BENDIX, Acting P. J.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, No. LD071307 Gary D. Roberts, Judge. Affirmed.
Lily Shia, in pro. per., for Appellant.
Gunther Shia, in pro. per., for Respondent.
BENDIX, Acting P. J.
Lily Shia appeals from an order denying a domestic violence restraining order against respondent Gunther Shia, her ex-husband. Both parties are self-represented on appeal. Lily fails to show the family law court erred by declining to consider many of Lily's allegations of abuse on the basis that they already had been litigated and decided in Gunther's favor. We further hold Lily's remaining allegations are not supported by substantial evidence or were not properly before the family law court. Finally, we conclude Lily was not prejudiced by her inability to examine a witness fully whose remote connection disconnected during the restraining order hearing. Accordingly, we affirm.
We will refer to the parties by first name for clarity, not out of familiarity or disrespect. (See In re Marriage of Schaffer (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 810, 803, fn. 2.)
BACKGROUND
1. 2022 statement of decision regarding domestic violence
Lily and Gunther were married in May 2011. Their daughter was born in July 2013. In May 2015, Gunther filed a petition for dissolution of the marriage.
On December 16, 2015, Lily filed a request for a domestic violence restraining order against Gunther. On February 19, 2016, a few days before the date set for the hearing on the restraining order, the parties reached a settlement agreement concerning child custody and visitation. As part of the settlement, Lily dismissed her restraining order request with prejudice. The agreement also limited the admissibility of evidence of Gunther's alleged acts of domestic violence predating the agreement in the event Lily sought a restraining order in the future.
Specifically, the agreement provided, "No act or event prior hereto, including but not limited to those alleged in [Lily's] domestic violence RFO [request for order], may be alleged to, disclosed to or considered by the Court in connection with any request by [Lily] for a temporary domestic violence restraining order ('TRO')." It further provided," '[i]f any TRO requested by [Lily] is granted, then at the hearing on the permanent restraining order [Lily] can present evidence of acts prior to the effective date of this [agreement], provided[,] however, that the Court cannot consider the evidence of past acts and cannot issue the permanent restraining order if: [¶] (1) The Court determines that [Lily] did not prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the act(s) alleged to have taken place after the effective date of this [agreement] ('the alleged recent act(s)') occurred; or, [¶] (2) That [the] . . . alleged recent act(s) do (does) not warrant a permanent restraining order.' "
Trial on the dissolution petition began on August 7, 2017. Lily sought to introduce evidence of domestic violence by Gunther as a factor in determining spousal support for Lily. The family law court, Judge Shirley K. Watkins presiding, ruled the settlement agreement barred such evidence. Lily appealed, and we reversed the spousal support judgment. (In re Shia (Jun. 29, 2020, B290859) [nonpub. opn.].) We concluded the settlement agreement limited introduction of domestic violence evidence only in restraining order proceedings, not proceedings to determine spousal support.
The instant appeal is the fourth we have heard in this case. In addition to case No. B290859 discussed herein, we have decided In re Shia (Mar. 26, 2019, B286864) [nonpub. opn.], affirming an earlier denial of a restraining order against Gunther, and In re Marriage of Shia (July 30, 2024, B324260) [nonpub. opn.], affirming an order granting Gunther primary physical custody of the parties' daughter.
On remand, the family law court, now with Judge Firdaus F. Dordi presiding, conducted a trial on two questions:" '(1) Whether evidence exists sufficient to substantiate emotional distress resulting from domestic violence that pre-dates February 19, 2016 perpetrated against the supported party (Lily) by the supporting party (Gunther), and (2) Whether, if so, based on that evidence and evidence relating to the parties['] current financial resources (e.g., income, assets, earning potential, etc.), Lily is entitled to additional spousal support over and above the amount previously awarded by the trial Court.' "
In addition to the parties, witnesses at trial included Lily's former roommate, a victim's advocate who interviewed Lily six months after Gunther filed for dissolution, and the executive director of a domestic violence center who followed up with Lily after Lily's intake with the victim's advocate. Lily also offered medical records as evidence.
Following trial, Judge Dordi issued a 51-page statement of decision on March 30, 2022. The court found the medical records offered by Lily did not corroborate her claims of abuse, and one actually contradicted her testimony. The court found Lily's roommate's testimony unhelpful because it was based primarily not on the roommate's personal knowledge, but on what Lily herself had told the roommate, which the court noted was hearsay. Similarly, the victim advocate's and domestic violence center executive director's testimony was based on Lily's own hearsay statements made six months after Gunther had filed for dissolution, and Lily provided no corroborating evidence despite claiming there were text messages and e-mails documenting the abuse.
