringing”/filing, not the later administrative issuance.
- External vs internal appeal: An “external” appeal starts new proceedings (appellant’s notice is the initiating process). An “internal” appeal is within existing proceedings. The court left open how far the reasoning applies to internal appeals.
- Practice Directions (PDs): Procedural rules/guidance (e.g., PD 52B, PD 5B). They govern orderly conduct of litigation but do not necessarily dictate the statutory meaning of “brought” for time-bar purposes.
- Article 6 ECHR access to a court: Guarantees effective access to judicial determination of civil rights. Strict time limits are permitted, but not if they impair the essence of the right in the individual case without proportionality.
- Ladd v Marshall fresh evidence test: A structured approach for admitting new evidence on appeal: (i) not reasonably anticipated/obtainable with reasonable diligence; (ii) important influence; (iii) apparently credible.
- “Surrogacy principle”: The idea that a litigant is generally bound by their lawyers’ conduct. The court treated it as rooted in agency and less apt where the adviser is not conducting litigation and the party is effectively acting in person.
5) Conclusion
Eskander v General Medical Council establishes (for external statutory appeals) that an appeal is “brought” within a statutory time limit
when the appellant’s notice is delivered to the court office within time, even if the prescribed fee was not paid by the deadline,
provided the court does not reject the filing and later issues it. The court’s reasoning extends the bright-line, delivery-based approach in
Siniakovich v Hassan-Soudey [2026] EWCA Civ 215 from limitation “actions” to statutory professional discipline appeals.
The judgment also signals practical responses to the resulting “lacuna” risk (non-payment leading to a never-issued, never-dismissed appeal),
and preserves (as an alternative route) the narrow Article 6 jurisdiction to extend rigid statutory deadlines where refusing would impair the essence of access to an appeal.