Jeremy Lewis v. Commonwealth of Kentucky

IMPORTANT NOTICE

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED OPINION

THIS OPINION IS DESIGNATED "NOT TO BE PUBLISHED."

PURSUANT TO THE RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE

PROMULGATED BY THE SUPREME COURT, RAP 40(D), THIS

OPINION IS NOT TO BE PUBLISHED AND SHALL NOT BE

CITED OR USED AS BINDING PRECEDENT IN ANY OTHER

CASE IN ANY COURT OF THIS STATE; HOWEVER,

UNPUBLISHED KENTUCKY APPELLATE DECISIONS,

RENDERED AFTER JANUARY 1, 2003, MAY BE CITED FOR

CONSIDERATION BY THE COURT IF THERE IS NO PUBLISHED

OPINION THAT WOULD ADEQUATELY ADDRESS THE ISSUE

BEFORE THE COURT. OPINIONS CITED FOR

CONSIDERATION BY THE COURT SHALL BE SET OUT AS AN

UNPUBLISHED DECISION IN THE FILED DOCUMENT AND A

COPY OF THE ENTIRE DECISION SHALL BE TENDERED ALONG

WITH THE DOCUMENT TO THE COURT AND ALL PARTIES TO

THE ACTION.

1

RENDERED: OCTOBER 23, 2025

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

Supreme Court of Kentucky 2024-SC-0483-MR

JEREMY LEWIS APPELLANT

V.

ON APPEAL FROM LESLIE CIRCUIT COURT

HONORABLE OSCAR G. HOUSE, JUDGE

NO. 20-CR-00076-001

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY APPELLEE

MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT

AFFIRMING

A Leslie County jury convicted Jeremy Lewis of murder, tampering with physical evidence, and abuse of a corpse. He received a total sentence of fifty years' imprisonment and appeals to this Court as a matter of right.¹Having carefully reviewed the law, record, and briefs, we affirm. Lewis was employed as a Leslie County Sheriff's Deputy. In 2017, he began dating Michelle Collett while she was separated from, but still married to, Joseph Morgan. Prior to her relationship with Morgan, Collett was married to Tyler North. Collett and North shared joint custody of their minor daughter. In 2018, North instituted legal proceedings seeking sole custody and sought to relocate the child to Harlan County where he resided. The custody

2

2

dispute was contentious. In response, Lewis and Collett devised a plan to kill North.

Collett contacted North on social media to arrange for a possible sexual encounter. On June 24, 2018, Collett and North agreed to meet in a park in Leslie County at 10 p.m. Lewis and Collett had arrived early to scout the location. Lewis concealed himself under a bridge while Collett waited in her car.

North appeared shortly after the scheduled meeting time. However, he was reluctant to leave his vehicle. As a ruse, Collett told North she had lost her keys and asked him to help her find them. North shined his headlights into the area indicated by Collett and exited his truck to assist her in the search. A short time later, Lewis emerged from his hiding place and told North not to move. Lewis deployed his taser, but only one prong struck North. Lewis then dropped the taser and drew his service weapon and fired five shots at North. At least one of the shots struck North in the head, killing him. Lewis and Collett began cleaning up North's blood and loaded his body in the back seat of his truck. They planned to drive to a remote location and bury the corpse. However, shortly after leaving the scene, Lewis realized he had forgotten to collect the spent casings and sent Collett back to retrieve them. After gathering the casings, Collett obtained a pickaxe and shovel from Morgan to help with the burial of North's body. Lewis and Collett then drove North's truck to an abandoned strip-mining site. They buried North's body in a shallow grave. After burying North, Lewis and Collett drove his truck to

3

another remote location and set it on fire. They returned to Morgan's residence and burned the clothes they had been wearing.

When North did not show up for work the next day, his co-workers contacted his wife²who filed a missing person report with the Kentucky State Police (KSP). A day or two later, Lewis became concerned that North's body would be discovered and decided to move it to a different location. Additionally, he feared dental records and a tattoo could be used to identify North. After disinterring North's body, Lewis removed the head and one of the arms with a Sawzall tool that Morgan had provided. Lewis buried the body in another remote location and disposed of North's head and arm up the mountain behind Morgan's house. The tools used to dismember and bury North were all burned.