After summarizing and analyzing the parties' testimony regarding Lily's claims of disturbing the peace, coercive control, and physical violence, the court found Lily largely not credible, noting, in particular, Lily's failure to produce corroborating documentary evidence. In contrast, the court found Gunther "to be credible in most respects." The court concluded, "In light of the credibility considerations, the court finds that LILY failed to meet her burden of showing by a preponderance of the evidence that (a) she had suffered domestic violence, as defined in [Family Code s]ections 6211, 6203, and 6320, at the hands of GUNTHER . . ., and (2) that any emotional/physical abuse/violence that she may have suffered impacted to any extent, her ability to work either at the time of the initial trial or thereafter."
Lily did not appeal from the March 30, 2022 decision.
2. 2023 request for domestic violence restraining order
On June 16, 2023, Lily filed a request for a domestic violence restraining order against Gunther on behalf of herself and her younger child, identified in the request as "Baby Boy."In an accompanying declaration, Lily identified 11 bases for her request.
Lily apparently gave birth to the child sometime in 2021. Gunther is not the child's father.
First, Lily claimed a "Threat of Physical Harm." (Underscoring omitted.) She contended her daughter told her the daughter had overheard Gunther speaking with a man "about wanting to beat up and really hurt [Lily]." Lily claimed she had obtained corroborating evidence that Gunther intended to hire someone to harm or kill her, including an affidavit from the man with whom the daughter allegedly overheard Gunther speaking. Information later provided to the court indicated the man Gunther allegedly spoke with is named Chih-Hua Chi Tsz, but goes by the name Fred Chi.
Second, Lily claimed "Coercive Control by Intimidation." (Underscoring omitted.) She cited as examples incidents during the marriage in which Gunther purportedly attempted to force her to have an abortion when she was pregnant with her daughter, or to sign a marital agreement after they separated. Lily also contended Gunther had repeatedly told Lily not to report any abuse because he could be deported, lose his job, or go to jail.
Third, Lily claimed Gunther was coercing their daughter to harm herself. Lily based this claim on a note Lily found in their daughter's backpack in 2022 in which the daughter stated she hated life and wanted to die, and other expressions of fear or sadness.
Fourth, Lily claimed Gunther had demonstrated a lack of respect for life, alleging, as examples, that Gunther had mistreated a dog during their marriage and had a history of aborted pregnancies with other women prior to the marriage.
Fifth, Lily alleged Gunther had "Unreasonable and Extreme Jealousy" (underscoring omitted) regarding her new baby, including their daughter's affection for the child, and was "obsess[ed] with interrogating our daughter for details about the baby."
Sixth, Lily accused Gunther of attempting to assert financial control over her by engaging in "financial tracking using the judicial system." She alleged someone had called the Los Angeles County Department of Public Social Services (DPSS) and pretended to be Lily to remove her account's confidential status and gain access to her files. She believed Gunther was the impersonator, given he had motive and knowledge of her personal information sufficient to effect the deception. She further alleged she had received a "hostile call" from someone claiming to be a DPSS fraud investigator demanding financial information and threatening to deprive her of her welfare benefits if she did not comply. Again, she believed Gunther was behind that call.
Seventh, Lily accused Gunther of slandering her to their daughter, specifically, her daughter had told her Gunther said Lily was a bad mother with mental problems who should not be allowed to raise children.
Eighth, Lily claimed "Veiled Intimidation" (underscoring omitted), which manifested in Gunther allegedly telling their daughter he did not care if Lily were alive or dead, and it would be better if Lily were dead. Lily believed Gunther intended that" 'message' to get back to [Lily]."
Ninth, Lily alleged "Coercive Control by Monitoring" (underscoring omitted), referring to incidents during the marriage in which Gunther went through her phone and laptop and checked her gas mileage and financial transactions. She further claimed that after they separated, Gunther activated video and listening devices in her home. Lily claimed Gunther more recently had lied to the court to gain access to her home, including telling the court he needed to recover a trumpet that Lily believed did not actually exist.
Tenth, Lily accused Gunther of "Gaslighting" (underscoring omitted) by denying he suffered from steroid-induced rages during their marriage and denying Lily's contributions to Gunther's career success.
Gaslighting has been defined as "psychological manipulation of a person usually over an extended period of time that causes the victim to question the validity of their own thoughts, perception of reality, or memories and typically leads to confusion, loss of confidence and self-esteem, uncertainty of one's emotional or mental stability, and a dependency on the perpetrator." (Merriam-Webster Dict. Online (2025) <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/gaslighting> [as of Jan. 27, 2025], archived at <https://perma.cc/B5TN-47HP>.)
Eleventh, in a paragraph entitled "[Gunther's] Motivation" (underscoring omitted), Lily contended Gunther's judgment was "clouded by his financial grievances," his misapprehension that Lily ruined his career, and their daughter's rebelliousness and willfulness. She mentioned again Gunther's alleged jealousy of their daughter's affection for Lily's baby, and expressed concern as to how Gunther would react if he heard their daughter refer to Lily's new partner as "Papa."
