Legacy Inquests, “Public Record” Rationales, and Stays Pending Legislative Reform:
Commentary on Soldiers A & C, Application for Judicial Review [2025] NICA 64

1. Introduction

This Court of Appeal decision sits at the intersection of legacy justice, coronial law, and judicial review procedure in Northern Ireland. It arises from an attempt by two former soldiers (“Soldiers A & C”) to challenge a decision of the Attorney General for Northern Ireland (“AGNI”) to direct a fresh inquest into the shooting of Joseph McCann in Belfast in April 1972, and to challenge a stay imposed on their judicial review proceedings.

The judgment does not resolve the substantive lawfulness of the Attorney General’s decision. Instead, it does two important things:

  • It expands the grounds on which leave for judicial review is granted, holding that there is an arguable case that the Attorney General’s reliance on the inquest creating a “public record” may amount to taking into account an irrelevant consideration and/or an error of fact.
  • It upholds a stay on the judicial review proceedings, deferring substantive determination until the legislative landscape – particularly proposed amendments to the Northern Ireland Troubles (Legacy and Reconciliation) Act 2023 (“the Legacy Act”) – becomes clearer.

The case is therefore significant in two respects:

  1. It signals judicial scepticism about using inquests primarily as mechanisms for creating a “public record” in the legacy context, at least where the statutory framework defines a more focused purpose (the “four questions”).
  2. It re‑affirms the high threshold for appellate interference with case‑management stays, particularly in politically live and legislatively fluid areas such as Troubles‑related investigations.

The parties were:

  • Appellants: Soldiers A & C.
  • Respondent: The Attorney General for Northern Ireland, in respect of her decision of 18 April 2024 under section 14 of the Coroners Act (Northern Ireland) 1959.

2. Summary of the Judgment

2.1 Outcome

The Court of Appeal (Keegan LCJ, Colton LJ, Fowler J) held that:

  1. Leave to apply for judicial review should be granted on an additional ground (ground (i)) relating to the Attorney General’s purpose in directing a fresh inquest – specifically, her reference to the inquest providing a “public record” of events. The court held that there is an arguable case this involved:
    • a potential error of law,
    • the taking into account of an irrelevant consideration, and/or
    • an error of fact.
  2. The appeal against the stay imposed by Humphreys J on the judicial review proceedings was dismissed. The stay remains in place at least until pending legislation (the Northern Ireland Troubles Bill) is clarified and potentially enacted.

2.2 Practical Consequences

  • Soldiers A & C now have leave on three grounds (as a result of earlier and current rulings), one of which is newly restored by the Court of Appeal: the “public record” rationale.
  • However, no substantive hearing on the merits will occur until the stay is lifted, which is tied to the outcome of ongoing legislative changes relating to Troubles‑related inquests.
  • The Attorney General’s decision remains in place but is in effect in limbo, because:
    • Section 44 of the Legacy Act currently prevents new Troubles‑related inquests being held.
    • The judicial review challenging the Attorney’s decision is stayed.

3. Factual and Legal Background

3.1 The 1972 Killing of Joseph McCann

Joseph McCann, believed to be a prominent member of the Official IRA, was shot dead on 15 April 1972 during civil disorder in Belfast near the Markets area. A vehicle checkpoint was in place. A police officer sought the assistance of soldiers in arresting McCann, who was wanted on suspicion of terrorist offences. After an encounter between McCann and the officer, it is alleged that security forces shouted at McCann to stop; when he ran, three soldiers (A, B, and C) fired shots, resulting in his death.

Key factual points from the judgment:

  • Three soldiers fired: A, B and C.
  • The criminal proceedings recorded that A and C each fired one shot, while Soldier B likely fired “the balance” (i.e. most) of the shots.
  • Soldier B has since died.

3.2 Earlier Proceedings: Criminal Trial and First Inquest

Original inquest: An inquest into McCann’s death took place in 1973 and reported. Details of that inquest matter because they ground allegations of error of fact in the Attorney General’s later decision.