A few days later, Lewis set fire to the house he rented with Collett. He hoped to destroy any additional evidence and provide an excuse for why his service weapon was missing. The morning after the fire, North's burnt truck was located and KSP detectives were dispatched to investigate. While processing the scene of the burnt truck, the detectives were alerted to the house fire.

The detectives interviewed both Lewis and Collett at the scene of the house fire. Lewis directed the detectives to the place where his weapons were

4

stored. The detectives observed remnants of a rifle and shotgun but did not locate any handguns.

After a couple of months had passed, Lewis and Collett were interviewed again. Lewis claimed he was sick at home and did not speak to anyone on the night North went missing. Cellphone location data contradicted Lewis's alibi and placed him both in the area where North was last seen and where North's burnt truck was discovered. Lewis was arrested. Subsequently, a portion of North's skull was recovered.

On October 7, 2020, Lewis was indicted for murder and Collett was indicted for complicity to murder. Both Lewis and Collett, along with Morgan, were later indicted for tampering with physical evidence and abuse of a corpse. After his arrest, Lewis spoke with police three times at the jail: October 28, 2020; November 4, 2020; and January 7, 2021. The statements police obtained from the October 28 interview were suppressed by the trial court. However, at the November and January interviews, Lewis admitted to being at the murder scene, but claimed Collett had murdered North. Lewis further asserted he reluctantly agreed to assist Collett conceal the crime because he feared her and her family.

At trial, Lewis maintained that Collett had killed North and that he was unaware of any plan. Collett and Morgan both testified against him. Rejecting Lewis's defense, the jury convicted him of murder, tampering with physical evidence, and abuse of a corpse. The trial court sentenced Lewis to fifty years'

5

imprisonment in accordance with the jury's recommendation. This appeal followed.

LAW AND ANALYSIS

A. State of the Record and Briefs.

As a preliminary matter, the parties dispute the state of the record and compliance with our briefing rules. The Commonwealth has requested this Court to consider the dismissal of this appeal as a sanction for Lewis's failure to provide a complete record and for deficiencies relative to the statements of preservation throughout Lewis's brief. In his reply brief, Lewis responded in opposition to the Commonwealth's argument and noted his efforts to supplement the record. Having sufficiently considered the issue, we decline to dismiss the appeal and will otherwise address any briefing deficiencies as appropriate.

B. The trial court properly denied motion for competency evaluation.

Lewis first argues the trial court erred by denying his motion for a competency evaluation. Specifically, he asserts that coercive interrogation techniques rendered him incompetent to make various pre-trial statements to police. We disagree.

RCr³8.06 governs the incapacity of an accused to stand trial and states as follows:

If upon arraignment or during the proceedings there are reasonable grounds to believe that the defendant lacks the

6

capacity to appreciate the nature and consequences of the proceedings against him or her, or to participate rationally in his or her defense, all proceedings shall be postponed until the issue of incapacity is determined as provided by KRS [Kentucky Revised Statutes] 504.100.

This rule "vests the trial judge with discretion whether to order a mental examination of a defendant or not, and generally for an examination to be required there must be reasonable grounds to believe the defendant insane."

Dye v. Commonwealth, 477 S.W.2d 805, 806 (Ky. 1972). Lewis has not cited to any legal authority to support his claim of incompetency. Moreover, Lewis has not pointed to any evidence tending to demonstrate a lack of "capacity to appreciate the nature and consequences of the proceedings against him . . . or to participate rationally in his . . . defense."

RCr 8.06. Therefore, "[t]he simple answer to this argument . . . is that an examination of the record shows that there is no evidence tending to show that [Lewis] was insane." Henley v. Commonwealth, 621 S.W.2d 906, 910 (Ky. 1981). Thus, we conclude this assertion of error is without merit.

C. The trial court properly refused to dismiss indictment for destruction of evidence.

Second, Lewis argues the trial court erred by denying his motion to dismiss the indictment. He claims the destruction of potentially exculpatory evidence warranted dismissal. We disagree.

To establish a due process violation relative to the destruction of evidence,

the defendant must show (1) that the State acted in bad faith in failing to preserve the evidence; (2) that the exculpatory potential of

7

the evidence was apparent before its destruction; and (3) that the evidence was, to some extent, irreplaceable.

