Introduction
This decision concerns the minimum terms imposed on two young offenders convicted of murdering a 16-year-old victim during a public pursuit involving dangerous driving and a knife attack. The first appellant was 19 at the time of the offence. The third appellant was 16 and was therefore sentenced as a child.
The principal issues were whether the sentencing judge had given sufficient weight to youth, lack of premeditation, absence of an intention to kill, personal vulnerability and the offenders’ limited relevant records; and whether the different statutory starting points for adult and child offenders had produced an unjustifiable disparity.
A second appellant’s sentence appeal became academic because his conviction was quashed in the related conviction appeal, reported at [2025] EWCA Crim 1418.
Summary of the Judgment
The sentences
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The first appellant received mandatory custody for life. His minimum term was fixed at 24 years before deduction of time spent on remand, resulting in a term of 23 years and 142 days.
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The third appellant was ordered to be detained during Her Majesty’s pleasure. His minimum term was fixed at 18 years before custody credit, resulting in a term of 17 years and 113 days.
The Court of Appeal’s decision
The Court of Appeal dismissed both sentence appeals. Although the minimum terms were “tough”, they were neither wrong in principle nor manifestly excessive.
The trial judge had properly considered all relevant aggravating and mitigating circumstances. He had also avoided mechanically applying the markedly different statutory starting points of 25 years for the adult offender and 12 years for the child offender.
The judgment confirms that youth must be assessed as a continuum rather than by treating the eighteenth birthday as a sharp dividing line. Nevertheless, youth and vulnerability do not displace the seriousness of the offence, the offender’s individual role or the need to avoid an unjustifiable disparity between co-offenders.
Factual and Sentencing Context
The first appellant
The first appellant joined a group pursuit, obtained the long-bladed knife from the younger appellant, chased down the victim and stabbed him several times in a residential street. The sentencing judge found an intention to cause really serious harm, but not an intention to kill. The wounds had been delivered with moderate rather than severe force and were not directed at the heart or neck.
His statutory starting point was treated as 25 years because the knife used in the murder had been taken to the scene. Although no statutory aggravating factor was found, the attack’s public nature, duration, associated dangerous driving and impact on residents were serious non-statutory aggravating features.
Mitigation included his age, the absence of premeditation, the lack of an intention to kill and the absence of previous convictions for violence.
The third appellant
The third appellant had signalled the start of the attack, brandished the knife, struck a vehicle with it, led the pursuit on foot and then handed the weapon to the first appellant knowing how it was intended to be used. He did not intend that anyone should die, but his participation was substantial.
His statutory starting point was 12 years because he was under 18 when the murder was committed. The judge nevertheless found grave aggravating features justifying a substantial upward movement.
His mitigation was considerable. Reports described childhood trauma, bereavement, domestic violence, developmental and emotional immaturity, possible Autistic Spectrum Disorder, vulnerability to exploitation by older males and misplaced loyalty to older associates. The offence was spontaneous rather than planned, and he had no relevant previous convictions.
Legal Framework
Mandatory sentences for murder
Under section 322 of the Sentencing Act 2020, an offender aged 18 to 20 convicted of murder must receive custody for life. An offender who was under 18 when the murder was committed must be detained at His Majesty’s pleasure. In each case, the court must specify a minimum term before the offender may be considered for release by the Parole Board.
Completion of the minimum term does not produce automatic release. It only permits the Parole Board to consider whether continued detention remains necessary for public protection.
Schedule 21 starting points
At the relevant time, paragraph 4 of Schedule 21 prescribed a normal starting point of 25 years for an adult offender who took a knife or other weapon to the scene intending to commit an offence or have it available as a weapon, and then used it in the murder.
For an offender under 18, the applicable starting point under the then paragraph 6 was 12 years. The newer age-banded provisions in paragraph 5A did not apply because the appellants were convicted before 28 June 2022.
A starting point is not the final minimum term. The court must move upwards or downwards after evaluating aggravation, mitigation, culpability, age, maturity and the offender’s role.
Precedents Cited
Attorney General's Reference (Clarke) [2018] EWCA Crim 185; [2018] 1 Cr App R (S) 52
This authority establishes that turning 18 is not a sentencing “cliff edge”. Maturity continues to develop beyond the eighteenth birthday, at different rates for different individuals. The first appellant relied on this principle to argue that, at 19, his age should have produced a greater reduction from the 25-year starting point.
The Court of Appeal accepted the relevance of the principle but found that the trial judge had already applied it. The authority does not require a particular numerical discount and does not prevent a severe minimum term where the offence and the offender’s role justify it.
This case similarly rejects any sudden acceleration in sentence merely because an offender has crossed an age threshold. Sentencing should reflect a continuum of age and maturity, rather than a mathematical application of Schedule 21.
