J.C. McLIN, JUDGE.
The defendant, James Porter McFarland, presents for our review a certified question of law pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 37(b)(2). The defendant pleaded guilty to driving under the influence, second offense. As a condition of his guilty plea, the defendant reserved a certified question of law challenging the denial of his motion to suppress based upon his allegation that police subjected him to an unconstitutional investigative stop. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court denying the defendant's motion to suppress.
Background
On July 15, 2008, the Wilson County Grand Jury indicted the defendant, James Porter McFarland, for driving under the influence of an intoxicant, second offense, a Class A misdemeanor. On January 7, 2009, the defendant filed a motion to suppress any evidence gathered from the police officers' stop of the defendant's vehicle. The trial court held an evidentiary hearing on the motion to suppress on April 7, 2009.
At the suppression hearing, Officer Scott Fulton, with the Mt. Juliet Police Department, testified that he was working in the "south patrol zone" on January 19, 2008, when he came upon the defendant. A bank teller had called the police and reported that the defendant might have been driving while intoxicated. The bank teller informed the police that the defendant was driving a silver Chevrolet Corvette. Officer Fulton spotted a vehicle traveling on Mt. Juliet Road that matched the description given by the teller, and he followed it.
Officer Fulton described Mt. Juliet Road as a three-lane road that was under construction. The left and center lanes continued south on Mt. Juliet Road, and the right lane was a turn lane to enter onto the interstate. The defendant was traveling in the center lane. While he was following the defendant's vehicle, Officer Fulton twice observed the defendant weave his vehicle outside his lane of traffic. According to Officer Fulton, they were
at a dead stop at the traffic light at Western Drive[,] which is where West Wilson Middle School is. [Officer Fulton] was in the left lane three or four cars back, and [the defendant] was the lead vehicle in the right lane and there were, again, three or four cars behind him. When the light turned green, as [the defendant] was pulling away from that intersection, when he was weaving, he weaved [sic] over into the left lane and back to the right lane and over into the left lane again and back into the right lane.
Because of the lane of traffic in which the defendant was driving, Officer Fulton assumed that the defendant would continue to drive south on Mt. Juliet Road. However, the defendant activated his right turn signal and turned from the center lane onto the interstate's entry ramp.
Officer Fulton said that he would normally turn on the rear blue lights of his patrol car to indicate that he needed to merge into another lane of traffic; however, he could not "say one hundred percent that [he] did that in this case[.]" He further explained that he would turn on the rear blue lights "to get behind somebody without alerting the person [whom he is] trying to get behind." Here, he wanted to observe the defendant, but he did not want the defendant to stop in the middle of the intersection. He was not able to get directly behind the defendant until just before the defendant turned to get onto the interstate. Officer Fulton waited until he and the defendant passed the concrete barriers that were along the side of the interstate before he signaled for the defendant to pull over his vehicle.
Officer Fulton had a digital camera system in his patrol car. He stated that the camera system was "set to record and it buffer[ed], so it capture[d] [thirty] seconds prior to activation of video, but not audio." Officer Fulton could turn on the camera system either manually by pressing a button or automatically by activating the front blue lights on the patrol car. When he recorded the defendant, Officer Fulton had manually activated the camera. Officer Fulton recorded the defendant, and the prosecution played the tape for the court.
On cross-examination, Officer Fulton testified that the defendant's making an improper right turn onto the interstate entry ramp was part of the reason that he stopped him. Regarding the defendant weaving his vehicle, Officer Fulton explained that he "crossed into the lane of traffic where other vehicles were, but it was the same direction of traffic. . . ." However, he agreed that the defendant's weaves did not cause him to active the blue lights on his patrol car. Officer Fulton also agreed that he did not attempt to pull over the defendant until they were "well down the on-ramp after [the defendant had] executed the right[-]hand turn[.]" The defendant did not weave or commit any other traffic violations while driving on the ramp to the interstate.
Officer Fulton said that the lanes in which he and the defendant were traveling had not been "changed, moved, [or] redesignated [sic]" due to the construction but he could not recall whether signs clearly marked the turning lane to enter the interstate. He stated that there was a large enough gap between the first vehicle in the right-hand lane and the vehicle behind it to allow a vehicle to turn onto the interstate. However, because the second vehicle had to stop to allow Officer Fulton and the defendant to pull in front of it, he disagreed that the gap was large enough for two vehicles to make the right hand turn without interfering with or endangering the second vehicle. Upon further questioning, Officer Fulton agreed that "[t]here was sufficient space between the first vehicle in the turning lane . . . [and] the second vehicle for both [him] and [the defendant] to make right[-]hand turns." Officer Fulton did not see the second vehicle attempt to stop or begin to move forward while he and the defendant were attempting to turn right. Officer Fulton also did not see the defendant speeding. According to Officer Fulton, there was approximately one mile between the spot where he first observed the defendant and where he activated the camera system. He further stated that the distance between the entry ramp to the interstate and where he pulled the defendant over was approximately a half mile.