McPherson v. Commonwealth, 360 S.W.3d 207, 217 (Ky. 2012). Specifically,

"[i]t must appear that the State deliberately sought to suppress material, potentially exculpatory evidence." Id. In addition, "dismissal is only one of several remedies available for such violations." Swan v. Commonwealth, 384 S.W.3d 77, 91 (Ky. 2012), overruled on other grounds by Ray v. Commonwealth,

611 S.W.3d 250 (Ky. 2020). We further explained:

Other remedies, such as exclusion of evidence or a missing- evidence instruction to the jury, may be appropriate depending on the facts. Id. In fact, our law appears to express a preference for missing-evidence instructions, which are used "to cure any Due Process violation attributable to the loss or destruction of exculpatory evidence by a less onerous remedy than dismissal or the suppression of relevant evidence." Estep v. Commonwealth, 64 S.W.3d 805, 810 (Ky. 2002). A missing-evidence instruction specifically allows the jury to draw an inference against the Commonwealth from the fact that evidence is missing, lost, or destroyed.

Id. at 91-92 (internal citation omitted).

At the hearing on Lewis's motion to dismiss, Trooper Randall Coots testified that a local police officer brought him a plastic bag containing three weathered shell casings. At the time Trooper Coots received the casings, KSP had already searched the park for relevant evidence. The local officer reported to Trooper Coots that North's family members had collected the casings from the park where North was murdered. Trooper Coots stated the casings appeared tarnished and rusty as if they had been exposed to the elements for a very long time while North's murder had occurred just a few days prior.

8

Trooper Coots examined the casings and noted there was no documentation to show who found the casings or where the casings had been located. Based on his training and experience, Trooper Coots determined the casings were unrelated to North's death and disposed of them.

We cannot conclude Lewis has established that Trooper Coots destroyed the casings in bad faith or that the casings had any apparent exculpatory potential before their destruction. Moreover, even if Lewis had made a proper showing, dismissal would not have been the proper remedy under Swan, 384 S.W.3d at 91-92, because a missing evidence instruction would have sufficed to remedy any such error. The trial court properly denied the motion to dismiss.

D. The trial court properly refused to accept Lewis's guilty plea.

Third, Lewis argues the trial court erred by refusing to accept his guilty plea to the charges of tampering with physical evidence and abuse of a corpse. He further argues his offer to plead guilty was tantamount to an offer to stipulate and, therefore, the trial court erred by admitting evidence on these charges. We disagree.

RCr 8.08 provides in part that "[t]he court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty[.]" We have observed, "[t]he discretion of the trial court exists whether the proposed guilty plea is offered with or without consideration in the form of a plea agreement." Skinner v. Commonwealth, 864 S.W.2d 290, 294 (Ky. 1993). In other words, there is "no requirement, constitutional or otherwise, that the court accept such a plea" at any time, for any reason. Keller v. Commonwealth,

9

719 S.W.2d 5, 7 (Ky. App. 1986). "Certainly where . . . the Commonwealth articulates an objection to the plea and a reason why a trial should be had, failure to accept the plea does not constitute reversible error." Id. On the morning of the first day of trial, Lewis approached the bench and informed the trial court he wished to plead guilty to the charges of tampering with physical evidence and abuse of a corpse. The Commonwealth objected and argued that, while the charges arose from separate cases, the evidence was intertwined. The trial court denied the motion. Lewis renewed the motion on the second day of trial, which the trial court again overruled explaining, "the trial has already started and the Commonwealth's proof on these actions was all . . . intertwined."

Lewis cites North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 38 (1970), and Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 260 (1971), in support of his argument that the trial court erred by refusing to accept his guilty plea. However, Alford is distinguishable from the present appeal while Santobello supports the decision of the trial court here.

In Alford, the Supreme Court of the United States famously held that a trial court does not commit constitutional error by accepting a guilty plea where a defendant admits the sufficiency of the evidence to convict but nevertheless continues to profess innocence. 400 U.S at 38. Notably, however, Alford does not hold that a trial court must categorically accept such a plea at the sole behest of the defendant.