Criminal trial: Soldiers A & C were prosecuted for murder and acquitted. In that trial:

  • Statements made by the soldiers at the time of the incident were ruled inadmissible, which was central to the acquittals.
  • The trial judge, O’Hara J, in R v A, C [2021] NICC 3, criticised the contemporaneous process by which these statements had been taken.

3.3 Attorney General’s Section 14 Referral for a Fresh Inquest

On 18 April 2024, the Attorney General directed a fresh inquest into McCann’s death under section 14(1) of the Coroners Act (Northern Ireland) 1959. Section 14 gives the Attorney a broad discretion to direct an inquest:

“…when she considers it advisable.”

Before making the direction, she received and considered submissions from all interested parties, including the soldiers and the next of kin.

3.4 The Legacy Act and the Prohibition on New Troubles‑Related Inquests

The political and legislative background is crucial. Section 44 of the Northern Ireland Troubles (Legacy and Reconciliation) Act 2023 provides that no new inquest may be held into Troubles‑related deaths. As the Court put it:

“As the law currently stands, no inquest will take place unless or until section 44 is amended or repealed.” [5]

More specifically, the case concerns a new section 16A of the 1959 Coroners Act, inserted by section 44 of the Legacy Act. Because the McCann inquest had not been allocated to a coroner by 1 May 2024, it is caught by this provision (described as “putative” in the judgment). The consequence is that:

“…as the law currently then stood there could be no fresh inquest into the death of Mr McCann.” [17]

Thus, the Attorney General’s direction in principle calls for an inquest, but in practice the Legacy Act prevents that inquest from proceeding.

3.5 The Northern Ireland Troubles Bill (2025) and Future Reforms

After the first‑instance judgment but before this appeal, further legislative proposals emerged:

  • The Northern Ireland Troubles Bill was published on 14 October 2025.
  • It proposes to amend the Legacy Act and to rename the Independent Commission for Reconciliation and Information Recovery.
  • Clause 84 proposes to insert a new section 16AB into the 1959 Coroners Act. If enacted:
    • The Advocate General for Northern Ireland (or delegate) would have to consider this case.
    • That office would have to decide either:
      • to convene an inquest, or
      • to direct a member of the re‑configured “Legacy Commission” to investigate instead.

This pending Bill is central to whether it is sensible or just to progress the soldiers’ judicial review now, or to await legislative clarification.

3.6 The Judicial Review Before the High Court

Soldiers A & C sought leave to judicially review the Attorney General’s decision. Their Order 53 statement was “overly prolix” [12], but the High Court judge, Humphreys J ([2025] NIKB 31), distilled it into four heads:

  1. Error of law – that the Attorney General misdirected herself as to the purpose of an inquest.
  2. Error of fact – that she failed to recognise that certain statements had been adduced at the original 1973 inquest.
  3. Inadequate reasons.
  4. Error concerning timing – that she erred by directing a new inquest just 12 days before the Legacy Act took effect in relation to Troubles‑related inquests.

Humphreys J:

  • Granted leave on ground (ii) (error of fact) and ground (iv) (timing near the Legacy Act).
  • Refused leave on ground (i) (misdirection as to purpose of inquest) and ground (iii) (inadequate reasons).
  • Imposed a stay on the proceedings, holding that there was no present utility in proceeding while the Legacy Act barred the inquest and while potential legislative changes loomed.

A later application to remove the stay was refused on 2 December 2025. That refusal, together with the earlier stay, formed part of the appeal.

4. Issues Before the Court of Appeal

Two issues arose on appeal:

  1. Renewal of Ground (i) – Purpose of the Inquest
    Should leave be granted to challenge the Attorney General’s decision on the additional ground that she erred as to the purpose of an inquest, particularly in treating it as a vehicle to create a “public record” of what occurred?
  2. Appeal Against the Stay
    Was Humphreys J wrong in principle – or plainly wrong in result – to stay the judicial review proceedings pending legislative developments, so that the appeal court should lift the stay?