On redirect examination, Officer Fulton explained that the police department received the information about the defendant's driving from the bank teller after the defendant had driven up to the drive-thru window at the bank. The bank teller believed that the defendant might have been driving while intoxicated so she called the police department and gave them a description of his vehicle. Officer Fulton spotted the defendant's vehicle about three miles from the bank where the teller worked. The patrol car camera was on the center of the windshield and captured primarily vehicles directly in front of the patrol car; but it also recorded vehicles on the left and right.
After hearing the proof, the trial court denied the defendant's motion to suppress. In doing so, the court noted that the video alone was not enough to justify the stop. However, considering the bank teller's phone call and the corroboration of that phone call by Officer Fulton's undisputed observations, the trial court found that there was reasonable suspicion for Officer Fulton to stop the defendant.
The defendant pleaded guilty to driving under the influence, second offense, and the court sentenced him to serve eleven months and twenty-nine days, suspended after service of forty-five days in the county jail. As part of his plea agreement, the defendant reserved this certified question of law:
Whether the stop of the Defendant's vehicle was illegal and in violation of the Defendant's State and Federal Constitutional Rights guaranteed by Article 1 Section 8 of the Tennessee Constitution; the 4th Amendment of the United States Constitution, Article 1 Section 7 of the Tennessee Constitution; Article 1 Section 8 of the Tennessee Constitution; and the 14th Amendment to the United States Constitution because the stop lacked the requisite reasonable suspicion for the officer to initiate a stop of the Defendant's vehicle, requiring suppression of the stop consistent with the Defendant's Motion to Suppress, which was denied by the Trial Court after hearing proof.Analysis
"When evaluating the correctness of a trial court's ruling on a pretrial motion to suppress, the court on appeal must uphold the trial court's findings of fact unless the evidence preponderates otherwise." State v. Williams, 185 S.W.3d 311, 314 (Tenn. 2006). "Questions of credibility of the witnesses, the weight and value of the evidence, and resolution of conflicts in the evidence are matters entrusted to the trial judge as the trier of fact." State v. Lawrence, 154 S.W.3d 71, 75 (Tenn. 2005) (quoting State v. Odom, 928 S.W.2d 18, 23 (Tenn. 1996)). However, appellate review of a trial court's conclusions of law and application of law to facts on a motion to suppress evidence is a de novo review. See State v. Nicholson, 188 S.W.3d 649, 656 (Tenn. 2006); State v. Walton, 41 S.W.3d 75, 81 (Tenn. 2001).
Both the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, section 7 of the Tennessee Constitution protect individuals from unreasonable searches and seizures. These constitutional provisions are designed "to prevent arbitrary and oppressive interference with the privacy and personal security of individuals." State v. Daniel, 12 S.W.3d 420, 424 (Tenn. 2000) (quoting INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 216 (1984)). Therefore, "[u]nder both the federal and state constitutions, a warrantless seizure is presumed unreasonable, and evidence discovered as a result thereof is subject to suppression unless the state demonstrates that the seizure was conducted pursuant to one of the narrowly defined exceptions to the warrant requirement." Nicholson, 188 S.W.3d at 656; see also State v. Binette, 33 S.W.3d 215, 218 (Tenn. 2000). One such exception is a brief investigatory stop by a law enforcement officer if the officer has a reasonable suspicion, based upon specific and articulable facts, that a person has either committed a criminal offense or is about to commit a criminal offense. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968); Binette, 33 S.W.3d at 218. This narrow exception has been extended to the investigatory stop of vehicles. See United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 881 (1975); State v. Watkins, 827 S.W.2d 293, 294 (Tenn. 1992). Reasonable suspicion is something more than an "inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or hunch." Terry, 392 U.S. at 27. In evaluating whether a police officer has a reasonable suspicion, supported by specific and articulable facts, a court must consider the totality of the circumstances. Binette, 33 S.W.3d at 218. Those circumstances may include the personal observations of the police officer, information obtained from other officers and agencies, information obtained from citizens, and the pattern of operation of certain offenders. Watkins, 827 S.W.2d 294. Additionally, the court must consider any rational inferences and deductions that a trained officer may draw from those circumstances. Id.
In this appeal, the defendant argues that police officers stopped his vehicle without the requisite reasonable suspicion to believe that he had committed or was about to commit a crime. The defendant argues that neither the bank teller's report nor Officer Fulton's observations amounted to reasonable suspicion to support the warrantless stop of his vehicle. In rebuttal, the state argues that, given the totality of the circumstances, Officer Fulton had reasonable suspicion to believe that the defendant had either committed or was committing a crime.
