Adam Sindell v. Latonya Coach

24-13529 Opinion of the Court 3

I.

In June 2020, Sindell was a pretrial detainee in the Houston County Jail.¹He resided in the L-Pod section of the jail, which housed roughly eighty pretrial detainees. Jail officials checked de- tainees' cells three times per day for contraband and rule violations. On June 25, Sindell filed a grievance against Deputy Coach, a su- pervising officer in the L-Pod. He alleged that during her routine check of his cell, Coach pulled his mattress out from under him, causing him to injure his elbow, and threw away his Bible because he possessed more books in his cell than the rules allowed. The Houston County Sheriff's Office reviewed the incident and found Sindell's allegations against Coach to be "unsustained" and un- founded, including that it was "disproven that [Deputy] Coach threw [Sindell's] Bible into the trash."

On June 30, Coach again conducted her routine checks of the L-Pod. During one check, Coach told the other L-Pod detain- ees, while pointing to Sindell, that no one could trade food and they would have to eat in their cells because people were filing griev- ances against her. According to Sindell, she told the others, "You don't get to come out of your cell because this guy wants to write grievances . . . ." When she checked Sindell's cell that day, she again found that he possessed more books than he was allowed and

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4 Opinion of the Court 24-13529 put him on "lockdown," meaning that he was not allowed out of his cell with the other detainees during "rec time."

During rec time that day, Coach worked at the security desk in the common area. In addition to the security desk, the common area had a computer kiosk where detainees could send emails and file grievances. Detainees on lockdown could buzz the security desk and speak with Coach. Sindell used the buzzer to request toi- let paper. Coach retrieved toilet paper and gave it to another de- tainee to take to Sindell in his cell. When the other detainee reached the cell, Coach unlocked the cell door. Sindell took the op- portunity to leave his cell for the kiosk in the common area to send a message to his fiancée, even though he knew he was on "lock- down."

Coach saw Sindell in the common area, told him that he was on lockdown, and instructed him "a couple of times" to return to his cell. Sindell did not do as instructed. Because he did not obey, Coach ordered all of the detainees out of their cells on "rec time"

to return to their cells so that, if Sindell remained out of his cell, he would be immediately identifiable. All of the other detainees re- turned to their cells. Sindell remained at the kiosk. Coach called for other officers to assist with Sindell.

Deputies Cleckner and Boerger responded to Coach's call. Cleckner told Sindell twice, in quick succession, to lock down. Sin- dell testified that Coach told them that Sindell "needs his ass kicked." Sindell began walking away from the kiosk and toward Cleckner and Boerger with his palms open by his sides. Cleckner

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24-13529 Opinion of the Court 5 and Boerger walked toward Sindell while Coach remained behind them near the security desk. Cleckner pointed toward Sindell's cell, and one second later, wrapped Sindell's legs with his arms and took him to the ground. Boerger put his arm around Sindell's upper back in an apparent attempt to control his fall, but Sindell's head hit the floor. Cleckner and Boerger began to turn Sindell onto his stom- ach, and he went limp. They handcuffed him and lifted him up, and he remained limp. They placed him in a chair, and Sindell began having what appeared to be seizures. Cleckner and Boerger took Sindell to the medical unit in a wheelchair. Sindell suffered bruising and cuts and stated that he also suffered from an injured wrist, sei- zures, and a low‐grade fever. Sindell testified that he continues to suffer pain that impacts his ability to work.

Sindell sued Deputies Cleckner, Coach, and Boerger under

42 U.S.C. § 1983 for excessive force, failure to intervene, and retal- iation for exercising his First Amendment rights. With consent by all parties, Boerger was dismissed from the suit. Cleckner and Coach moved for summary judgment, and the district court granted their motion, finding they were entitled to qualified im- munity. Sindell timely appealed.

II.

We review de novo a district court's decision on summary judgment. Teel v. Lozada, 99 F.4th 1273, 1280 (11th Cir. 2024). Sum- mary judgment is appropriate where there is no genuine dispute of material fact and the moving party "is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). "We view the facts in the light

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6 Opinion of the Court 24-13529 most favorable to the non-moving party." Crocker v. Beatty, 995 F.3d 1232, 1239 n.5 (11th Cir. 2021) (internal quotation marks omitted).

III.

Sindell contends that the district court erred in granting summary judgment to Deputies Cleckner and Coach on his claims of excessive force and failure to intervene under the Fourteenth Amendment and retaliation under the First Amendment. We begin with an overview of qualified immunity and then address each claim in turn.