The family law court, Judge Roberts presiding, scheduled a hearing on the restraining order request but declined to grant an ex parte temporary restraining order (TRO) pending that hearing. In denying the TRO, the court wrote, "Most of the allegations have been repeatedly litigated in the past. Under the totality of the circumstances, there is no basis for a no-notice TRO."
Lily filed a supplement to her restraining order arguing the court gave insufficient weight to her claims of more recent domestic violence, and disputed that any past acts of abuse had been litigated for purposes of any restraining order proceeding.
Gunther filed a response to the restraining order request in which, inter alia, he described his communications with Fred Chi and attached text messages and an e-mail between Gunther and Chi in November and December 2021. Gunther believed Chi had contacted him under false pretenses. Specifically, he contended Chi claimed to be seeking help for what Chi represented was a scam by a friend of Lily's. In actuality, Gunther believed Chi had ulterior motives that Gunther had not yet discerned apart from obtaining information about Gunther for Lily's benefit.
In the e-mail Gunther attached to his response, Chi introduced himself to Gunther and asked whether Gunther had assisted someone named Kathleen Brown in obtaining a loan. Chi referred to a "serious mess" involving Brown with "lies and shady things going on," and expressed concern Chi was "being scammed."
In the text messages, Chi asked Gunther about Lily's whereabouts and appeared to indicate Brown was using the purported loan she took out to pay Lily's mortgage. In texts from early December 2021, Chi and Gunther set up a meeting at a ramen shop, and Chi again referred to Chi's belief that Brown was scamming him, and Chi's desire to "get [Brown's] ass deported." Chi texted that if Brown was deported, "Lily can't use her to go out there [to] scam and make money for her. Then [that] might help [Gunther's] case." The other December texts appear to be Chi's attempt to offer emotional support to Gunther. None of the communications discusses physically harming Lily.
3. Hearing and ruling on restraining order request
The family law court, again with Judge Roberts presiding, held a hearing on Lily's restraining order request on July 14, 2023. Lily appeared with counsel; Gunther appeared in propria persona. Also present was court-appointed counsel for their daughter.
a. Court narrows issues for hearing
The court began the hearing by reviewing Lily's restraining order request and narrowing the allegations for which a hearing was required.
The court found a hearing was required as to Lily's first contention that Gunther was seeking someone to harm her.
The court found Lily's second contention, coercive control by intimidation, had previously been litigated and addressed in Judge Dordi's March 30, 2022 statement of decision, and would not be reheard.
The court found Lily's third contention that Gunther was coercing their daughter to harm herself was not properly before the court because it concerned danger to the daughter, not Lily. The court stated those allegations could be brought in another proceeding "upon the appointment of a guardian ad litem or by minor's counsel."
The court found Lily's fourth contention, Gunther's lack of respect for life, contained no allegations of domestic violence apart from what was already incorporated into the discussion of coercive control, a matter that, again, had already been litigated.
The court found Lily's fifth contention, extreme jealousy, did not allege conduct constituting domestic violence, even if proven.
The court found Lily's sixth contention, financial control, did require hearing as to her allegations that Gunther had accessed her financial information and arranged for someone to impersonate a DPSS investigator.
The court found Lily's seventh contention, slander, did not constitute domestic violence, nor did her allegations regarding veiled intimidation, her eighth contention.
The court found Lily's ninth contention, coercive control by monitoring, largely had been litigated previously, and the new allegation that Gunther had gone to Lily's home to recover a trumpet did not constitute domestic violence even if proven. The court similarly found the 10th contention, gaslighting, had been litigated and resolved in the March 30, 2022 statement of decision. The court found Lily's 11th contention regarding Gunther's motivation did not assert allegations regarding domestic violence requiring a determination by the court.
Thus, the allegations that remained for hearing were the claims Gunther had sought someone to harm Lily, had accessed her financial information, and had arranged for someone to impersonate a DPSS investigator. Because the narrowed scope no longer concerned the parties' daughter, the court excused daughter's counsel. Lily's counsel did not object to the narrowed scope, or argue against the court's determination that some allegations had already been litigated and others would not constitute domestic violence even if proven.
b. Allegations that Gunther sought to physically harm Lily
As to the allegations Gunther sought someone to harm Lily, Lily offered into evidence a notarized affidavit from Fred Chi dated May 11, 2023, two months before the hearing. In the affidavit, Chi stated he became acquainted with Gunther in November 2021, and during a chat about "significant others," Gunther asked if Chi "knew anyone that could hurt Gunther's wife Lily." Chi did not think Gunther was serious, but when they met in person in December 2021, Gunther "asked again if I knew anyone to hire to hurt or threaten his wife Lily." Chi averred he was "extremely uncomfortable, ignored the request and left." Gunther contacted Chi twice more, once in 2022 and once in February 2023, again asking if Chi could find someone to hurt Lily. Chi stated he wrote the affidavit because he felt "extremely stressed-out and uncomfortable," and "worried not only for Gunther's mental state, but for his wife Lily as well."