In the light most favorable to the state, Officer Fulton testified that the police received a phone call alerting them that the defendant might have been driving while intoxicated. Officer Fulton spotted the defendant's vehicle and followed him. While following him, he twice observed the defendant weave his vehicle outside his lane of travel and into the next lane. He also observed the defendant make a right-hand turn onto the interstate entry ramp from the center lane. The trial court found that while any of these factors alone might not have amounted to reasonable suspicion, the totality of the circumstances — the bank teller's call and the corroboration of the phone call by Officer Fulton's undisputed observations-amounted to reasonable suspicion to justify Officer Fulton stopping the defendant's vehicle. In our view, the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court's findings. We conclude that Officer Fulton had reasonable suspicion, supported by specific and articulable facts, to support the investigative stop of the defendant's vehicle. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court denying the motion to suppress.
Conclusion
Based on the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court's denial of the defendant's motion to suppress.
We do not think the clarification that an officer's actual subjective intent is not critical to the determination of whether an arrest has occurred and that whether a purpose to arrest exists should be viewed from the perspective of a reasonable person in the defendant's position would have changed the result in Johnson-Hugi. The court concluded Johnson-Hugi had not been arrested because at the beginning of her encounter with undercover officers she was given a choice between being arrested or cooperating with law enforcement. 484 N.W.2d at 601. She chose to cooperate which precluded any reasonable understanding that she was being arrested. Id.
It has been suggested that the meaning of "arrest" in our speedy indictment rule should be conformed to the meaning of "arrest" under the federal speedy indictment rule. We disagree. Although the federal speedy indictment statute was adopted in 1974 — two years before the 1976 amendments of the Iowa Criminal Code — there is no evidence the general assembly intended to conform the Iowa speedy indictment rule to the federal rule. Although both the Iowa and the federal provisions utilize the word "arrested," that is the beginning and the end of the similarity between the two provisions. Certainly the very core of the federal rule adopted in 1974 is the time allotted to the government to file criminal charges — thirty days. 18 U.S.C. § 3161(b) (2006). However, our general assembly chose a deadline of forty-five days, rejecting the core of the federal framework and evidencing a disinclination to follow the federal model in lockstep. Thus, based on the language of rule 2.33(2)(a) alone, any suggestion that the federal speedy indictment regime was "the pattern" for the Iowa rule is suspect.
The federal speedy indictment rule provides in relevant part:
Any information or indictment charging an individual with the commission of an offense shall be filed within thirty days from the date on which such individual was arrested or served with a summons in connection with such charges.18 U.S.C. § 3161(b) (2006).
The Iowa Criminal Code was enacted in 1976, but it did not become effective until January 1, 1978. See 1976 Iowa Acts ch. 1245.
Further, despite claims to the contrary, there is no evidence of a longstanding, special meaning of "arrest" in federal law that is congruent with the former "held to answer" language of Iowa's former speedy-indictment statute. Federal court decisions interpreting the federal speedy indictment rule and interpreting "arrested" for speedy indictment purposes filed after the 1976 revision of Iowa's criminal code surely did not inform the drafters as to the meaning of the term "arrest." Instead we find it more likely the Iowa legislature was familiar with and influenced by definitions of "arrest" that already existed in Iowa law. See Iowa Code §§ 755.1, .2, and .7 (1975); see also State v. Medina, 165 N.W.2d 777, 782 (Iowa 1969); Frink, 255 Iowa at 66-67, 120 N.W.2d at 437.
Despite rule 2.33's explicit policy statement favoring speedy prosecutions, we have acknowledged competing policy considerations in our decisions, particularly in a situation, such as this one, where police seek cooperation from a suspect to advance other investigations.
Law enforcement authorities must be accorded latitude in procuring the non-volunteer assistance of private citizens to serve as confidential informants in combating crime. If every such action were deemed to be an "arrest" for purposes of rule [2.33(2)], the time within which authorities could use informants to obtain information would be substantially limited. We refuse to hamstring law enforcement authorities by such a rule.Johnson-Hugi, 484 N.W.2d at 602.
Although we recognize the importance to law enforcement of cooperation from suspects involved in criminal activity, we conclude the purposes of the speedy indictment rule need not be sacrificed to secure it. As Justice Snell noted in his dissent in Johnson-Hugi, the fear that law enforcement will be "hamstrung" by the speedy indictment rule seems "overblown" because, notwithstanding enforcement of the rule, law enforcement officers can use informants for as long as they wish. Id. at 603 (Snell, J., dissenting). They need only determine within forty-five days "whether their informant is capable and willing to provide the information that they desire." Id. Further,
[i]f law enforcement [officers] desire to utilize cooperation agreements after an arrest, and to delay the filing of charges pending completion of the agreement, a waiver of the speedy indictment rule can be requested as part of the cooperation agreement.Delockroy, 559 N.W.2d at 47.