10

Additionally, in Santobello, the Supreme Court noted that plea bargains comprise an essential part of the judicial process. 404 U.S. at 260. However, the Court further observed:

all of these considerations presuppose fairness in securing agreement between an accused and a prosecutor. It is now clear, for example, that the accused pleading guilty must be counseled, absent a waiver. Moore v. Michigan, 355 U.S. 155, 78 S.Ct. 191, 2 L.Ed.2d 167 (1957). Fed.Rule Crim.Proc. 11, governing pleas in federal courts, now makes clear that the sentencing judge must develop, on the record, the factual basis for the plea, as, for example, by having the accused describe the conduct that gave rise to the charge. The plea must, of course, be voluntary and knowing and if it was induced by promises, the essence of those promises must in some way be made known. There is, of course, no absolute right to have a guilty plea accepted. Lynch v. Overholser, 369 U.S. 705, 719, 82 S.Ct. 1063, 1072, 8 L.Ed.2d 211 (1962); Fed.Rule Crim.Proc. 11. A court may reject a plea in exercise of sound judicial discretion.

Id. at 261-62 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). In the present appeal, the Commonwealth articulated a reasonable objection to Lewis's motion to plead guilty. Therefore, we cannot conclude the trial court abused its discretion. Lewis further contends the trial court erred by admitting evidence on the charges of tampering and abuse of a corpse because his motion to plead guilty was tantamount to an offer to stipulate. Again, we disagree. The Commonwealth is entitled "to present a complete, un-fragmented, un-artificial picture of the crime committed by the defendant, including necessary context, background and perspective." Commonwealth v. Melton,

670 S.W.3d 861, 866 (Ky. 2023) (quoting Major v. Commonwealth, 177 S.W.3d 700, 708 (Ky. 2005)). "[W]here evidence is needed to provide a full presentation

11

of the offense, or to 'complete the story of the crime,' . . . there is no reason to fragment the event by suppressing parts of the res gestae." Webb v. Commonwealth, 387 S.W.3d 319, 326 (Ky. 2012). Additionally, the prosecution is permitted to introduce evidence that would "tend to prove any element of the charged crime." See United States v. Senffner, 280 F.3d 755, 764 (7th Cir. 2002) (cleaned up). As a corollary, "the defendant may not stipulate away the parts of the case that he does not want the jury to see." Pollini v. Commonwealth, 172 S.W.3d 418, 424 (Ky. 2005).

Lewis cites Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 180 (1997), in support of his argument.⁴However, this decision is distinguishable from the present appeal.

In Old Chief, the defendant was charged with being a felon in possession of a firearm. Id. at 174. The trial court denied the defendant's offer to stipulate to a prior felony conviction. Id. at 177. At trial, the prosecution was permitted to introduce evidence relative to the nature of the prior conviction. Id. The intermediate Court of Appeals affirmed. Id.

The Supreme Court reversed and distinguished between the situation where evidence of a prior conviction is used to prove a status, such as being a felon in possession of a firearm, from those situations where "the prosecution with its burden of persuasion needs evidentiary depth to tell a continuous

12

story[.]" Id. at 190. When a defendant's status is at issue, "the most the jury needs to know is that the conviction admitted by the defendant falls within the class of crimes that Congress thought should bar a convict from possessing a gun, and this point may be made readily in a defendant's admission and underscored in the court's jury instructions." Id. at 190-91. The Supreme Court further explained:

Given these peculiarities of the element of felony-convict status and of admissions and the like when used to prove it, there is no cognizable difference between the evidentiary significance of an admission and of the legitimately probative component of the official record the prosecution would prefer to place in evidence. For purposes of the Rule 403 weighing of the probative against the prejudicial, the functions of the competing evidence are distinguishable only by the risk inherent in the one and wholly absent from the other. In this case, as in any other in which the prior conviction is for an offense likely to support conviction on some improper ground, the only reasonable conclusion was that the risk of unfair prejudice did substantially outweigh the discounted probative value of the record of conviction, and it was an abuse of discretion to admit the record when an admission was available. What we have said shows why this will be the general rule when proof of convict status is at issue, just as the prosecutor's choice will generally survive a Rule 403 analysis when a defendant seeks to force the substitution of an admission for evidence creating a coherent narrative of his thoughts and actions in perpetrating the offense for which he is being tried.

Id. at 191-92 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). In the present appeal, the trial court did not err by admitting evidence on the charges of tampering and abuse of corpse. These charges do not require proof of a "status" comparable to the felon-in-possession charge in Old Chief. Moreover, contrary to Lewis's assertion, these charges were not resolved by the denial of his motion to plead guilty. In addition, the proof on these charges did

13

not constitute improper evidence of prior bad acts. Instead, the proof of tampering and abuse of corpse amounted to direct proof of the charged offenses. Under Melton, 670 S.W.3d at 866, the Commonwealth was entitled to prove its case and the trial court properly rejected Lewis's attempt to conceal such from evidence from the jury in the form of a stipulation. There was no error.

