Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.
The defendant contends that he was denied his right to a speedy trial pursuant to CPL 30.30. We do not agree. After subtracting periods of delay excludable pursuant to CPL 30.30 (4) (see, People v. Pappas, 128 A.D.2d 556; People v. Seabrook, 126 A.D.2d 583), the total time chargeable to the People is well within the permitted six calendar months which, in this case, totaled 182 days (see, e.g., People v. Pappas, supra; People v. Jones, 105 A.D.2d 179, 188, affd sub nom. People v. Anderson, 66 N.Y.2d 529, 540). Thus, the defendant's postreadiness motion to dismiss pursuant to CPL 30.30 (see, People v. Anderson, supra, at 536; People v. Seabrook, supra) was properly denied.
Inasmuch as there was no identification procedure conducted by the police, no preliminary hearing on this matter was required (see, People v. Robinson, 117 A.D.2d 826).
Upon the exercise of our factual review power we are satisfied that the evidence was of sufficient quantity and quality to establish the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The defendant's trial attorney provided meaningful representation (see, People v. Baldi, 54 N.Y.2d 137).
We see no abuse of discretion in the sentence imposed by the court (see, People v. Suitte, 90 A.D.2d 80).
Finally, we have considered the defendant's remaining contention and find it to be without merit. Brown, J.P., Niehoff, Sullivan and Harwood, JJ., concur.