With these principles in mind, we shall briefly review the relevant caselaw to identify the types of facts and circumstances that our appellate courts have deemed to constitute an arrest for speedy indictment purposes. In Johnson-Hugi, undercover officers met Johnson-Hugi at her house to purchase drugs. 484 N.W.2d at 599. The officers identified themselves and gave Johnson-Hugi a choice between becoming a confidential informant and being arrested. Id. at 600. Johnson-Hugi agreed to cooperate. Id. The officers then patted her down, searched her purse, and drove her to the police station. Id. At the station, she received Miranda warnings, filled out paperwork "confirming her status as a `cooperating individual,'" and was returned to her home. Id. Because Johnson-Hugi had been presented with the choice of cooperation or arrest at the beginning of her encounter with law enforcement, we determined her decision to cooperate "necessarily precluded the possibility of there being an `arrest.'" Id. at 601. Accordingly, we concluded she had not been arrested. Id. at 602
In Smith, the court of appeals also concluded a defendant who agreed to cooperate had not been arrested. State v. Smith, 552 N.W.2d 163, 166 (Iowa App. 1996). Officers obtained a search warrant for the home Smith shared with his girlfriend. Id. at 164. When they arrived at the house to execute the warrant, the officers handcuffed Smith as he attempted to block their entry. Id. After the search revealed incriminating evidence, Smith offered to cooperate in exchange for leniency. Id. The officers told Smith he was "facing charges for possession with intent to deliver and they were taking him to the station to straighten it out," Id. At the station, Smith received Miranda warnings and provided the officers with information about his drug supplier. Id. After the supplier's home was searched pursuant to a search warrant, Smith was allowed to leave the station. Id. Concluding that Smith's transportation to and detention at the police station was incidental to the cooperation agreement, the court of appeals concluded Smith had not been arrested. Id. at 166.
The court of appeals did not rely on the "purpose to arrest" language of Johnson-Hugi to determine that Smith was not arrested.
However, in Delockroy, a case involving the same events described above in Smith, the court of appeals concluded Delockroy was arrested for speedy indictment purposes despite her boyfriend's cooperation agreement. 559 N.W.2d at 46. Delockroy was handcuffed at the same time as Smith when police forced their way into the house to execute a search warrant. Id. at 44. Although Smith spoke with the officers and offered to cooperate during the search, Delockroy did not participate in the conversations. Id. Delockroy and Smith were transported to the police station in separate vehicles. Id. Delockroy's handcuffs were removed after she arrived at the station, and she was read her Miranda rights and placed in a room by herself. Id., Although Smith negotiated an agreement providing for reduced charges against Delockroy in exchange for his cooperation, Delockroy did not take part in the discussions between Smith and law enforcement. Id. She was ultimately released with Smith several hours later. Id. Because police had probable cause to arrest her, because she had been transported to the police station against her will, and because she was not actively seeking to work out a deal with the police herself, the court of appeals concluded she had been arrested under these circumstances. Id. at 46.
Although as in Johnson-Hugi the court of appeals did consider whether there was evidence of a "purpose to arrest," we do not think the determination that Delockroy was arrested turned on that question. Rather the critical facts, as articulated by the court of appeals, would have led a reasonable person in Delockroy's position to believe she was arrested.
In reviewing the circumstances surrounding Wing's interaction with law enforcement on July 7, 2007, we conclude that, despite the fact that late in the encounter there was some discussion about future cooperation, a reasonable person in Wing's position would have believed an arrest had occurred. A car he was traveling in was subject to a routine traffic stop. Wing cooperated with the officer conducting the stop, providing identification, submitting to a pat down search, and complying with a request to wait on the sidewalk while the vehicle was searched. When a large brick of marijuana was discovered in the course of the search, Wing admitted ownership of the contraband and was immediately handcuffed, Mirandized, searched again, and placed in the back of the patrol car. There was no discussion up to that point, as there was in Johnson-Hugi, as to the prospect of his cooperation in other drug investigations, and Wing had not been given a choice between being arrested and cooperating with law enforcement. 484 N.W.2d at 600. At this point in the encounter, Wing was not even aware that there were other officers involved in the operation. When Detective Proehl arrived and spoke with him, Wing agreed to let the officers search his house. However, there was still no discussion up to that point of Wing's cooperation as an informant in other drug crime investigations. Officer Schertz had already exerted his authority, objectively evidencing a purpose to arrest, and Wing had submitted to that authority before Proehl arrived at the scene. See Johnson-Hugi, 484 N.W.2d at 601.
