Schott v. Lucatelli

parties did not enter into a written agreement; rather, defendant deposited funds totaling $250,000 into an account that plaintiff could access to pay for construction materials and labor costs for himself and other workers. Plaintiff obtained the necessary permits and began construction around June 2018. As plaintiff spent winters in Florida, construction was halted during those months. Plaintiff resumed construction in May 2019; by January 2020, plaintiff had worked 31 weeks, working at least 40 hours per week. It is uncontroverted that plaintiff was paid for the work he performed in 2018 but was not paid for any work performed thereafter. According to plaintiff, at some point in 2019, the available funds were running low, so he prioritized paying for materials and the labor of others, agreeing to postpone paying himself until defendant received the proceeds from the upcoming sale of a family cottage. Before traveling to Florida in January 2020, plaintiff provided defendant a handwritten summary of the work he had performed, with the sum due to him as of that date. When plaintiff returned in April 2020, he discovered that defendant had locked him out of the unfinished home and hired someone else to complete construction, so he provided her with an invoice for his unpaid work.

As defendant notes, plaintiff would be unable to recover under a quantum meruit theory if his claim was solely premised on an invoice that "contained no description of the tasks that were performed or the work that was completed" ( Jaeger v Bellavia , 172 AD3d at 1502). That is not the case here. While the April 2020 invoice provided minimal description of the work performed, plaintiff provided significant testimony regarding the scope of the work he performed between May 2019 and January 2020. Deferring to Supreme Court's credibility determinations, the record reflects that, during that time, plaintiff finished the exterior siding for the home, performed electrical work and installed a well, roof insulation, plumbing, lighting fixtures and drywall, among other things. Such a finding was further corroborated by photographs depicting the work [*3] performed and by the testimony of plaintiff's wife and brother, both of whom assisted with various aspects of the construction ( see Murray v Bickerton , 225 AD3d at 1088; Jaeger v Bellavia , 172 AD3d at 1502; Douglas Constr. of Fulton County v Marcais , 239 AD2d 803, 804 [3d Dept 1997]; Clark v Torian , 214 AD2d 938, 938 [3d Dept 1995]). Additionally, considering the higher rates charged by the professional construction trade witnesses, we are satisfied that $35 per hour reflects the reasonable value of plaintiff's work ( see Thomas J. Hayes & Assoc., LLC v Brodsky , 101 AD3d at 1562-1563; Frank v Feiss , 266 AD2d 825, 826 [4th Dept 1999]; compare Home Constr. Corp. v Beaury , 149 AD3d 699 , 702 [2d Dept 2017]; Michaels v Byung Keun Song , 138 AD3d 1074 , 1075 [2d Dept 2016]). Under these circumstances, we find that Supreme Court properly calculated the reasonable value of plaintiff's work. [FN3]

We also reject defendant's request that we reverse the grant of prejudgment interest at the statutory rate, as our review of the record does not reveal any appropriate basis to do so ( see CPLR 5001 [a]). While the theory of quantum meruit is an equitable one, its nature remains quasi-contractual ( see e.g. Villnave Constr. Servs., Inc. v Crossgates Mall Gen. Co. Newco, LLC , 201 AD3d 1183 , 1185 [3d Dept 2022]; cf. McDermott v City of New York , 50 NY2d 211, 217 n 2 [1980]). Our case law conflicts on whether quantum meruit awards stem from an action at law and are thus entitled to mandatory prejudgment interest, or whether they are instead equitable actions, thus leaving the determination of prejudgment interest to the sound discretion of the trial court ( see CPLR 5001 [a]; Buckley v Sheridan , 85 Misc 3d 327 , 329-330 [Sup Ct, Greene County 2024]; compare Ogletree, Deakins, Nash, Smoak & Stewart v Albany Steel , 243 AD2d 877, 879 [3d Dept 1997], with Precision Founds. v Ives , 4 AD3d 589 , 593 [3d Dept 2004]). Further, although the First and Second Departments have both found that prejudgment interest on quantum meruit awards is mandatory ( see Marin v Constitutional Realty, LLC , 161 AD3d 538 , 539 [1st Dept 2018], lv denied 32 NY3d 911 [2018]; Tesser v Allboro Equip. Co. , 73 AD3d 1023 , 1027 [2d Dept 2010]), the question remains open in the Fourth Department ( compare TY Elec. Corp. v DelMonte , 101 AD3d 1626 , 1626 [4th Dept 2012], with Crane-Hogan Structural Sys., Inc. v State of New York , 88 AD3d 1258 , 1262 [4th Dept 2011]). Under the facts presented herein, we would uphold the prejudgment interest award regardless of which standard we apply. Thus, inasmuch as deciding this appeal does not turn on resolving said conflict â€" and the parties do not call on us to do so â€" we decline to address it. To the extent not expressly addressed herein, defendant's remaining contentions have been considered and found to lack merit.

Aarons, Ceresia, Fisher and McShan, JJ., concur.