5. Ground 1 – The “Public Record” Rationale and Leave for Judicial Review

5.1 The Statutory Purpose of an Inquest

The court noted that it was “common case” that the purpose of an inquest is to answer the four statutory questions in Rule 15 of the Coroners (Practice and Procedure) Rules (Northern Ireland) 1963 [10].

Although the judgment does not reproduce those questions, they are well‑known in coronial law and typically concern:

  • who the deceased was;
  • when and where the deceased died;
  • and in what manner or by what means the deceased came by his or her death.

In modern human‑rights‑compliant coronial practice (especially post‑Article 2 jurisprudence), the “how” question can often be interpreted quite broadly (“by what means and in what circumstances”), but the process nonetheless has defined statutory objectives. It is not a free‑standing exercise to publish or construct a historical narrative.

5.2 Paragraph 30 of the Attorney General’s Decision

The key passage is paragraph 30 of the Attorney General’s decision, quoted in full by the Court [11]:

“There are clearly significant issues as to the availability of material witnesses, both security force members and civilians. This is apparent from the 2021 Crown Court proceedings and the same difficulties would undoubtedly arise in any inquest that might take place. However, an inquest would not be inhibited from considering the soldiers' written statements and could potentially receive oral evidence from military and other witnesses and would thereby be able to provide a public record of what occurred. Further, the prosecution failed because the judge held that the soldiers' 1972 statements and the 2010 material were inadmissible not due to the unavailability of military and other witnesses.”

For the soldiers, the contentious element was the Attorney’s assertion that a fresh inquest would “provide a public record of what occurred”.

5.3 How the Argument Was Pleaded

The Court of Appeal criticised the Order 53 statement as “overly prolix” [12], which had hindered the first‑instance judge. Nonetheless, counsel for the soldiers, Mr Aiken KC, identified that the “public record” point had been pleaded not only as:

  • an alleged error of law about the proper purpose of an inquest,

but also as:

  • taking into account an irrelevant consideration, and
  • committing an error of fact.

Crucially, the High Court judgment had not addressed these additional dimensions (irrelevant consideration and error of fact) in its reasoning on ground (i). This omission opened the door to the Court of Appeal’s intervention.

5.4 Why “Public Record” May Be an Irrelevant Consideration

In judicial review, a public decision‑maker must exercise a statutory power for proper purposes and by reference to relevant considerations. If the Attorney General’s section 14 discretion is exercised to achieve purposes outside the statutory scope – such as primarily creating a public narrative – this is potentially unlawful.

The Court of Appeal accepted that the Attorney General could be understood as merely describing a consequence of holding an inquest (namely, that it would yield a public record). But, looking at the way the case had been pleaded across “three domains” (error of law, irrelevant consideration, error of fact), the Court held that there is an arguable alternative argument deserving leave:

“…in referring to creating a public record in her direction the AGNI arguably took into account an irrelevant consideration and also made an error of fact.” [13]

5.5 Why “Public Record” May Involve an Error of Fact

The Court also endorsed, as arguable, the contention that the Attorney General’s “public record” rationale proceeded on a mistaken factual basis, because:

“The latter argument is supported by the comprehensive decisions on this subject matter which are in the public domain.” [13]

That is, there are already extensive public judicial decisions (the 1973 inquest, O’Hara J’s 2021 criminal trial judgment, and perhaps other materials) that amount to a substantial public record of the events and the soldiers’ involvement. Treating a further inquest as needed in order to create such a record may therefore be based on a factually dubious foundation. At minimum, the Court held, that is an arguable position.

5.6 Threshold of Arguability and Leave

Importantly, the Court’s conclusion is confined to the leave stage. It does not decide whether the Attorney General’s decision is in fact unlawful. Rather, it applies the standard test: whether the applicant has shown a realistically arguable case.

The Court concluded that this threshold is met:

“Leave is therefore granted on ground (i) in favour of the argument made on behalf of Soldiers A & C as we find that the threshold of arguability is met.” [13]

It also emphasised that allowing this ground to proceed “does not cause any significant issue for the respondent,” since the question would inevitably arise in any overall assessment of how the Attorney exercised her discretion.