The Court treated this principle as part of the governing framework, but it did not support the proposition that youth must outweigh all other factors. The sentencing judge had expressly guarded against a steep escalation following the first appellant’s eighteenth birthday.
This was the central authority on disparity. It addresses the “acute problem” arising where co-offenders convicted of the same murder fall on opposite sides of the age of 18 and therefore attract substantially different statutory starting points.
It requires the sentencing court to move from each statutory starting point to outcomes in which any remaining difference is no more than a fair reflection of age and other legitimate distinctions.
In the present case, the trial judge did not preserve the mechanical 13-year gap between the 25-year and 12-year starting points. He fixed minimum terms of 24 and 18 years before custody credit. The remaining six-year difference reflected age, maturity, personal circumstances and the fact that the adult offender inflicted the fatal wounds.
Analysis of the Court’s Reasoning
1. Sentencing remained an individualised exercise
The Court examined each appellant’s conduct separately. The first appellant was the principal offender because he used the knife and caused the fatal injury. The younger appellant did not inflict the wounds, but his conduct was integral: he initiated aspects of the confrontation, carried the weapon during the pursuit and deliberately supplied it for the attack.
2. Absence of an intention to kill did not make the murder less serious in an absolute sense
Both offenders intended really serious harm, which is sufficient for murder. The absence of an intention to kill was mitigating, but it did not neutralise the sustained and highly dangerous group violence or the deliberate use of a long-bladed knife.
3. Youth required weight, not a predetermined discount
The Court rejected the suggestion that being 19 necessarily required a larger numerical reduction. Age and maturity are important but must be considered alongside role, culpability and harm. The one-year movement below the adult starting point was significant because aggravating circumstances could otherwise have justified a term above 25 years.
For the child offender, vulnerability, exploitation and developmental immaturity carried substantial weight. They did not, however, erase his active and knowing participation. The judge was entitled to move substantially above the 12-year starting point.
4. Disparity did not require equal sentences
The principle against unjustifiable disparity seeks consistent and rational sentencing, not parity between offenders whose ages, roles and personal circumstances differ. The six-year distinction was justified by the adult offender’s direct commission of the stabbing and the younger offender’s enhanced mitigation.
5. The appellate threshold was not met
The Court was not deciding what minimum terms it might have imposed at first instance. Its task was to determine whether the judge’s conclusions were legally wrong or outside the permissible range. Because the judge had correctly identified the starting points, considered the relevant evidence and balanced aggravation against mitigation, the sentences could not be overturned merely because they were severe.
Complex Concepts Simplified
- Minimum term
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The period that must be served before an offender may apply to the Parole Board for release. It is not a guaranteed release date.
- Custody for life
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The mandatory life sentence applicable here to an offender aged between 18 and 20 convicted of murder.
- Detention at His Majesty’s pleasure
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The indeterminate sentence imposed for murder committed by a person under 18.
- Starting point
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The initial benchmark under Schedule 21. It is adjusted to reflect aggravating and mitigating circumstances.
- Manifestly excessive
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A sentence so severe that it falls outside the range reasonably available to the sentencing judge. It is not enough that another judge might have imposed a lower term.
- Unjustifiable disparity
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An irrational or unfair difference between co-offenders’ sentences. Different terms remain proper where they reflect age, role, culpability or mitigation.
- Non-statutory aggravating factor
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A circumstance increasing seriousness even though it is not specifically listed in the governing statute.
- Intent to cause really serious harm
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An intention sufficient for murder in English law, even where the offender did not intend to kill.
Impact
The judgment consolidates three important sentencing principles:
- Youth extends beyond a rigid chronological boundary and must be assessed by reference to maturity as well as age.
- There is no automatic or mathematical age-based reduction from a Schedule 21 starting point.
- When adult and child co-offenders are sentenced for the same murder, courts must moderate the statutory starting-point disparity without ignoring differences in role and personal mitigation.
Future sentencing courts are likely to rely on the decision where young co-offenders straddle the age of 18. It also demonstrates that adverse childhood experiences, exploitation and immaturity can carry substantial mitigating force while still being outweighed by active participation in grave violence.
The decision further reinforces the limited nature of appellate intervention. A carefully reasoned minimum term will not be disturbed simply because it is at the severe end of the permissible range.
Conclusion
R v Cashin and Others confirms that sentencing for murder must combine statutory structure with individual assessment. The eighteenth birthday is not a cliff edge, but neither youth nor vulnerability produces an automatic discount. Serious participation, weapon use and public danger may justify substantial minimum terms.
The governing principle is proportional differentiation: co-offenders should not receive mechanically divergent sentences because they fall on opposite sides of an age threshold, yet their sentences need not be equal where age, maturity, mitigation and role legitimately differ. On that basis, the minimum terms of 24 and 18 years before custody credit were upheld.