E. The trial court properly denied the various motions to suppress evidence.

For his fourth contention of error, Lewis argues that various items recovered from the search of his burnt residence should have been suppressed. Specifically, he argues the terms of the warrant were overly broad and that the detectives exceeded the scope of the warrant.

We decline to address the terms and scope of the search warrant because the warrant has not been included in the record. In his opening brief, Lewis points to the appendix of his brief, without citing either the specific page of the appendix or the official record. However, the document in the appendix is the affidavit for the search warrant, not the search warrant itself. In his reply brief, Lewis cites to the record, but the search warrant that Lewis has cited is not the same warrant referenced in his motion to suppress and argument on appeal. It is axiomatic that a silent or incomplete record is presumed to support the decision of the trial court. Commonwealth v. Thompson, 697 S.W.2d 143, 145 (Ky. 1985).

14

In addition, Lewis argues that several burnt firearm magazines recovered from the search of his residence should have been suppressed because of alleged deficiencies in the chain of custody. We disagree. Under Kentucky law, "it is unnecessary to establish a perfect chain of custody or to eliminate all possibility of tampering or misidentification, so long as there is persuasive evidence that the reasonable probability is that the evidence has not been altered in any material respect." Helphenstine v. Commonwealth, 423 S.W.3d 708, 717 (Ky. 2014) (internal quotation and footnote omitted). "Even if we assume there are gaps or problems in the chain of custody, their presence normally go[es] to the weight of the evidence rather than its admissibility." Id. (Internal quotation and footnote omitted). In his brief, Lewis does not appear to pursue his chain of custody argument but instead continues to argue the magazines should have been suppressed because the officers exceeded the scope of the warrant. Again, we decline to review matters involving the scope of the warrant because it was not included in the record.

Lewis further argues the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress evidence of statements he made to police on November 4, 2020, and January 7, 2021. Specifically, he contends: (1) the statements were obtained in violation of the right to counsel; (2) the police allegedly used abusive and coercive interrogation techniques. We disagree.

"We review a trial court's decision on a motion to suppress on two levels."

Payne v. Commonwealth, 681 S.W.3d 1, 4 (Ky. 2023). The first inquiry pertains

15

to "whether the trial court's findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence." Id. (quoting Commonwealth v. Neal, 84 S.W.3d 920, 923 (Ky. App. 2002)). "If so, they are conclusive." Id. The second inquiry involves "a de novo review of the trial court's application of the law to those facts to determine whether its decision is correct as a matter of law." Id. (quoting Neal, 84 S.W.3d at 923).

After Lewis was arrested, police interviewed him on October 28, 2020. The trial court suppressed the statements made at this interview because the police continued to question Lewis after he had invoked the right to counsel. On November 4, 2020, Lewis was arraigned and appointed counsel. Later that day, Lewis contacted the jailer and requested to speak with the detectives about the charges. The jailer relayed Lewis's message to the detectives. The detectives met Lewis at the jail, per his request, read him the Miranda warnings, and spoke with him. Similarly, on January 7, 2021, Lewis again contacted the jailer and asked to speak with the detectives who subsequently went to the jail to speak with Lewis.

In his brief, Lewis claims "[t]he Detectives simply summoned Mr. Lewis from his cell" to question him. However, this Court cannot, and will not, substitute our view for that of the trial court. Payne, 681 S.W.3d at 4. Based upon our review of the testimony and evidence presented at the suppression

16

hearing,⁵we conclude the trial court's finding that Lewis initiated both conversations is supported by substantial evidence, and thus, is conclusive. Under Kentucky law, it is well-established that "once the right to counsel has attached by the commencement of formal criminal charges, any subsequent waiver of that right during a police-initiated custodial interview is ineffective." Keysor v. Commonwealth, 486 S.W.3d 273, 282 (Ky. 2016). Conversely, however, there is no rule of law that "bars the use of evidence obtained when the defendant initiated the conversation with police." Id. at

281. Here, Lewis has failed to demonstrate the trial court misapplied the law to the facts. In light of the trial court's conclusive determination that Lewis initiated the conversations on November 4 and January 7, we cannot conclude the trial court erred by denying the motion to suppress. Id. Lewis further argues statements obtained at the November 4 and January 7 interviews were the product of abusive and coercive interrogation tactics. We disagree.