5.7 Significance of the Court’s Approach

The Court’s reasoning has two notable implications:

  1. It underlines the need for precision in the Attorney General’s reasons when deploying section 14 powers, especially in legacy matters. Reliance on broad notions such as “creating a public record” may be vulnerable.
  2. It confirms that mischaracterisation of the status quo – for example, under‑acknowledging existing judicial findings and public judgments – can support an error of fact challenge.

Without deciding the substantive point, the Court sends a clear signal: inquests are not to be treated as general historical commissions; they have a defined statutory function, and policy‑based or symbolic rationales must be firmly anchored to that function.

6. Ground 2 – The Stay and Appellate Deference to Case Management

6.1 Nature of the Stay

Humphreys J stayed the judicial review proceedings, after granting partial leave, on the basis that:

  • The Legacy Act currently precluded any fresh inquest into McCann’s death, so litigating the challenge to the Attorney General’s direction would have no immediate practical effect.
  • It was sensible to await legislative developments before investing substantial judicial time and resources in a potentially academic challenge.
  • The overriding objective in Order 1 rule 1A of the Rules of the Court of Judicature (NI) 1980 supported this approach.

The appellants argued that the stay was unjust: in their view, the direction of legislative change was clear and the stay served, in effect, as a shield preventing their challenge from being heard in time to affect how future mechanisms might treat their case.

6.2 The Legal Framework for Reviewing Stays

The Court of Appeal treated the stay as an exercise of the judge’s case‑management discretion. It relied on:

  • AB (Sudan) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2013] EWCA Civ – described as authority that stays are discretionary case‑management decisions, rarely reversed on appeal. (The judgment summarises rather than quotes at length.)
  • Azam v University Hospital Birmingham NHS Foundation Trust [2020] EWHC 2284 (QB), which sets out the limited grounds on which such discretionary decisions can be disturbed [14].

Drawing on Azam, the Court listed five categories where an appellate court may interfere:

  1. A misdirection in law;
  2. Some procedural unfairness or irregularity;
  3. Taking into account irrelevant matters;
  4. Failing to take into account relevant matters; or
  5. A decision that is “plainly wrong” – i.e. one that exceeds the “generous ambit within which reasonable disagreement is possible.” [14]

These categories encapsulate a traditional approach to appeals against discretionary decisions: the appellate court does not substitute its own view, but asks whether the first‑instance judge has strayed beyond the bounds of reasonable judicial discretion.

6.3 Comparative Cases: Jordan, McCord and the Illegal Migration Act Case

The Court referenced three further cases:

  • Jordan [2019] UKSC 9 and McCord (unreported, 18 January 2019) – Northern Ireland cases where stays were reversed on appeal. The Court noted that both involved arguments under the Human Rights Act 1998 [15], signifying a context where prompt judicial determination can be especially important.
  • The Illegal Migration Act 2023 case [2024] NIKB 44 – a recent instance where a stay was imposed by the Court of Appeal, with the Supreme Court later refusing the Home Secretary’s application for permission to appeal [15].

The Court stressed that each of these is “fact specific” [15], but collectively they:

  • Confirm the high bar for overturning stays;
  • Demonstrate that stays can be either imposed or lifted depending on the particular balance of justice in each context; and
  • Highlight that, even in constitutionally charged or human‑rights‑sensitive cases, appellate courts intervene only if the stay is misdirected in principle or plainly wrong in outcome.

6.4 The Court’s Application of the Principles

Several key considerations informed the Court’s conclusion that the stay should remain in place:

(a) The Existing Legal Position Under the Legacy Act

At the time Humphreys J imposed the stay:

  • The Legacy Act’s section 44 and inserted section 16A meant that no fresh inquest into McCann’s death could lawfully proceed.
  • Accordingly, even if the soldiers succeeded in their judicial review, there would be no immediate practical restoration of their position.

The judge thus concluded that there was “no utility” in progressing the substantive judicial review until it was clearer what Parliament would do [17].