Lily also called Chi as a witness at the hearing. Chi appeared remotely by video, apparently while on an airplane or other form of mass transit. The court noted it was difficult to hear Chi, and asked Chi to "please speak slowly and distinctly." Chi acknowledged he had presented a sworn affidavit and that everything in it was true and correct. Chi stated he only met Gunther once, and did not know him personally. The court asked Chi about conversations he had had with Gunther. Chi responded, "I don't remember. It's been so long. I only talked to him very briefly" on the telephone one time in December 2021. Chi also had a "very short and brief" online conversation with Gunther in November 2021. Asked by the court if he remembered chatting with Gunther about significant others, as stated in the affidavit, Chi said, "I don't remember exactly."
Questioned further by the court, Chi said he believed he had two conversations in total with Gunther, and met with him in person once in December 2021 or January 2022. The court asked what was discussed in the in-person conversation, and Chi said, "Just talking about his life and counseling and stuff like that. That's when he told me about his life. We were just chitchatting, very short, brief."
The court asked if Gunther said anything that concerned Chi, and Chi answered, "I wasn't sure. I don't know him that well. Personally, I don't. So I was more listening to him. That's it." The court again asked if Gunther said anything that concerned Chi, and Chi said, "A little bit. Just a little bit. I wasn't sure. That's his personal life. So I wasn't sure too much detail, you know, until later on." He continued, "[Gunther] was telling me how much problem he has with his wife or ex-wife. I don't know her or anything. It's what he was complaining about. He was having a lot of issues with her." The court asked if Gunther said anything else, and Chi said, "Honestly, I can't remember exact detail. It was so long ago." After further prompting from the court, Chi added, "He was saying like he was having a lot of problems. They were fighting all the time. They got a lot of issues with each other. That's what he told me." Chi said that was all he remembered.
The court asked if Chi had been in contact with Gunther more recently, and Chi said no. Asked if he had communicated with Gunther in the past year, Chi said he did not remember. The court asked how Chi's affidavit had "come to be created," and Chi said, "[M]e and my friend, we were talking about it, and that's what she mentioned, you know, with her. So I cannot hear." The court asked if the friend Chi referred to was Lily, and Chi indicated he could no longer hear the court, and asked if the court could hear him. Chi then disconnected.
The court stated the affidavit was "of questionable evidentiary weight under the best of circumstances," and "[g]iven the testimony of Mr. Chi, the court will give it no weight. He had no recollection despite the court asking him multiple times of anything that was threatening." The court declined to receive the affidavit into evidence, noting that even if the court did receive it, "it would be given no weight in light of the testimony that was received."
The court acknowledged Chi was on an airplane while testifying, "[b]ut he was able to testify about the conversations that he recalled. He was repeatedly asked for the details of those conversations, and he never said anything about a threat to kill someone or harm someone, which would be the headline in any conversations that I'd ever had with someone."
Lily's counsel argued that Chi simply was answering the court's questions about recalling conversations without understanding the court wanted to know if anything was said about a threat. The court disagreed.
Lily's counsel then questioned Gunther, who acknowledged meeting Chi but denied asking Chi to find someone to harm Lily. Gunther testified Chi in fact was the one who asked Gunther if he would be interested in finding someone to harm or threaten Lily, and Gunther "absolutely said no."
The court found Lily had not met her burden of proof on the issue of physical harm, and was not entitled to a restraining order on that basis.
Later in the hearing, Lily's counsel objected that she did not have the opportunity to ask Chi follow-up questions. The court responded, "[Chi] did clearly understand the questions that he responded to. He did not affirm any part of the affidavit other than affirming in a general way. The court was left with the distinct impression that the entire thing was a fraud upon the court, but I don't need to make that finding. The only finding I need to make is whether given what he did say, whether [Lily has] met [her] burden of proof, and the court found that [she] did not."
The court further noted that the e-mail and text messages between Chi and Gunther that Gunther submitted with his response to the restraining order request were not consistent with Chi's affidavit. The court stated, "So I'm very curious as to the story behind that [affidavit], but I don't really need to resolve that curiosity because of the witness' testimony that was received."
c. Allegations of financial control
As to the allegations that Gunther had attempted to assert financial control over Lily, Lily sought to introduce a letter she wrote to her CalWORKS social worker. The letter is not in the appellate record. According to Lily's counsel at the restraining order hearing, in that letter, Lily stated someone posing as an investigator had tried to access her accounts. The court stated its tentative view was the letter was inadmissible hearsay, but allowed Lily's counsel to examine Lily about it.