The relevant inquiry into the voluntariness of a confession or other incriminating statement is threefold:

(1) whether the police activity was 'objectively coercive'; (2) whether the coercion overbore the will of the defendant; and (3) whether the defendant showed that the coercive police activity was the 'crucial motivating factor' behind the defendant's confession.

17

Bailey v. Commonwealth, 194 S.W.3d 296, 301 (Ky. 2006) (quoting Henson v. Commonwealth, 20 S.W.3d 466, 469 (Ky. 1999)). "Factors relevant to a characterization of the interrogation include the length of detention, the lack of any advice to the accused concerning his constitutional rights, the repeated or prolonged nature of the questioning, and the use of overtly coercive techniques such as the deprivation of food or sleep, or the use of humiliating tactics." Id. at 300-01 (citing Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 226 (1973)). In addition, courts may also consider the subjective characteristics of the defendant such "as age, education, intelligence, and linguistic ability." Id. at 300 (citing Allee v. Commonwealth, 454 S.W.2d 336, 341 (Ky. 1970)). Here, the purportedly improper tactics identified by Lewis all pertain to the October 28 interview. However, the trial court suppressed the evidence obtained from this interview. Relative to the interviews conducted on November 4 and January 7, Lewis simply complains about the approximately ninety-minute length of each interview. Here, Lewis was provided with Miranda warnings at the commencement of each interview. We cannot conclude, without more, that the relatively short duration of these interviews amounted to an objective indication of coercion.

F. The trial court properly denied motion for directed verdict.

Fifth, Lewis argues he was entitled to a directed verdict on the murder charge. We disagree.

A trial court's denial of motion for directed verdict should not be reversed unless the appellate court determines "it would be clearly unreasonable for a

18

jury to find guilt[.]" Commonwealth v. Benham, 816 S.W.2d 186, 187 (Ky. 1991). When confronted with a motion for directed verdict, the trial court must assume the truth of the Commonwealth's evidence and "draw all fair and reasonable inferences from the evidence in favor of the Commonwealth." Id. A conviction must be based on "evidence of substance, and the trial court is expressly authorized to direct a verdict for the defendant if the prosecution produces no more than a mere scintilla of evidence." Id. at 187-88. Ultimately, the directed verdict standard depends on "the statutes creating the offense[,]"

and "is not controlled by the law as described in the jury instructions[.]"

Acosta v. Commonwealth, 391 S.W.3d 809, 816 (Ky. 2013), overruled on other grounds by Ray, 611 S.W.3d at 266.

Lewis primarily relies on credibility arguments and the presence of conflicting evidence to support his argument for a directed verdict. However, the general rule in Kentucky is that "[i]t is only where the testimony is so incredible on its face as to require its rejection as a matter of law that the jury will not be permitted to consider it." Ross v. Commonwealth, 531 S.W.3d 471, 475 (Ky. 2017) (quoting Daulton v. Commonwealth, 310 Ky. 141, 220 S.W.2d 109, 110 (1949)). This unusual circumstance arises "when the substance of the testimony, detached from the personal credibility of the witness . . . is so laden with doubt and implausibility that it cannot rationally be regarded as a fact capable of supporting a verdict." Id. (emphasis added). At trial, the Commonwealth produced sufficient evidence to support the jury's verdict on the charge of murder. Collett directly testified that she and

19

Lewis planned to murder North and that Lewis shot and killed him. Additionally, the cell phone location data contradicted Lewis's statement that he was sick at home at the time of the murder. Further, Morgan testified that he helped Lewis dispose of the body and other evidence.

"The testimony of even a single witness is sufficient to support a finding of guilt, even when other witnesses testified to the contrary if, after consideration of all of the evidence, the finder of fact assigns greater weight to that evidence." Commonwealth v. Suttles, 80 S.W.3d 424, 426 (Ky. 2002) (citing Murphy v. Sowders, 801 F.2d 205 (6th Cir. 1986)). Considering the evidence as whole in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, we are convinced the Commonwealth produced ample evidence to support the finding of guilt. Any issues relative to the credibility of Collett and Morgan was a matter for the jury to resolve. Id. The trial court properly denied the motion for directed verdict.

G. The trial court properly determined no discovery violation occurred.

Sixth, Lewis argues the trial court erred by admitting certain evidence which he alleges the Commonwealth failed to disclose in violation of a discovery order. We disagree.