(b) The Emerging Legislative Changes

When the stay was revisited, the Northern Ireland Troubles Bill had been published but not enacted. Clause 84 proposed to give the Advocate General a key role in deciding whether to convene an inquest or refer matters to the new Legacy Commission.

For the appellants:

  • Counsel argued that the direction of travel was clear, notably through:
    • the published text of the Bill; and
    • the Framework Document signed by the British and Irish governments, which they said pointed towards likely enactment.
  • They contended that a stay would allow the legislative process to operate as a shield against litigation, preventing the soldiers from obtaining a judgment in time to affect how future mechanisms might treat their case (for example, whether it would fall into the “pool” of cases for the Advocate General/Legacy Commission).

For the Attorney General:

  • It was argued that, regardless of whether a direction by AGNI survived, the next of kin could make their own referral to the new Legacy Commission under the proposed scheme [20].
  • From that perspective, the impact of the judicial review on the shape of any future investigation was uncertain or potentially limited.

The Court noted that this generated uncertainty for both sides – including for Soldiers A & C, who are elderly and “understandably anxious about further investigations” [20].

(c) Judicial Restraint in Anticipating Legislation

The Court attached weight to Humphreys J’s statement (quoted at [22]) that:

“It would be, in my opinion, quite wrong for the judiciary to assume the outcome of the parliamentary process… [I]t remains a matter for Parliament to determine whether and to what extent inquests caught by the Legacy Act may resume.”

The Court endorsed this stance:

  • The Bill’s timescale and final content remained uncertain.
  • It would be inappropriate for courts to proceed on the basis that specific legislative amendments will necessarily pass in a particular form.
  • This reflects a constitutional principle of judicial restraint in relation to ongoing parliamentary processes.

(d) The Overriding Objective

The Court also emphasised the relevance of the overriding objective in Order 1 rule 1A [23]:

“That is because the aim of the court is to deal with cases justly in accordance with the overriding objective…”

Dealing with cases “justly” includes, among other things:

  • ensuring proportionality between cost, time and complexity;
  • avoiding unnecessary expenditure of judicial resources;
  • avoiding determination of issues in a legally unstable or transitional landscape;
  • striking a fair balance between the parties’ interests and the public interest.

6.5 Conclusion on the Stay

Having reviewed both the original decision to impose the stay and the later refusal to lift it, the Court concluded that none of the Azam criteria for appellate interference were met:

“…it has not been established that [the judge] has misdirected himself or made an error such that we would overturn his decision on the grant of a stay.” [24]

The Court accepted that:

  • The human impact on the soldiers (elderly, anxious) and the next of kin is real and recognised [21].
  • Legislative changes are likely to clarify the position “relatively soon” [24].
  • Once the Bill receives Royal Assent, the balance may shift, particularly if additional issues such as serious delay emerge [24].

For the time being, however:

“Fundamentally, we cannot say that a stay at least until the passing of the new legislation is unreasonable.” [24]

Accordingly, the appeal against the stay was dismissed; the stay remains in place.

7. Precedents and Authorities Cited

7.1 AB (Sudan) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2013] EWCA Civ

While the judgment gives only a brief reference, AB (Sudan) is relied on for the principle that:

  • The decision whether to stay proceedings is a classic exercise of judicial discretion in case management.
  • Such decisions are therefore rarely disturbed on appeal unless clearly flawed in law, process, or overall judgment.

This reinforces a general theme: appellate courts are cautious about second‑guessing the day‑to‑day management of litigation by first‑instance judges.

7.2 Azam v University Hospital Birmingham NHS Foundation Trust [2020] EWHC 2284 (QB)

Azam is more extensively summarised. It provides the five grounds on which an appellate court can interfere with a discretion such as a stay [14]. Of particular importance is the test of “plainly wrong”:

A decision is plainly wrong if it exceeds the “generous ambit within which reasonable disagreement is possible.”

This formulation has become a standard expression of deference to first‑instance case‑management decisions.

