Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.
The defendant contends that he was denied his right to a speedy trial pursuant to CPL 30.30. We do not agree. After subtracting periods of delay directly resulting from the defendant's pretrial motions (CPL 30.30 [a]; People v. Worley, 66 N.Y.2d 523, 527; People v. Brown, 113 A.D.2d 812); delays to which the defendant consented by failing to object (CPL 30.30 [b]; People v Gaggi, 104 A.D.2d 442, appeal dismissed 65 N.Y.2d 636); adjournments at the defendant's request (CPL 30.30 [b]; People v. Brown, supra), and delays resulting from the failure or inability of the defendant or his counsel to appear (CPL 30.30 [c], [d]; People v. Hall, 61 A.D.2d 1050, 1051), the total time chargeable to the People is well within the permitted six calendar months, which, in this case, totaled 182 days (see, e.g., People v. Jones, 105 A.D.2d 179, 188, affd 66 N.Y.2d 529, 540). Thus, the defendant's postreadiness motion to dismiss pursuant to CPL 30.30 (see, People v. Anderson, supra, at p 536) was properly denied.
The defendant's second contention, that the trial court's charge on reasonable doubt diluted the People's burden, was not preserved for our review (see, CPL 470.05; People v Jones, 55 N.Y.2d 771, 773; People v. Thomas, 50 N.Y.2d 467). In any event, the reasonable doubt charge, taken in its entirety (see, People v. Jones, 27 N.Y.2d 222, 226) did not diminish the People's required burden of proof (see, People v. Jones, supra; People v Daniels, 107 A.D.2d 818; People v. Cruz, 97 A.D.2d 518). Thompson, J.P., Brown, Eiber and Kunzeman, JJ., concur.