United States v. Daniel Quintero

22-12846 Opinion of the Court 3 Summary disposition is appropriate either where time is of the essence, such as "situations where important public policy is- sues are involved or those where rights delayed are rights denied,"

or where "the position of one of the parties is clearly right as a mat- ter of law so that there can be no substantial question as to the out- come of the case, or where, as is more frequently the case, the ap- peal is frivolous." Groendyke Transp., Inc. v. Davis, 406 F.2d 1158, 1161-62 (5th Cir. 1969).

When a motion to dismiss the indictment is based on subject matter jurisdictional grounds, we review the district court's denial de novo. United States v. Alfonso, 104 F.4th 815, 820 (11th Cir. 2024), cert denied, No. 24-6177 (U.S. May 19, 2025), and No. 24-6691 (U.S. May 19, 2025). Likewise, we review "de novo a district court's in- terpretation of a statute and whether a statute is constitutional."

Id. (quotation marks omitted). However, we review for plain error a constitutional challenge to a statute that is raised for the first time on appeal. Id. at 828.

Plain error occurs where: (1) there is an error; (2) that is plain; (3) that affects the defendant's substantial rights; and (4) that seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judi- cial proceedings. United States v. Moriarty, 429 F.3d 1012, 1019 (11th Cir. 2005). "It is the law of this circuit that, at least where the ex- plicit language of a statute or rule does not specifically resolve an issue, there can be no plain error where there is no precedent from the Supreme Court or this Court directly resolving it." United States v. Lejarde-Rada, 319 F.3d 1288, 1291 (11th Cir. 2003).

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4 Opinion of the Court 22-12846 The MDLEA makes it a crime to "knowingly or intention- ally . . . possess with intent to manufacture or distribute, a con- trolled substance" on board "a [covered] vessel subject to the juris- diction of the United States," and to conspire to do the same.

46 U.S.C. §§ 70503(a)(1), (e)(1), 70506(b). The Act defines a "vessel subject to the jurisdiction of the United States" as including, in rel- evant part, "a vessel without nationality." Id. § 70502(c)(1)(A). A

"vessel without nationality" is defined in the Act to include, in rel- evant part, "a vessel aboard which the master or individual in charge makes a claim of registry and for which the claimed nation of registry does not affirmatively and unequivocally assert that the vessel is of its nationality." Id. § 70502(d)(1)(C). The MDLEA "ap- plies even though the act is committed outside the territorial juris- diction of the United States." Id. § 70503(b).

Under Article I, Section 8, Clause 10 of the Constitution, Congress has "three distinct grants of power: (1) the power to de- fine and punish piracies, (the Piracies Clause); (2) the power to de- fine and punish felonies committed on the high Seas, (the Felonies Clause); and (3) the power to define and punish offenses against the law of nations (the Offences Clause)." Alfonso, 104 F.4th at 820 (quotation marks omitted, alteration adopted) (citing U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 10).

In Alfonso, the defendants appealed their convictions under the MDLEA that were based on the United States Coast Guard's seizure of their vessel bearing no indicia of nationality in the Do- minican Republic's EEZ. 104 F.4th at 818-19. In response to their

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22-12846 Opinion of the Court 5 challenges that the MDLEA was unconstitutional as applied to them because the Felonies Clause was limited by international law, we noted that we "repeatedly have upheld the MDLEA as a valid exercise of Congress's power to define and punish . . . Felonies on the high Seas." Id. at 820 (quotation marks omitted, first alteration added, second alteration in the original). Looking to the meaning of the "high seas" at the time the Constitution was ratified, we con- cluded that "international law does not limit the Felonies Clause."

Id. at 821-23, 826. We held that a nation's EEZ is "part of the 'high seas' for purposes of the Felonies Clause in Article I of the Consti- tution," and thus "enforcement of the MDLEA in EEZs is proper."

Id. at 823, 827. We noted that we "h[eld] only that customary in- ternational law has no bearing on the meaning of the 'high seas' as understood by the Framers at the time they adopted the Felonies Clause. We recognize[d] that there are potentially other instances when international law considerations may inform MDLEA-based challenges." Id. at 823 n.10.¹