An officer claiming the protection of qualified immunity

"must initially establish that he was acting within his discretionary authority." Skop v. City of Atlanta, 485 F.3d 1130, 1136 (11th Cir. 2007). Once established, "the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show that the official is not entitled to qualified immunity." Id. at 1137. To do so requires two parts. Id. The plaintiff must show both that the officer "violated a constitutional right" and "that constitutional right was clearly established at the time." Ireland v. Prummell, 53 F.4th 1274, 1297 (11th Cir. 2022). "We may decide these issues in either order." Hinson v. Bias, 927 F.3d 1103, 1116 (11th Cir. 2019). If we find the right allegedly violated was not clearly established, we need not decide if the officials committed a constitutional violation. See Maddox v. Stephens, 727 F.3d 1109, 1121 (11th Cir. 2013). The law may clearly establish a constitutional right in three ways: (1) "case law with indistinguishable facts"; (2) "a broad state- ment of principle within the Constitution, statute, or case law"; or

(3) "conduct so egregious that a constitutional right was clearly

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24-13529 Opinion of the Court 7 violated, even in the total absence of case law." United States v. Hill,

99 F.4th 1289, 1301 (11th Cir. 2024) (quotation marks omitted). The Supreme Court has cautioned us "not to define clearly established law at a high level of generality." Plumhoff v. Rickard, 572 U.S. 765, 779 (2014). Although a plaintiff does not need to identify "a case directly on point, . . . existing precedent must have placed the stat- utory or constitutional question beyond debate." Ashcroft v. al-Kidd,

563 U.S. 731, 741 (2011). The critical question of the clearly-estab- lished test "asks whether already existing law was so clear that, given the specific facts . . . every reasonable official would have un- derstood that what he is doing violates the Constitutional right at issue." Gates v. Khokhar, 884 F.3d 1290, 1303 (11th Cir. 2018) (inter- nal quotation marks omitted). And where the plaintiff relies on a broad principle, "it must be obvious that the general rule applies to the specific situation in question." Youmans v. Gagnon, 626 F.3d 557, 563 (11th Cir. 2010) (per curiam).

A. Excessive Force

First, regarding his claim of excessive force, Sindell concedes that "there is no specific case law" addressing the circumstances here. Instead, he asserts that, under the broad statement of princi- ple against the use of objectively unreasonable force on pretrial de- tainees, Deputy Cleckner's takedown violated his clearly estab- lished right to be free from excessive force. In support, Sindell relies primarily on Kingsley v. Hendrickson,²which clarified that an officer

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8 Opinion of the Court 24-13529 violates a pretrial detainee's constitutional rights when "the force purposely or knowingly used against him was objectively unrea- sonable." 576 U.S. 389, 396-97 (2015). But nothing in Kingsley's "ap- plication in our precedent" would put "the unconstitutionality of [Cleckner's] conduct 'beyond debate.'" Hill, 99 F.4th at 1302 (quot- ing White v. Pauly, 580 U.S. 73, 79 (2017)). Although the law is clearly established that "the use of force on compliant, nonresistant detainees is excessive," id. at 1301, Sindell was actively disobeying orders to "lockdown" leading up to Deputy Cleckner's use of force. And the law is clearly established that officers "may not use gratu- itous force against a prisoner who has been already subdued."

Skrtich v. Thornton, 280 F.3d 1295, 1303-04 (11th Cir. 2002), over- ruled on other grounds by Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (2009); see also Danley v. Allen, 540 F.3d 1298, 1309 (11th Cir. 2008) (finding the use of force became unreasonable when it continued past the need for force), overruled in part on other grounds as recognized by Randall v. Scott, 610 F.3d 701, 709 (11th Cir. 2010). But Deputy Cleckner ceased using force as soon as Sindell was on the ground and hand- cuffed, so the force did not continue past the need for it. Ultimately, Sindell does not identify "a broad statement of principle within the Constitution, statute, or case law" that would govern the circumstances here. Hill, 99 F.4th at 1301. Nor do we discern such a principle. Deputy Cleckner is therefore entitled to determining whether the law was clearly established," outside of an "obvious clarity" case. Gilmore v. Georgia Dep't of Corr., No. 23-10343, -- F.4th --, 2025 WL 1911728, at *2 (11th Cir. July 11, 2025) (en banc).

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24-13529 Opinion of the Court 9 qualified immunity because Sindell cannot show a clearly estab- lished constitutional right. See Ireland, 53 F.4th at 1297. Because fail- ing either of qualified immunity's requirements answers the ques- tion before us, we do not decide whether Cleckner's actions amounted to a use of excessive force. See Maddox, 727 F.3d at 1121. Accordingly, we affirm the district court's grant of summary judg- ment to Cleckner on Sindell's claim under § 1983 of excessive force. B. Failure to Intervene

Next, Sindell challenges the district court's grant of qualified immunity to Deputy Coach on his claim that she failed to intervene to stop Cleckner from using excessive force. An officer present at the scene can be liable for failing to "take reasonable steps to pro- tect the victim of another officer's use of excessive force," even if the officer herself did not use excessive force. Hadley v. Gutierrez,

526 F.3d 1324, 1330 (11th Cir. 2008). But the non-intervening of- ficer must have been "in a position to intervene yet failed to do so."