Further, unlike Smith, who had been handcuffed at the beginning of his encounter with law enforcement because he was being uncooperative and violent, 552 N.W.2d at 164, Wing was Mirandized, handcuffed, and searched immediately upon his admission of ownership of a large quantity of marijuana. Officer Schertz testified that he handcuffed Wing for safety reasons and because he was afraid he might try to run. However, despite this claim, we note that while both Officer Schertz and Wing knew there was contraband in the trunk of the car, Wing was completely cooperative during the entire encounter. Officer Schertz had previously turned his back on Wing and implicitly trusted him to stand on the sidewalk while he searched the vehicle. Schertz had also already conducted one pat down of Wing to determine he was not carrying a weapon.
Officer Schertz asked Detective Proehl if Wing was a "10-59" just before he transported Wing to his house, and Proehl replied that he was. Even assuming Wing understood the police code used, it was too late to "unarrest" Wing. See State v. Davis, 525 N.W.2d 837, 840 (Iowa 1994) (holding that a person cannot be arrested and later "unarrested" to stop the tolling of the speedy indictment clock).
There is evidence in the record tending to prove Detective Proehl and the members of the Tactical Operations Bureau who had been investigating Wing planned to arrest Wing only if his cooperation in other investigations could not be secured. Even if we credit this evidence, however, it is not dispositive because the subjective intent of Detective Proehl and his colleagues is not controlling in the determination of whether a reasonable person in Wing's position would have believed he had been arrested. Any conditional plan to arrest Wing only if he refused to serve as an informant was apparently not communicated to Officer Schertz, nor was it communicated to Wing before he was Mirandized, searched, handcuffed, and placed in the patrol car upon his admission of ownership of the brick of marijuana.
At some point either during or after the search of the house where more evidence incriminating Wing was found, Detective Proehl finally brought up the subject of cooperating with law enforcement on other investigations in the area. Although Wing expressed a general willingness to cooperate, no formal paperwork was completed "confirming [Wing's] status as a `cooperating individual.'" Id. at 600. Rather, Wing was given Officer Proehl's business card and told to "give [him] a call." Wing was given no guidance as to what was expected of him to avoid prosecution for the crimes to which he had admitted. And although Wing did not call Detective Proehl, Proehl waited five months before obtaining an arrest warrant and pursuing charges against Wing.
We note that the district court concluded Officer Proehl "gave [Wing] his cell phone number, and told him they would call him." However, both Proehl and Wing testified conversely that Proehl told Wing to call him.
It is not clear what Wing was promised, if anything, in exchange for his cooperation. The extent of the evidence in the record is that Wing expressed a willingness to "help . . . with other drug investigations in the Davenport area or the Scott County area." Although we have concluded that Wing was arrested before he was transported to his house for the search, even if we take into consideration the rest of the events of the evening and conversation regarding cooperation, we are not convinced that the terms and implications of the cooperation arrangement were clear enough to relieve a reasonable person in Wing's position of the belief that he had been arrested that night.
As the court of appeals noted in Delockroy, if officers enter into cooperation agreements after an arrest, they may certainly include a waiver of the speedy indictment rule as part of the agreement. 559 N.W.2d at 47. In this case, no formal agreement was ever reached which might have included a speedy indictment waiver. Given that Wing never called Proehl, law enforcement officers had forty-five days of unresponsiveness in which to determine that Wing's cooperation might fall short of their expectations and to secure a waiver of the speedy indictment rule or cause an indictment to be filed. We do not think forty-five days during which no communication was received from Wing was insufficient to assess Wing's willingness to cooperate in a manner satisfactory to law enforcement. Accordingly, we conclude enforcement of the speedy indictment rule would not "hamstring" law enforcement under the circumstances presented here. The speedy indictment rule and "the fourth amendment share a kinship in that the fourth amendment's proscription on unreasonable seizures is designed `to prevent arbitrary and oppressive interference by enforcement officials with the privacy and personal security of individuals.'" Johnson-Hugi, 484 N.W.2d at 603 (Snell, J., dissenting) (quoting United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 554, 96 S.Ct. 3074, 3081, 49 L.Ed.2d 1116, 1126 (1976)). We conclude the rule was violated here and therefore reverse Wing's conviction.
In fact, a rule enforcing the time requirements imposed by the speedy indictment rule in the absence of a formal cooperation agreement waiving the suspect's right under the rule also arguably motivates the suspect to cooperate quickly to avoid prosecution or suffer the consequences.
IV. Conclusion.
We conclude Wing was arrested on July 7, 2007, for speedy indictment purposes, and the trial information filed in January 2008 was untimely. The district court erred by denying Wing's motion to dismiss. Accordingly, we vacate the decision of the court of appeals, reverse the conviction, and remand for entry of a dismissal.
