Lashonda Peeples v. National Data Research, Inc.

24-10956 Opinion of the Court 3 was inaccurate because it disclosed a record of a criminal offense in South Carolina that had since been expunged.

After Ms. Peeples challenged the representation of the of- fense in her file as inaccurate, NDR updated the background report to reflect that the offence had been expunged with a notation. Ms. Peeples then contested the accuracy of the modified report because South Carolina state law provides that an expunged record be- comes "nonpublic" and can only be accessed by "those authorized law or court officials who need to know" the information in the record, and a criminal background report only includes those rec- ords that are public because nonpublic records are confidential. See S.C. Code § 22-5-910(D). NDR declined to update the background report again, because in its view the report was accurate as to the existence of a criminal offense and its subsequent expungement. Ms. Peeples had, at this point, enrolled in the AICASA pre- medical program for one semester and her continued participation was contingent upon the submission of a complete background re- port. She decided against submitting it, fearing that the expunge- ment notation would bar her from enrolling in the program full- time.

On July 13, 2022, Ms. Peeples brought a Fair Credit Report- ing Act claim against NDR. She alleged that NDR's background report violated 15 U.S.C. § 1681e because NDR failed to "follow reasonable procedures to ensure the maximum possible accuracy of the information," and 15 U.S.C. § 1681i because NDR failed to

"conduct a reasonable reinvestigation, correct the disputed

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4 Opinion of the Court 24-10956 information, and maintain reasonable procedures to prevent the reappearance of the inaccurate information."

The district court adopted the magistrate judge's report and recommendation that NDR was entitled to summary judgment on all of Ms. Peeples' claims. Because it was undisputed that the re- port was communicated only to Ms. Peeples, as opposed to a third party, the court concluded that Ms. Peeples could not succeed on her § 1681e claim. The court also determined that the inclusion of Ms. Peeples' record of conviction, along with an expungement no- tation, in the report did not render the report inaccurate under § 1681i because it ultimately was an accurate recitation of her crim- inal history.

On appeal, Ms. Peeples argues that the district court misin- terpreted both FCRA provisions in reaching its conclusions. For the reasons discussed below, we may not evaluate the merits of these arguments because we conclude that Ms. Peeples lacks Arti- cle III standing.

II

We recently held in Nelson v. Experian Information Solutions, Inc., 144 F.4th 1350 (11th Cir. 2025), an FCRA case, that a plaintiff could not demonstrate injury to establish Article III standing solely by "spending money and time attempting to correct errors on a credit report that has not been published to a third party or other- wise affected [her.]" Id. at 1352. In that case, Ms. Nelson brought a FCRA claim under 15 U.S.C. § 1681i(a)(1)(A) challenging a credit reporting agency's alleged failure to "conduct a reasonable

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24-10956 Opinion of the Court 5 reinvestigation" upon notification of inaccurate information in her consumer report. See 144 F.4th at 1353. She alleged harm in two ways: she "spent time and money to correct information on her credit report" and the inaccuracy "increase[d] her risk of identity theft" in the future. See id. at 1354.

We concluded that Ms. Nelson could not show concrete harm, independent of an alleged statutory violation, or substantial risk of harm flowing from the alleged statutory violation, to estab- lish injury-in-fact for standing purposes. See id. at 1352. First, the time and money Ms. Nelson spent trying to correct the error could not establish injury-in-fact unless those efforts responded to, or at- tempted to fix, an independent concrete harm. See id. at 1354-55 (reasoning that the expenditure of time and money to correct a statutory violation does not establish standing unless it corrects an error "that itself caused a concrete harm") (emphasis removed). Second, Ms. Nelson's theory of standing based on a threat of future identity theft failed because it was too speculative—it depended on the credit reporting agency sending incorrect information to a third party, which would then act and send an offer to an incorrect loca- tion, after which an intervening actor would use that information to steal her identity. See id. at 1356-57. In order for a risk of future harm to sufficiently establish injury, a plaintiff must show that "the harm is actual or imminent." Id. at 1357. The "chain-of-events"

Ms. Nelson asserted to establish standing were too attenuated and speculative to satisfy the injury-in-fact requirement. See id.

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6 Opinion of the Court 24-10956 We heard oral argument in this case prior to our decision in Nelson. So, at our request, the parties filed supplemental briefs on Ms. Peeples' standing in light of Nelson. Having reviewed the brief- ing, we now conclude that Ms. Peeples lacks Article III standing because she cannot show that she suffered concrete injury or faced a substantial risk of harm from the alleged FCRA violations. Ms. Peeples contends that her concrete injury is that "she had to delay her admission to AICASA because the [r]eport was inaccurate, NDR refused to correct it, and AICASA would not ac- cept a criminal background report from any other source." In her supplemental brief, Ms. Peeples also asserts that she can establish standing because she "suffered emotional distress injuries because of her lost opportunity to obtain academic credentials necessary for her to realize her dream of attending medical school."

But, as we explained in Nelson, a plaintiff cannot establish standing by self-imposing her injury. See id. at 1354. Here, Ms. Peeples made the ultimate decision not to apply for further medical education because of her belief that AICASA "might not permit her to enroll if it discovered that she had been convicted of [the] of- fense[.]" Appellant's Br. at 7. Ms. Peeples' refusal to submit the modified report resulted in her leaving the program because she believed "she could not use the [r]eport in support of her applica- tion." Id. at 8. Ms. Peeples' own actions therefore caused her not to continue her medical education, and under Nelson this self-im- posed injury cannot meet the injury-in-fact requirement of stand- ing. See Nelson, 144 F.4th at 1354. Ms. Peeples' emotional suffering

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24-10956 Opinion of the Court 7 related to this "lost opportunity" likewise stemmed from her own decision not to complete her application and cannot create stand- ing. See id.

Additionally, Ms. Peeples made the decision not to submit the original or modified background report to AICASA based on her own belief that AICASA would make a certain decision upon receiving and reviewing the report. Her decision, which led to her asserted harms, both the loss of enrollment and emotional suffer- ing, was based on a "speculative chain of possibilities" that AICASA would, upon receipt of her modified background report with nota- tions regarding her conviction and its subsequent expungement, deny her further enrollment in her program. See Clapper v. Amnesty Int'l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 414 (2013). This "speculative series of events" was not "certainly impending to constitute injury in fact"

because no decision had been made by AICASA as to Ms. Peeples' enrollment based on the modified background report. See Nelson,

144 F.4th at 1357. Moreover, AICASA had given no indication as to what decision it would make upon reviewing the report, and whether that decision would have adversely affected Ms. Peeples. Ms. Peeples claims no other types of concrete injury, and, under Nelson, her allegations are insufficient to establish standing. Because Ms. Peeples lacks Article III standing, we may not reach the merits of her FCRA claims on appeal.

IV

For these reasons, we dismiss the appeal, vacate the district court's judgment, and remand with instructions that the district

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8 Opinion of the Court 24-10956 court dismiss the complaint without prejudice for lack of subject- matter jurisdiction.

APPEAL DISMISSED: VACATED AND REMANDED

WITH INSTRUCTIONS.

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