7.3 Jordan [2019] UKSC 9 and McCord (unreported, 18 January 2019)

These Northern Ireland cases are noted as examples where stays were overturned. The Court’s brief characterisation is that both concerned:

“arguments directly made under the Human Rights Act 1998.” [15]

While detailed facts are not recited, the implication is:

  • In human‑rights‑sensitive contexts (especially those engaging Article 2 and Article 3 ECHR), the balance may tilt more readily against delaying judicial scrutiny.
  • Yet even then, reversal of stays is exceptional, not routine.

7.4 The Illegal Migration Act 2023 Case [2024] NIKB 44

The Court refers to this recent decision as one in which the Court of Appeal in Northern Ireland itself imposed a stay, and where the Supreme Court refused the Home Secretary permission to appeal [15]. It illustrates:

  • The use of stays as a legitimate tool for managing high‑profile, legally complex and politically charged litigation.
  • The Supreme Court’s willingness to let such case‑management decisions stand where they fall within the permissible range.

7.5 O’Hara J’s 2021 Crown Court Decision ([2021] NICC 3)

Though not directly analysed in depth by the Court of Appeal, O’Hara J’s 2021 trial judgment forms a critical part of the factual matrix:

  • It recorded that A and C each fired one shot, with B firing most shots.
  • It highlighted serious flaws in the process by which soldiers’ statements were taken in 1972.
  • It formed part of the “comprehensive decisions” already in the public domain, relevant to the argument that a further inquest is not necessary merely for public record purposes.

8. Explaining Key Legal Concepts

8.1 Judicial Review and the Leave Stage

Judicial review is a process by which courts supervise the lawfulness of public decisions. It is not an appeal on the merits but focuses on legality, rationality, procedure, and proportionality (where applicable).

In Northern Ireland, applicants generally require leave to apply for judicial review. At this stage:

  • The court asks whether there is a realistically arguable case on one or more grounds.
  • It does not decide who is right; it decides whether the case should proceed to a full hearing.

Here, Soldiers A & C were granted leave on three grounds (two by the High Court, one reinstated by the Court of Appeal). The merits remain to be determined once the stay is lifted.

8.2 Section 14 of the Coroners Act (Northern Ireland) 1959

Section 14(1) empowers the Attorney General to direct a coroner to hold an inquest if she considers it “advisable”. This is a broad discretion, but not an unfettered one:

  • It must be exercised consistently with the statutory framework for inquests, including Rule 15’s four questions.
  • It must respect public law principles: relevant/irrelevant considerations, proper purpose, reasonableness, and factual accuracy.

8.3 Irrelevant Considerations and Error of Fact

In judicial review:

  • A decision is unlawful if the decision‑maker takes into account a legally irrelevant consideration, or fails to take account of a mandatory relevant consideration.
  • An error of fact can also ground a challenge where:
    • the fact is established to be wrong,
    • it was material to the decision, and
    • the applicant was not responsible for the error.

The “public record” rationale is challenged on both fronts: as a potentially improper statutory purpose and as a misreading of the existing public record.

8.4 The Overriding Objective

The overriding objective in Order 1 rule 1A requires the courts to deal with cases justly. Factors typically include:

  • ensuring fairness to all parties;
  • saving expense;
  • dealing with the case in ways proportionate to the issues;
  • ensuring cases proceed expeditiously;
  • allocating appropriate court resources.

Invoking this objective, the Court endorsed the High Court’s view that it would be disproportionate and potentially premature to resolve complex legacy‑related arguments while the legislative framework is unsettled.

8.5 The “Plainly Wrong” Standard on Appeal

For discretionary decisions (such as stays), an appellate court will not intervene merely because it would have decided differently. Instead, the decision must be:

“Plainly wrong” – outside the “generous ambit within which reasonable disagreement is possible.” [14]

This reflects respect for the trial judge’s “feel” for the case, management of procedural dynamics, and proximity to the parties.