DECISION OF COURT OF APPEALS VACATED; DISTRICT COURT JUDGMENT REVERSED AND CASE REMANDED.
All justices concur except CADY, J., who dissents.
CADY, Justice (dissenting).
I respectfully dissent. Statutes and rules must only be applied to circumstances intended to be within their purview. The speedy-trial rule was never intended to apply when a person is detained by police at a roadside encounter for suspected criminal conduct but released at the scene without being told he was under arrest, without being transported to the police station for processing and appearance before a magistrate, without being charged with a criminal offense, without being subjected to the other processes of the prosecution of a crime, and without any disruption and burden associated with a criminal prosecution. The majority has misapplied the definition of an arrest under the speedy-indictment rule by failing to appreciate that an arrest takes on a different meaning in the context of the right to a speedy trial.
The starting point to interpret the speedy-indictment rule begins with the context in which the rule was conceived. See State v. Kamber, 737 N.W.2d 297, 299 (Iowa 2007) (recognizing statutes must be interpreted in their context because words can have different meanings in different contexts). Like the federal speedy-indictment rule, the purpose of Iowa's speedy-indictment rule was to implement the constitutional right to a speedy trial. State v. Cennon, 201 N.W.2d 715, 718 (Iowa 1972); see also United States v. MacDonald, 456 U.S. 1, 7 n. 7, 102 S.Ct. 1497, 1501 n. 7, 71 L.Ed.2d 696, 703 n. 7 (1982) (recognizing the Speedy Trial Act of 1974 was intended "`to give effect to the [S]ixth [A]mendment right to a speedy trial'" (quoting S.Rep. No. 93-1021, at 1 (1974))); United States v. Hillegas, 578 F.2d 453, 456 (2d Cir. 1978) (recognizing the Speedy Trial Act of 1974 was intended to implement the constitutional right to a speedy trial).
A "literal reading" of the constitutional right to a speedy trial reveals the right "attaches only when a formal criminal charge is instituted and a criminal prosecution begins." MacDonald, 456 U.S. at 6, 102 S.Ct. at 1501, 71 L.Ed.2d at 702. This reading is the same for the right to a speedy trial under both the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section 10 of the Iowa Constitution because the operative language of the two provisions is the same. Both constitutional provisions provide that in "all criminal prosecutions" the "accused" shall have a "right to a speedy . . . trial." As observed by the United States Supreme Court:
On its face, the protection of the Amendment is activated only when a criminal prosecution has begun and extends only to those persons who have been "accused" in the course of that prosecution. These provisions would seem to afford no protection to those not yet accused, nor would they seem to require the Government to discover, investigate, and accuse any person within any particular period of time. The [A]mendment would appear to guarantee to a criminal defendant that the Government will move with the dispatch that is appropriate to assure him an early and proper disposition of the charges against him.United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 313, 92 S.Ct. 455, 459, 30 L.Ed.2d 468, 474 (1971). Consequently, "it is either a formal indictment or information or else the actual restraints imposed by arrest and holding to answer a criminal charge that engage the particular protections of the speedy trial provision." Id. at 320, 92 S.Ct. at 463, 30 L.Ed.2d at 479. Importantly, this approach is what the speedy-indictment rule sought to implement. Accordingly, the language of Iowa's speedy-indictment rule must be interpreted in the context of that point in time when a person becomes an "accused" in a criminal prosecution, not the point when a person is in police custody in such a way that a reasonable person would believe he or she is under arrest. An interpretation of an arrest based on a custodial setting is appropriate in implementing the rights against self-incrimination and the right to counsel, but not in implementing the right to a speedy trial. Compare State v. Evans, 495 N.W.2d 760, 762 (Iowa 1993) (right to counsel attaches when defendant is interrogated in police custody due to risk of self-incrimination in an inherently coercive environment), with State v. Gathercole, 553 N.W.2d 569, 573 (Iowa 1996) (rejecting the argument that a de facto arrest due to confinement by authorities triggers running of time for speedy trial). The rights serve different purposes and must be interpreted in light of those purposes. In other words, a rule implementing a constitutional right must be interpreted consistently with the aim and purpose of the particular constitutional right implemented.