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6 Opinion of the Court 22-12846 We affirmed these holdings in United States v. Canario-Vi- lomar, in which 2 appellants—one seized in a vessel 37 nautical miles north of Panama, and the other seized in a vessel 145 nautical miles north of Colombia—challenged the district court's jurisdic- tion, arguing, as relevant here, that the MDLEA exceeded Con- gress's authority under the Felonies Clause as constrained by inter- national law and that one appellant's arrest did not occur on the high seas because he was arrested in Colombia's EEZ. 128 F.4th 1374, 1376-79 (11th Cir. 2025). We relied on Alfonso and similarly concluded that Congress was not constrained by international law in crafting the MDLEA. Id. at 1381 ("[W]e reject Lemus and Ca- nario-Vilomar's contention that Congress was constrained by in- ternational law in crafting its definition of a stateless vessel or in defining the boundaries of the high seas."). Thus, we rejected an appellant's argument that EEZs were not part of the "high seas"

and "that Congress could not reach him merely because he chose to traffic drugs in Colombia's EEZ rather than farther out into the open ocean." Id. at 1381-82.

In Canario-Vilamar, we also rejected the appellants' argu- ment "that the MDLEA's definition of a vessel without national- ity—specifically, the inclusion of vessels for which a claimed nation can neither confirm nor deny registration—is ultra vires." Id. Re- lying on Alfonso's holding that the Felonies Clause is not limited by customary international law, we reasoned that "[i]t follows that that "'the Felonies Clause is not limited by customary international law.'" Id. at 1381 (quoting Alfonso, 104 F.4th at 826).

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22-12846 Opinion of the Court 7 international law cannot limit Congress's authority to define 'state- less vessel' for purposes of the MDLEA." Id. (citing Alfonso, 104 F.4th at 826). We held that there was no constitutional error at all in this MDLEA definition of a vessel without nationality, expand- ing upon Alfonso's holding that there was no plain error.

"[T]he MDLEA treats the terms 'nationality' and 'registry' as interchangeable throughout § 70502." United States v. Gruezo,

66 F.4th 1284, 1291 (11th Cir.), cert denied, 144 S. Ct. 178 (2023).

"The interchangeability and equivalency of these two terms in the MDLEA is further evidenced by § 70502(d)(1)(C), where the rejec- tion of a master's claim of registry is premised on the named coun- try's failure to confirm nationality." Id. In Alfonso, the defendants

"made a verbal claim of Columbian nationality for the vessel, but Colombia could not confirm or deny registry of the vessel, which rendered the vessel stateless and subject to the jurisdiction of the United States under the MDLEA, pursuant to 46 U.S.C. § 70502(d)(1)(C)." Alfonso, 104 F.4th at 819 (emphasis added). The MDLEA is constitutional under the Felonies Clause as applied to drug-trafficking crimes on the high seas without a

"nexus" to the United States. United States v. Cabezas-Montano,

949 F.3d 567, 587 (11th Cir. 2020).

"Under our prior-panel-precedent rule, a prior panel's hold- ing is binding on all subsequent panels unless and until it is over- ruled or undermined to the point of abrogation by the Supreme Court or by this Court sitting en banc." Id. at 1381 (quotation marks omitted, alteration adopted). We have "categorically rejected an

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8 Opinion of the Court 22-12846 overlooked reason or argument exception to the prior-panel prec- edent rule." Id. (quotation marks omitted). We have also stated that a panel may not disregard precedent and, thus, that the prior panel precedent rule applies, even if a later panel believes it was wrongly decided. United States v. Golden, 854 F.3d 1256, 1257 (11th Cir. 2017) (citing Smith v. GTE Corp., 236 F.3d 1292, 1303 (11th Cir. 2001) (rejecting an exception to the prior-panel precedent rule

"based upon a perceived defect in the prior panel's reasoning or analysis as it relates to the law in existence at that time")). Here, we grant the government's motion for summary affir- mance because its position is clearly right as a matter of law such that there can be no substantial question as to the outcome of the case. See Groendyke Transp., Inc., 406 F.2d at 1161-62. Quintero's arguments are foreclosed by our binding case precedent because we have held that § 70502(d)(1)(C) is not facially unconstitutional, that there is no constitutional error in MDLEA's definition of a

"vessel without nationality," and that a nation's EEZ is part of the

"high seas" for purposes of the Felonies Clause in Article I of the Constitution and thus enforcement of the MDLEA in EEZs is proper. See Alfonso, 104 F.4th at 820-23, 826-27; Canario-Vilomar,

128 F.4th at 1381-82. Further, we have held that that a claim of nationality triggers § 70502(d)(1)(C) and that the MDLEA extends to offenses bearing no "nexus" to the United States. See Gruezo, 66 F.4th at 1291; Alfonso, 104 F.4th at 819; Cabezas-Montano, 949 F.3d at 587. Thus, we affirm Quintero's convictions.

AFFIRMED.

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