In Kentucky, RCr 7.24 defines the scope of discovery in criminal proceedings. Stieritz v. Commonwealth, 671 S.W.3d 353, 367 (Ky. 2023). Pertinent to the present appeal, RCr 7.24(1) states:

Upon written request by the defense, the attorney for the Commonwealth shall disclose the substance, including time, date, and place, of any oral incriminating statement known by the attorney for the Commonwealth to have been made by a defendant

20

to any witness, and to permit the defendant to inspect and copy or photograph any relevant (a) written or recorded statements or confessions made by the defendant, or copies thereof, that are known by the attorney for the Commonwealth to be in the possession, custody, or control of the Commonwealth[.] A trial court possesses "broad remedial powers" to address discovery violations. Stieritz, 671 S.W.3d at 368 (quoting Akers v. Commonwealth, 172 S.W.3d 414, 417 (Ky. 2005)).

At trial, Lewis objected to the admission of two recordings that documented his interviews with police prior to his arrest.⁶Additionally, he further objected to the introduction of various social media messages. The Commonwealth responded that it had provided discovery to Lewis's former counsel.

The trial court conducted a hearing at which Lewis's former counsel testified. Additionally, the trial court considered various discovery-notice documents and representations made by the Commonwealth. Based on this evidence and argument, the trial court determined no discovery violation had occurred. Having reviewed the relevant testimony and documentation, we perceive no basis to disturb the trial court's ruling.

H. The trial court properly admitted evidence of cell site location information (CSLI).

Seventh, Lewis argues the trial court erred by allowing a police detective to testify regarding CSLI without being qualified as an expert. We disagree.

21

At trial, Detective Clayton Stamper testified that he secured historical CSLI reports from AT&T. Detective Stamper used Google Earth to create a map showing Lewis's movements based on the coordinates provided by AT&T. The trial court permitted Detective Stamper, over Lewis's objection,⁷to present and describe the map he created based on the CSLI.

In Torrence v. Commonwealth, 603 S.W.3d 214, 228 (Ky. 2020), we specifically held, "marking points on a graph—in these cases a map—based on a cell phone report including latitude and longitude of cell towers, does not require an expert." Lewis has failed to demonstrate that Detective Stamper's testimony exceeded the bounds permitted by Torrence. We need not consider Lewis's citation to various federal authorities in the absence of any argument why Torrence should not control. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by allowing the introduction of CSLI evidence.

I. The trial court properly refused to admit co-defendant's recorded statement.

Eighth, Lewis argues the trial court erred by refusing to admit Collett's recorded statement into evidence. We disagree.

At trial, Lewis attempted to play Collett's recorded statement during the testimony of Detective Vicki Day on two separate occasions. The Commonwealth objected on hearsay grounds, which the trial court sustained.

22

"KRE 801A(a)(1) allows admission of prior inconsistent statements of witnesses provided the witness testifies at trial and is examined about the statement, with the proper foundation laid pursuant to KRE 613." Gray v. Commonwealth, 203 S.W.3d 679, 686-87 (Ky. 2006). Lewis has not provided any authority permitting the use of one witness's prior inconsistent statement to impeach the testimony of a different witness.

Instead, he now claims the denial of his attempt to play the recordings during Detective Day's testimony violated his constitutional right to present a complete defense. However, we find no indication this constitutional issue was presented to the trial court and decline to address it. Gasaway, 671 S.W.3d at

314.

Additionally, Lewis invokes the "principle of evidentiary parity" to argue that he should have been able to play the recording of Collett's statement because the Commonwealth played Lewis's recorded statements. The situations are not equivalent because Lewis's recorded statements were clearly admissible as a party admission under KRE 801A(b) while Collett's recorded statement could only be used for impeachment as the prior inconsistent statement of a witness under KRE 801A(a). Moreover, the trial court did not categorically foreclose the use of Collett's recorded statement, it simply limited its use to the proper context under the applicable rules of evidence. Lewis failed to make any sufficient argument to the contrary. The trial court did not abuse its discretion.

23

J. The trial court did not improperly admit speculative testimony.

Ninth, Lewis argues the trial court erred by admitting speculative testimony. We disagree.

During Morgan's testimony at trial, he frequently introduced or qualified various statements with the phrase, "I think." For example, when asked if he knew how Lewis disposed of North's body, Morgan replied, "Sawzall, I think."