Lily testified she believed Gunther asked someone to pose as an investigator, and she reached this conclusion "just based on the pattern that we had when we were married." She said during a recent child support hearing, Gunther had told the commissioner he believed Lily was committing fraud regarding her entitlement to social services, and the commissioner told him "to contact that office." Lily said she later received a call from someone claiming to be a CalWORKS investigator, identifying himself as "Mr. High." Lily said High "was very loud, very intimidating," and he asked for the same details that Gunther and the commissioner had asked about in the child support hearing. When Lily declined to provide the information, High said that "if I didn't tell him right then and there, I would lose all my benefits."
Lily stated she contacted her social worker about Mr. High, and was told "that this wasn't, you know, a person that was opening-whatever I said at the time about some type of fraud investigation, they said no. So nothing happened to my account."
The court asked what information Lily received in response when she wrote to her social worker about the call from High. Lily answered that she was told "there was no Mr. High investigating me for fraud at all." The court said it would like to see whatever response Lily received from her social worker, and Lily said, "I can ask my social worker to write a letter." The court noted Lily's testimony that Gunther had accused her of fraud, and observed that the call from High might have been because Gunther had filed a claim of fraud that High legitimately was investigating. The court asked what evidence Lily had that this was not the case, and Lily said her only evidence was the call from her social worker. Lily said her social worker did not tell her who High was, and Lily did not remember if she asked.
Lily's counsel questioned Gunther, who acknowledged he had contacted DPSS and notified them of his suspicions of fraud by Lily, but denied knowing High or posing or asking someone to pose as a fraud investigator.
Regarding other instances of alleged financial control, Lily testified that within the previous six months someone had changed the telephone number associated with one of her credit cards to Gunther's telephone number. The court asked if Lily had any documentary evidence of this and she said she did not, but if the court gave her time she would try to obtain some. The court stated that absent a screenshot or other document establishing a change of phone number, there was no proof to support that allegation, noting Lily in earlier proceedings had been "repeatedly called to task and found not to be credible because she was making statements when there was better evidence that would establish what she was trying to establish."
Although not captured in the reporter's transcript, apparently Lily made a comment about the court not considering evidence of past abuse, because the court stated, "I just wanted to clarify a comment that [Lily] made a moment ago. It's not that I'm [not] considering the past. It's that I'm not allowing the past to be relitigated. So I have very much considered what was in the past in the statement of decision. I just wanted to clarify that."
Lily's counsel asked her if any other financial accounts had been affected. Lily said there were, but "I just don't keep them on my mind because it was just really overwhelming at the time that it occurred."
Lily also testified that in the previous year, someone accessed her social services account and removed its confidential status. Lily stated this could only be done by someone who had her social security number, date of birth, address, and other information. Lily believed Gunther was responsible, noting it happened shortly after a child support hearing.
The court found Lily had not met her burden to show domestic abuse through financial control: "There's stronger evidence that would establish what is being alleged here that was not presented. The evidence that was presented is circumstantial, not probative in the court's view." Regarding Lily's allegations that Gunther had arranged for High to impersonate a fraud investigator, the court found the evidence supported "another equally plausible explanation" that High was a legitimate fraud investigator, and Lily's evidence to the contrary consisted of "multiple levels of hearsay."
The court denied Lily's restraining order request. Lily timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
On appeal, Lily challenges nearly all of the family law court's rulings on her restraining order request. Our review is limited to those rulings and the appellate record before us. To the extent the parties, in their briefing or at oral argument, have raised issues unrelated to the family law court's rulings on Lily's restraining order request, or that are outside the appellate record, we disregard them.
A. Applicable Law and Standard of Review
The Domestic Violence Protection Act (DVPA; Fam. Code,§ 6200 et seq.)" 'provides for the issuance of restraining or "protective" orders, either ex parte or after hearing, that enjoin specific acts of abuse.' [Citation.]" (Malinowski v. Martin (2023) 93 Cal.App.5th 681, 691.)" '[A]buse'" includes intentionally or recklessly causing or attempting to cause bodily injury, sexual assault, placing a person "in reasonable apprehension of imminent serious bodily injury to that person or to another," and "any behavior that has been or could be enjoined pursuant to Section 6320." (§ 6203.) Section 6320 in turn allows courts to "enjoin[ ] a party from molesting, attacking, striking, stalking, threatening, sexually assaulting, battering, credibly impersonating . . ., falsely personating . . ., harassing, telephoning, . . ., destroying personal property, contacting, either directly or indirectly, by mail or otherwise, coming within a specified distance of, or disturbing the peace of the other party, and, in the discretion of the court, on a showing of good cause, of other named family or household members." (§ 6320, subd. (a).)
Unspecified statutory citations are to the Family Code.