9. Impact and Broader Implications

9.1 For Legacy Inquests and Attorney General Decisions

The judgment sends a clear message that the Attorney General’s section 14 power must be tightly tethered to the statutory function of an inquest. In the legacy setting:

  • Justifying a fresh inquest primarily on the basis that it will create a public record is vulnerable to challenge.
  • Decision‑makers must demonstrate why an inquest is needed to address the core statutory questions, not simply to add another layer of narrative when extensive records already exist.
  • Reasons should engage with the existing evidential and judicial record – including earlier inquests, criminal proceedings, and public reports.

9.2 For Soldiers and Security‑Force Participants in Legacy Cases

Although the merits remain undecided, this judgment:

  • Recognises the anxiety and burden on elderly veterans facing renewed scrutiny.
  • Validates, at least to the point of arguability, challenges to new inquests where the rationale is weakly connected to the legal purpose of an inquest.
  • Suggests that future AGNI decisions in legacy cases will have to be reasoned with particular care if they impact individuals who have already faced criminal trials or been the subject of extensive legal findings.

9.3 For the Next of Kin and Victims’ Families

Conversely, the decision:

  • Does not invalidate the Attorney General’s decision or finally bar a new inquest.
  • Acknowledges that legacy matters are being re‑structured through legislation, and that the next of kin will almost certainly have routes – whether via an inquest or via the Legacy Commission – to seek further investigation.
  • Implies that the eventual mechanism must balance the interests of the next of kin and the implicated individuals within a clear and lawful statutory scheme.

9.4 For the Relationship Between Courts and Parliament in Legacy Matters

At a more systemic level, the judgment illustrates:

  • Judicial reluctance to pre‑empt Parliament in an area undergoing active legislative reform.
  • Courts’ willingness to adopt a “wait and see” approach through stays, particularly where immediate adjudication could be rendered academic by imminent legislative changes.
  • That this deference is not absolute: once legislation is settled, or if delay becomes excessive or oppressive, the balance could shift towards resuming litigation.

9.5 For Case Management in Complex Public Law Litigation

The upholding of the stay underscores:

  • The centrality of the overriding objective in managing difficult, resource‑intensive litigation.
  • That it may be just and proportionate to pause proceedings where the legal background is about to be significantly re‑drawn.
  • The need for careful, ongoing judicial review of stays: the Court expressly contemplates that when the Bill becomes law, the soldiers “would be in a stronger position” to press for determination [24], and that “should other issues arise including delay the balance may shift” [24].

10. Conclusion

The Court of Appeal’s decision in Soldiers A & C, Application for Judicial Review [2025] NICA 64 is a nuanced intervention in the evolving law of legacy inquests and judicial review.

On the one hand, it expands the scope of the challenge to the Attorney General’s decision by granting leave on a key additional ground. It treats the Attorney’s reliance on the inquest creating a “public record” as arguably an irrelevant consideration and/or error of fact, and possibly an error of law. This reflects a broader principle: inquests must serve their statutory purpose, not be repurposed as general instruments of historical narration.

On the other hand, the Court firmly supports the High Court’s decision to stay the proceedings. By endorsing the high threshold for appellate interference with case‑management decisions and emphasising judicial restraint in the face of ongoing legislative reform, it leaves the substantive issues in abeyance until Parliament clarifies the future architecture of Troubles‑related investigations.

The key takeaways are:

  • Section 14 discretion is constrained: The Attorney General’s powers to order fresh inquests must be exercised for legally proper purposes, anchored to the defined role of inquests.
  • “Public record” is a risky justification: Treating an inquest primarily as a vehicle to create a public record is open to serious legal challenge, especially where a substantial existing record already exists.
  • Stays are robust tools in transitional legal contexts: Courts may legitimately pause difficult public law cases to avoid premature or academic determinations while Parliament re‑shapes the relevant framework.
  • Human impacts are acknowledged but balanced against systemic factors: The Court recognises the anxiety of elderly soldiers and the needs of victims’ families, but seeks to situate their disputes within a stable and coherent legislative regime.

As the Northern Ireland Troubles Bill progresses, this judgment will likely serve as a reference point for how courts manage the delicate interplay between individual rights, institutional responsibility, and evolving statutory mechanisms in the long‑running effort to address Troubles‑related deaths.