Morgan also testified he thought a bag that Lewis brought to his house contained North's body parts. Although Morgan testified he did not look into the bag, he stated that Lewis told him about the contents. The trial court overruled Lewis's continuing objection to Morgan's testimony based on speculation.

In Smith v. Commonwealth, 282 S.W.2d 840, 842 (Ky. 1955), our predecessor Court distinguished between true speculation and colloquial usage as follows:

The term 'guess' is not regarded as being a mere conjecture or speculation but as a colloquial way of expressing an estimate or opinion. It is a word frequently used where a witness is called upon to make estimates of speed or distance or size or time. Like the words 'suppose' or 'think', it is commonly used as meaning the expression of a judgment with an implication of uncertainty. Here, we are convinced Morgan's use of the phrase, "I think" was merely a colloquialism used to convey uncertainty rather than a lack of personal knowledge. Therefore, we cannot conclude the trial court abused its discretion by permitting Morgan to testify in this manner.

24

K. Lewis's sentence was not excessive.

Next, Lewis argues the fifty-year sentence imposed by the trial court was excessive and unreasonable. He further contends the trial court failed to consider mitigating factors in violation of the Eighth Amendment prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment. U.S. Const. amend. VIII.

Lewis has failed to indicate whether this issue was properly preserved for review and otherwise failed to request palpable error review. However, non- capital Eighth Amendment claims may be reviewed for palpable error when a claim is raised for the first time on appeal. See United States v. Raad, 406 F.3d 1322, 1323 (11th Cir. 2005).

In support of this argument, Lewis cites cases involving a sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole for a non-violent felony, Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277 (1983), and a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole upon a minor, Workman v. Commonwealth,

429 S.W.2d 374 (Ky. 1968). We perceive these decisions to be clearly distinguishable from the term of years received by Lewis. See Commonwealth

v. Phon, 545 S.W.3d 284, 298 (Ky. 2018). KRS 532.030(1) provides:

When a person is convicted of a capital offense, he shall have his punishment fixed at death, or at a term of imprisonment for life without benefit of probation or parole, or at a term of imprisonment for life without benefit of probation or parole until he has served a minimum of twenty-five (25) years of his sentence, or to a sentence of life, or to a term of not less than twenty (20) years nor more than fifty (50) years.

25

Lewis has not provided any authority tending to demonstrate that his fifty-year sentence for murder is excessive or otherwise constitutionally infirm. The jury heard the evidence and made its recommendation, which the trial court accepted in accordance with Kentucky law. Moreover, the trial court's judgment reflects that it provided due consideration to the nature and circumstances of the crime in addition to the "history, character, and condition of the Defendant[.]" We do not perceive any hint of an abuse of discretion. Hayes v. Commonwealth, 627 S.W.3d 857, 863 (Ky. 2021).

L. There was no cumulative error.

Finally, Lewis argues his convictions should be reversed under the cumulative error doctrine. We disagree.

The cumulative error doctrine provides that "multiple errors, although harmless individually, may be deemed reversible if their cumulative effect is to render the trial fundamentally unfair." Brown v. Commonwealth, 313 S.W.3d 577, 631 (Ky. 2010). "We have found cumulative error only where the individual errors were themselves substantial, bordering, at least, on the prejudicial." Id. (citing Funk v. Commonwealth, 842 S.W.2d 476 (Ky. 1992)). Further, "[w]here . . . none of the errors individually raised any real question of prejudice, we have declined to hold that the absence of prejudice plus the absence of prejudice somehow adds up to prejudice." Id. (citing Furnish v. Commonwealth, 95 S.W.3d 34 (Ky. 2002)). A criminal defendant "is guaranteed a fair trial[,]" but "[t]his does not mean, however, a perfect trial, free of any and

26

all errors." McDonald v. Commonwealth, 554 S.W.2d 84, 86 (Ky. 1977). In the present appeal, we fail to discern any multiplicity of errors that would render Lewis's trial fundamentally unfair.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Leslie Circuit Court is hereby affirmed.

All sitting. Lambert, C.J.; Bisig, Conley, Goodwine, Keller, and Nickell, JJ., concur. Thompson, J., concurs in result only.

COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT:

Stella B. House

COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:

Russell M. Coleman Attorney General of Kentucky Joseph A. Beckett

Assistant Attorney General