" '[D]isturbing the peace of the other party' refers to conduct that, based on the totality of the circumstances, destroys the mental or emotional calm of the other party.... This conduct includes, but is not limited to, coercive control, which is a pattern of behavior that in purpose or effect unreasonably interferes with a person's free will and personal liberty." (§ 6320, subd. (c).) Coercive control includes, inter alia, "[c]ontrolling, regulating, or monitoring the other party's movements, communications, daily behavior, finances, economic resources, or access to services. (Id., subd. (c)(3).)
"In general, we defer to the trial judge when reviewing an order granting or denying a DVRO. We review such decisions for abuse of discretion. [Citation.] We review a trial court's factual findings for substantial evidence. [Citation.]' "The question of whether a trial court applied the correct legal standard to an issue in exercising its discretion is a question of law [citation] requiring de novo review."' [Citation.]" (Bailey v. Murray (2024) 102 Cal.App.5th 677, 684.)
B. Lily Fails to Show The Family Law Erred In Finding The Parties Already Had Litigated The Allegations of Abuse Predating February 19, 2016
The family law court declined to hear evidence on Lily's allegations regarding coercive control by intimidation, lack of respect for life, coercive control by monitoring, and gaslighting, because the court found the parties already had litigated those matters as reflected in Judge Dordi's March 30, 2022 statement of decision regarding spousal support.
The family law court did not address whether the parties' February 19, 2016 settlement agreement affected Lily's ability to introduce evidence of purported abuse occurring before that date, and we express no opinion on that question.
Lily does not dispute that her allegations in support of these particular bases for a restraining order involved purported domestic abuse taking place before February 19, 2016, the subject of the March 30, 2022 decision. She nonetheless argues exclusion of this evidence was error because the litigation that led to the March 30, 2022 decision involved spousal support, not a request for a domestic violence restraining order. Put another way, the parties have litigated Lily's evidence of domestic violence only in the context of spousal support, not a request for a domestic violence restraining order. In Lily's view, therefore, her allegations, insofar as she offers them in support of a request for a restraining order rather than spousal support, cannot be deemed to have been previously litigated.
We can only infer this is what Lily is arguing, because her briefing is unclear on the point. Lily's appellate briefing in fact never mentions the March 30, 2022 decision, and there is no discussion of the spousal support proceedings in her summary of the case's procedural history. We caution that appellants are required to include all relevant facts and procedural history in their briefing, even if that information is unfavorable to their position. Lily's first mention of anything related to the spousal support proceedings is on page 41 of her opening brief, in which she argues the court's finding that her domestic abuse allegations already had been litigated was an "underlying confirmation bias . . . from the anchoring effect of an August 2021 . . . Opinion on Alimony-circumscribed to Lily's earning capacity-and does not translate in a restraining order trial, is not directive in a [domestic violence restraining order] hearing; is not found to be current; and should not influence the trial court's subsequent judgments ...." (Underscoring, boldface, italics, & fn. omitted.) Although we are unclear why Lily refers to an August 2021 opinion on alimony rather than the March 30, 2022 statement of decision, we infer Lily is arguing that the findings on spousal support should have no bearing on her restraining order request.
Lily's position is contrary to the principle of collateral estoppel, also called issue preclusion. That principle"' "precludes relitigation of issues argued and decided in prior proceedings." '" (Williams v. Doctors Medical Center of Modesto, Inc. (2024) 100 Cal.App.5th 1117, 1131.) Importantly, the principle applies even if the prior proceedings concerned different claims or causes of action. (Vandenberg v. Superior Court (1999) 21 Cal.4th 815, 828). Thus, to the extent the issues decided in the March 30, 2022 statement of decision were the same issues raised in Lily's restraining order request, Lily may not relitigate them even though the statement of decision concerned spousal support rather than a restraining order.
It is Lily's burden as appellant to demonstrate the family law court erred in concluding the issues raised in her restraining order request pertaining to abuse occurring prior to February 19, 2016 already had been litigated and decided in the March 30, 2022 statement of decision. (Grappo v. McMills (2017) 11 Cal.App.5th 996, 1006 [lower court's ruling presumed correct; appellant has burden to demonstrate error].) Lily does not meet this burden. Her briefing does not cite or discuss the March 30, 2022 statement of decision or the proceedings leading to it, and therefore does not indicate how, if at all, the issues decided in those proceedings differed from the issues of pre-February 19, 2016 abuse raised in her restraining order request. Her sole argument is that determinations of issues in a spousal support proceeding can have no preclusive effect in a subsequent restraining order proceeding. As we have explained, that is not the law. Lily therefore fails to demonstrate any error in the family law court's exclusion of her allegations of pre-February 19, 2016 abuse when ruling on her restraining order request.