Id. at 1331. Where the use of force "happened quickly and was over quickly," an officer usually does not have the opportunity to inter- vene. Jackson v. City of Atlanta, 97 F.4th 1343, 1362-63 (11th Cir.

2024).

The record here confirms that Deputy Coach was not "in a position to intervene," even if Deputy Cleckner used excessive force. Hadley, 526 F.3d at 1331. Only seconds passed in the time it took for Officer Cleckner to come near Sindell, wrap Sindell's legs with his arms, and take Sindell to the ground. Once Sindell was on the ground, he lost consciousness, and Cleckner stopping using

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10 Opinion of the Court 24-13529 force. From her position by the security desk, Coach did not have the time or position to intervene because of how "quickly" the events transpired. See Jackson, 97 F.4th at 1362-63. Thus, Sindell cannot show that Coach violated his constitutional rights by failing to intervene in an excessive use of force. We affirm the district court's grant of qualified immunity to Coach on Sindell's failure to intervene claim.

C. Retaliation

Finally, Sindell asserts that the district court erred in grant- ing qualified immunity to Coach and Cleckner on his First Amend- ment retaliation claim. On appeal, Sindell argues that Coach retal- iated against him for a grievance he filed against her for throwing his Bible in the trash by (1) putting him on lockdown, (2) ignoring him on the intercom, (3) telling the other people in Sindell's dor- mitory that they would not be able to pass food trays and would have to eat in their cells because Sindell filed a grievance against her, and (4) failing to intervene in response to Cleckner's use of force.³

The district court did not consider the first three alleged ba- ses for retaliation because Sindell raised them for the first time only in reply to the officers' motion for summary judgment. It is

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24-13529 Opinion of the Court 11 improper for a plaintiff to raise new claims through briefs opposing summary judgment. Gilmour v. Gates, McDonald & Co., 382 F.3d 1312, 1315 (11th Cir. 2004) (per curiam). We therefore decline to address those three arguments for the first time on appeal. See Ac- cess Now, Inc. v. Sw. Airlines Co., 385 F.3d 1324, 1331 (11th Cir. 2004). To make out a claim for retaliation under the First Amend- ment, a plaintiff must show that "(1) he engaged in protected speech; (2) the defendant's conduct adversely affected the pro- tected speech; and (3) a causal connection exists between the speech and the defendant's retaliatory actions." Bailey v. Wheeler,

843 F.3d 473, 480 (11th Cir. 2016). A person in detention "is consid- ered to be exercising his First Amendment right of freedom of speech when he complains to the prison's administrators about the conditions of his confinement." Smith v. Mosley, 532 F.3d 1270, 1276 (11th Cir. 2008). Thus, we consider Sindell's June 25, 2020, griev- ance to be constitutionally protected speech. See id. According to Sindell, Coach took adverse action against him by failing to intervene in Cleckner's use of force because of the grievance he filed against her. We agree that a reasonable jury could find that Coach's actions were motivated, at least in part, by Sindell's grievance. Sindell testified that Coach told the other de- tainees, while pointing to Sindell, that they would not be able to trade food and would have to eat in their cells because of griev- ances filed against her. Sindell also testified that she told Cleckner and Boerger when they arrived in the L-Pod that Sindell "needs his ass kicked." These facts, viewed in the light most favorable to

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12 Opinion of the Court 24-13529 Sindell, indicate that the grievance motivated Coach's actions to- ward Sindell and would support a reasonable jury in finding as much.

But even where protected speech motivates retaliatory ac- tions, qualified immunity still protects defendants where "the rec- ord indisputably establishes that the defendant in fact was moti- vated, at least in part, by lawful considerations." Stanley v. City of Dalton, 219 F.3d 1280, 1296 (11th Cir. 2000). Here, Sindell used a ruse to exit his cell in direct violation of Coach's lockdown order and disobeyed her direct orders to return. Coach was therefore mo- tivated, at least in part, by the lawful consideration to have Sindell return to his cell, so she is entitled to qualified immunity. See id. Sindell also argues that the grievance against Coach moti- vated Cleckner's use of force against him in violation of his First Amendment rights. Sindell's claim of retaliation against Deputy Cleckner fails, however, because he cannot show a causal connec- tion between the grievance and Cleckner's takedown. To deter- mine a causal connection, we ask "whether the defendants were subjectively motivated to discipline because [the detained person] complained of some of the conditions of his confinement." Smith,

532 F.3d at 1278. But Sindell does not point us to anything in the record, nor do we identify anything, indicating that Cleckner knew that Sindell filed a grievance against Coach. Instead, the district court found, and we agree, that Cleckner simply responded to Coach's call for assistance and acted in response to that call. With- out a causal connection, Sindell cannot establish that Cleckner

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24-13529 Opinion of the Court 13 retaliated against him for exercising his First Amendment right of freedom of speech. See Bailey, 843 F.3d at 480.

IV.

Therefore, we affirm the district court's grant of summary judgment to the Appellees based on qualified immunity.

AFFIRMED.

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