The right to a speedy trial was designed to minimize the fears and burdens associated with a criminal prosecution, not those associated with a brief detention of a person by police for suspected criminal conduct that gives rise to fears of a future criminal prosecution. The speedy-trial right exists primarily
to minimize the possibility of lengthy incarceration prior to trial, to reduce the lesser, but nevertheless substantial, impairment of liberty imposed on an accused while released on bail, and to shorten the disruption of life caused by arrest and the presence of unresolved criminal charges.MacDonald, 456 U.S. at 8, 102 S.Ct. at 1502, 71 L.Ed.2d at 704. Similarly, the speedy-indictment rule exists to "`expedite the processing of pending criminal proceedings.'" United States v. Varella, 692 F.2d 1352, 1358 n. 4 (11th Cir. 1982) (quoting Hillegas, 578 F.2d at 456). It does not exist to "supervise the exercise by a prosecutor of his investigative or prosecutorial discretion at a time when no criminal proceeding is pending before the court." Hillegas, 578 F.2d at 456. The government has traditionally been given substantial discretion under the separation-of-powers doctrine in decisions relating to the timing of an arrest. See United States v. Mays, 549 F.2d 670, 678 (9th Cir. 1977).
Originally, Iowa's speedy-indictment rule was written to make it clear that the time for the filing of the indictment was not triggered the moment a person reasonably believed an arrest had occurred. The rule first arose by statute and was triggered when a person was "held to answer" for a public offense. See Iowa Code § 795.1 (1975). The "held to answer" standard essentially meant the person was held to answer by a preliminary examination. State v. Montgomery, 232 N.W.2d 525, 526-27 (Iowa 1975). The concept of "held to answer" was unrelated to physical restraint, but concerned the appearance in court to answer the charge. See Bergman v. Nelson, 241 N.W.2d 14, 16 (Iowa 1976). Thus, the speedy-indictment rule was triggered based on circumstances that occurred within the court proceedings that started the criminal prosecution and supported the obligation of the state to properly proceed to trial or dismiss the charges. It was a straightforward approach, unrelated to conflicting facts and circumstances that can surround a warrantless arrest.
In 1976, our legislature repealed the statutory speedy-trial provisions when it established separate rules of criminal procedure to govern court proceedings. See 1976 Iowa Acts ch. 1245, § 1301, r. 27 (codified at Iowa Code ch. 813, r. 27 (1979)) (establishing the Iowa Rules of Criminal Procedure, including speedy-indictment rule). In doing so, it adopted the speedy-trial dismissal rules as a part of the rules of criminal procedure, patterned largely on the federal speedy-trial rule. See 4 John L. Yeager Ronald L. Carlson, Iowa Practice: Criminal Law and Procedure § 1242, at 298 (1979) [hereinafter Yeager Carlson]. The federal rule triggered the speedy-indictment requirement from the date of arrest or the filing of a formal charge against an accused, whichever occurred first. Hilbert v. Dooling, 476 F.2d 355, 357 (2d Cir. 1973). Iowa followed this approach by adopting the arrest for the commission of a public offense as the triggering event for the filing of an indictment. See Iowa Code ch. 813, r. 27(2) (1979).
Nevertheless, an arrest within the context of the federal speedy-trial rule has always entailed an accusation so that an "arrest" under the Federal Act is the point at which a defendant is first charged and held, physically or in a legal sense, to answer for a charge. See United States v. Sayers, 698 F.2d 1128, 1130-31 (11th Cir. 1983). As a rule implementing the constitutional right of an accused to a speedy trial, federal courts have taken the approach that the speedy-indictment time restraints were not triggered until a defendant was "the subject of formal proceedings." Hillegas, 578 F.2d at 457. Likewise, the legislative history of the Federal Act reflects that Congress proceeded on the "assumption . . . that any arrested individual would also be a `charged' or `accused' individual." United States v. Jones, 676 F.2d 327, 331 (8th Cir. 1982). Accordingly, courts have uniformly held that "an arrest or summons standing alone [is] not enough to trigger the time limitations of the Speedy Trial Act." United States v. Francis, 390 F.Supp.2d 1069, 1071 (N.D.Fla. 2005).
Thus, the Iowa legislature adopted its speedy-indictment rule by using the "arrest" language of the Federal Act, which had a clear, special meaning compatible with the former "held to answer" language of Iowa's statutory speedy-indictment rule. Moreover, there is no indication the Iowa legislature otherwise sought to alter the speedy-indictment approach when it repealed the statute and adopted the rule. See Yeager Carlson at 298-99 (stating the Iowa rule followed "an approach not dissimilar from [the] former" statute). Instead, the legislature was merely bringing its rule in line with the federal approach.