Lily argues that at the time of the spousal support proceedings leading to the March 30, 2022 decision, she was unable to provide all applicable evidence because of her medical issues at the time, including a medical prohibition "from compiling triggering evidence." Lily cites nothing in the record indicating she raised these concerns at the time of the spousal support proceedings. Even if she had, and assuming arguendo the family law court did not provide Lily sufficient opportunity to prove her case in the spousal support proceedings, her remedy was an appeal from the March 30, 2022 decision. Having not taken that appeal, she cannot now challenge that decision or the circumstances that led to it.
Lily argues that coercive control is demonstrated through a pattern of behavior, which necessarily requires courts to consider past as well as current behavior. Thus, she contends, as a matter of public policy, the family law court should have looked to Gunther's conduct before February 19, 2016.
Again, the family law court did look to Gunther's conduct before February 19, 2016 when it decided the spousal support issues in 2022. The court found insufficient evidence that Gunther had committed acts of domestic violence including coercive control. Lily fails to show this finding did not apply equally to her restraining order request under principles of collateral estoppel.
Lily contends that the statutes governing domestic violence restraining orders nowhere indicate a party may not rely on allegations that already have been litigated. Collateral estoppel, however, is a bedrock principle applied broadly in civil litigation, and Lily provides no basis not to apply it here.
C. Lily's Other Claims Were Unsupported by Substantial Evidence or Were Not Properly Before the Family Law Court
As set forth below, we discern no error or abuse of discretion in the family law court's other rulings on Lily's allegations.
Lily argues her allegations that Gunther was coercing their daughter to harm herself sufficiently established abuse against Lily as well, because it "destroy[s Lily's] mental or emotional calm." The family law court concluded these claims were not properly before it in the proceeding because they primarily concerned the daughter, and thus should be brought by the daughter's appointed counsel or a guardian ad litem. Lily's counsel did not object to this approach at the restraining order hearing, thus forfeiting any challenge to it on appeal. (GoTek Energy, Inc. v. SoCal IP Law Group, LLP (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 1240, 1248 [issue forfeited if not raised in trial court].) On appeal, Lily similarly fails to address this procedural ruling, thus providing no basis for us to reverse it.
Lily contends the family law court did not consider her younger child's (i.e., "Baby Boy") mental state and safety. Lily does not explain how, given the court's conclusion Gunther posed no danger to Lily, he somehow posed a separate danger to her son meriting a restraining order. Put another way, Lily identifies no allegations of danger specific to her son that would survive the court's adverse findings as to Lily.
Lily argues her allegations of Gunther's jealousy justify a restraining order because he "punishes" their daughter if she speaks favorably about Lily's new partner or son. Lily did not raise this allegation of punishment below-she merely claimed Gunther was excessively interested in learning details about her new life, and that Lily was concerned his jealousy would lead to violence. Lily's claim that Gunther punishes their daughter out of jealousy is forfeited for failure to raise it before the family law court. Lily cites no authority that Gunther's negative feelings or interest in her new life, alone, constitute domestic violence. We further observe her only example of Gunther's alleged excessive interest in her new life is his apparent knowledge of her son's age, which does not demonstrate any impropriety.
Lily does not challenge on appeal the family law court's rejection of her allegations that Gunther instituted a false fraud investigation against her or accessed her financial and social service accounts. Rather, she refers to evidence she contends establishes Gunther controlled her finances during their marriage. Assuming arguendo this evidence is not precluded as previously litigated, Lily nonetheless does not identify where in the record the evidence appears, and we therefore disregard it. (See Inyo Citizens for Better Planning v. Inyo County Bd. of Supervisors (2009) 180 Cal.App.4th 1, 14 [" 'We are not required to search the record to ascertain whether it contains support for [appellant's] contentions.' "].)
In arguing she was entitled to a restraining order based on Gunther's slandering her, Lily refers to a June 28, 2024 filing by "MC" (perhaps minor's counsel) summarizing statements by Gunther that Lily contends are defamatory. This filing postdates the family law court's denial of the restraining order and is not properly part of the record on appeal.
Lily attached the June 28, 2024 filing as an exhibit to her opening brief on appeal, without a motion to augment the record or request for judicial notice. In any event, because the evidence was not before the family law court when that court rendered the decision now before us on appeal, we do not consider it.
Lily does not address or dispute the family law court's rejection of her allegations of "Veiled Intimidation" (underscoring omitted) as not constituting domestic violence. In any event, we conclude the court did not abuse its discretion in finding those allegations, namely that Gunther had told their daughter he did not care if Lily was alive or dead and it would be better if she were dead, did not in and of themselves, justify a restraining order. That is, it was not unreasonable for the family law court to find Gunther's purported statements were not intended as actual threats.
On the issue of Gunther improperly monitoring her, Lily refers to two "recent" cases, apparently involving the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services, in which Lily claims Gunther obtained confidential information about Lily. Lily did not raise these allegations below, and has forfeited them. To the extent Lily accused Gunther below of accessing her home to recover his trumpet or other possessions, she acknowledged in her restraining order request he did so with court permission, stating, "The Court granted [Gunther] two-hour access to an area in the family residence to pick up [the trumpet and other items]." We fail to see how acts taken with the permission of the court can constitute grounds for a restraining order.
Lily argues gaslighting can constitute abuse because it causes her to question her own mental well-being and sanity. Lily does not dispute the family law court's conclusion that the gaslighting allegations predated February 19, 2016 and could not be relitigated. Assuming arguendo Lily's gaslighting allegations concern Gunther's more recently denying his purported steroid-induced rages and Lily's contributions to his career success, we decline to hold that ex-spouses' denials of each other's accusations, without more, constitute psychological abuse meriting a restraining order.
D. Lily's Inability To Reexamine Fred Chi Was Not Prejudicial
Lily argues she was denied due process because Fred Chi disconnected from the hearing after the court questioned him, and Lily's counsel therefore had no opportunity to reexamine him. Assuming arguendo the family law court erred in not continuing the hearing to allow additional examination of Chi, and further assuming arguendo the stringent "harmless beyond a reasonable doubt" standard of prejudice for constitutional error applies (In re Angela C. (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 389, 395), we conclude further examination of Chi, had it occurred, would not have affected the outcome.
Chi's affidavit, signed two months before the restraining order hearing, leveled serious allegations against Gunther, specifically that on four separate occasions, including one that very year, Gunther had asked Chi if Chi could find someone to harm Lily. Chi described the emotional impact of these requests on him, stating the requests left him "extremely stressed-out and uncomfortable," and "worried not only for Gunther's mental state, but for his wife Lily as well."
Under examination by the family law court, however, Chi did not repeat any of those allegations, instead claiming virtually no memory of his interactions with Gunther. The court asked Chi several times if Gunther said anything that concerned him, and Chi could not recall. Nor could he recall if he had spoken to Gunther that year, despite stating in his affidavit Gunther had contacted him a few months earlier. We agree with the family law court that, had Gunther repeatedly asked Chi to find someone to hurt Lily as Chi had averred two months earlier, Chi would have remembered and underscored his testimony with that information, particularly when Chi also averred in his affidavit Gunther's requests had caused him stress, discomfort, and worry.
The family law court clearly concluded Chi's inability or unwillingness to confirm the statements in his affidavit undermined his credibility such that further questioning would serve no purpose. Indeed, the court found Chi so lacking in credibility that it expressed concern there had been a fraud on the court. We can conceive of nothing Lily's counsel could elicit on further examination that would have changed the court's view to Lily's benefit.
Lily contends there were several issues her counsel could have clarified, potentially to Lily's benefit, had there been further examination of Chi. As examples, she suggests counsel could have inquired about additional text messages and other communications that Gunther may not have included in his response to the restraining order request, as well as investigate with Chi some of Gunther's testimony, including Gunther's claim that it was Chi who suggested harming Lily, not Gunther. Lily also argues, had her counsel reminded Chi that his affidavit referred to a 2023 conversation with Gunther, it might have prompted Chi to recall the subject of the earlier communications as well.
Absent actual copies of text messages or other written communications between Chi and Gunther, which Lily has not offered and merely speculates exist, we have no basis to conclude the family law court would have been persuaded by testimony from Chi that he had in fact received incriminating messages or had incriminating conversations with Gunther, given Chi's initial and repeated statements he had virtually no recollection of any matters of concern in his communications with Gunther. As for the purported 2023 conversation, the court explicitly asked Chi if he had been in contact with Gunther during that past year (which was 2023), and Chi said he did not recall, so further questions on that topic would have served no purpose.
Lily argues Chi's affidavit was so concerning that the court should have allowed her to corroborate it with evidence of past threats by Gunther. As discussed, to the extent the purported threats Lily refers to predated February 19, 2016, the family law court found those allegations already had been litigated and rejected in the March 30, 2022 statement of decision, and Lily on appeal has not shown this was error. The record does not indicate Lily alleged more recent threats apart from Chi's affidavit. Thus, Lily fails to show there were other threats the court should have considered.
Lily contends her daughter can testify regarding conversations the daughter heard between Gunther and Chi, and there is also video evidence of the daughter expressing concern about Gunther and Chi. The record does not indicate Lily sought to have her daughter testify nor did Lily offer video evidence of her daughter, so any claim the court should have received such evidence is forfeited.
Lily also states there were other witnesses present for the hearing but the court's rulings "implicitly excluded" them. Lily cites nothing in the record indicating other witnesses were present at the hearing or that she sought to call them.
DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed. The parties are to bear their own costs on appeal.
We concur: WEINGART, J. M. KIM, J.
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