Today, the majority repeats an error that began thirty years ago following the adoption of the speedy-indictment rule. The facts of this case simply make the error much more obvious. Instead of giving the word "arrest" the full meaning it was intended to have when the rule was adopted, we have somehow fallen off track by defining the word in the context of police custody viewed through the eyes of a reasonable person. We presumed, incorrectly, that an arrest had but one meaning. As a result, we are likely the only jurisdiction in the nation to trigger the requirement to file an indictment based on a case-specific, fact-intensive analysis of when police action rises to the level of an arrest. Moreover, this approach has resulted in a host of conflicting decisions in which "[w]hat is characterized by police as a non-arrest is occasionally found to constitute an arrest, and vice versa." 4A B. John Burns, Iowa Practice Series: Criminal Procedure § 7:3, at 77 (2005). The analysis followed by the majority totally ignores the absence of any charges and disregards the purposes of speedy indictment. Not only is such a loose standard unnecessary and detached from the purpose and aim of the right to a speedy trial, it is largely unprincipled and capable of inconsistent results. See, e.g., id. § 7:3, at 77-80 (describing numerous cases in Iowa in which the standard rendered inconsistent application); compare State v. Davis, 525 N.W.2d 837, 839 (Iowa 1994) (applying rule to OWI, first offense, prosecution to deny State's request to toll indictment period, even though defendant was released without charges), with State v. Lasage, 523 N.W.2d 617, 620 (Iowa Ct.App. 1994) (applying rule to first-degree murder prosecution to toll the speedy-indictment period when defendant was released without charges).
The error by the majority can perhaps be best revealed by the unimaginable reversal of roles created by its analysis. The majority literally places the power to commence a criminal prosecution in the hands, or mind, of the accused. Under the analysis by the majority, the reasonable belief of a person detained by police that he or she has been arrested for an unnamed criminal act forces the prosecutor to expeditiously bring an indictment against the person, even though the prosecutor never wanted to indict the person and the police never wanted to initiate a criminal prosecution. This is the type of circumstance that results when rules and statutes become disconnected from their purpose and intent.
In this case, Wing was never subjected to the burdens sought to be protected by the speedy-trial guarantee. When he was taken home instead of taken to the police station, he was "in the same position as any other subject of a criminal investigation." MacDonald, 456 U.S. at 8-9, 102 S.Ct. at 1502, 71 L.Ed.2d at 704. Although the event may have caused "stress, discomfort, and perhaps a certain disruption in normal life," he was "not impaired to the same degree as . . . after [an] arrest while charges are pending." Id. at 9, 102 S.Ct. at 1502, 71 L.Ed.2d at 704, His situation did "`not compare with that of a defendant who has been arrested and held to answer.'" Id. (quoting Marion, 404 U.S. at 321, 92 S.Ct. at 464, 30 L.Ed.2d at 479). He was in the same position as any other person under investigation for a criminal offense whose right to a speedy indictment has not yet attached. Id. at 8-9, 102 S.Ct. at 1502, 71 L.Ed.2d at 704. Moreover, any actual prejudice due to any delay by the prosecution in later bringing charges is a separate issue fully protected "by the Due Process Clause and by statutes of limitations." Id. at 8. 102 S.Ct. at 1502, 71 L.Ed.2d at 704.
Finally, even assuming the legislature did intend to create a unique speedy-indictment rule triggered by the point in time in which a reasonable person believed an arrest had occurred, the record clearly shows no such arrest took place. For sure, a reasonable person who would have observed Wing being removed from the car after the police discovered drugs in the trunk, placed in handcuffs, read his Miranda rights, and even placed in the backseat of the police vehicle would reasonably believe an arrest had occurred. Yet, the reasonable-person test considers all the relevant facts and circumstances. See, e.g., State v. Bogan, 774 N.W.2d 676, 680 (Iowa 2009) (recognizing the reasonable-person custody determinations for purposes of Miranda involve an objective analysis of all the facts and circumstances); State v. Delockroy, 559 N.W.2d 43, 46 (Iowa Ct.App. 1996) (examining all facts and circumstances of police encounter to determine whether an arrest occurred). In this case, a reasonable person with knowledge of the rest of the story surrounding the stop would conclude differently. The remainder of the facts and circumstances that complete the story of Wing's police encounter are that the police had no intention or desire to use the roadside stop to make an arrest but only wanted to establish a relationship with Wing, who was known by police to be involved with drugs, which might benefit an ongoing community task force operation. Furthermore, a reasonable person viewing the totality of this encounter would also know Wing was not told at any time he was under arrest or that he would be charged with a crime, and that Wing was transported to his home from the roadside stop to continue to go on with his life without the burdens associated with a criminal prosecution. See Iowa Code § 804.14 (2007) (requiring a person making an arrest to "inform the person to be arrested of the intention to arrest"); id. § 804.22 (requiring a person placed under arrest to be brought before a magistrate without unnecessary delay). The majority failed to consider the totality of the circumstances, which clearly show Wing was never arrested. Instead, Wing was detained and released without being subjected to the process of the criminal justice system that accompanies an arrest.
This case was an opportunity to correct a mistake and make the law conform to its purpose and aim. I dissent because it was an opportunity we should have taken.
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