Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.
It is well-settled that a plea of guilty forfeits the right to appellate review of the denial of a motion to dismiss the indictment for violation of the statutory right to a speedy trial (People v O'Brien, 56 N.Y.2d 1009; People v Friscia, 51 N.Y.2d 845; People v Velez, 179 A.D.2d 834; People v Wade, 139 A.D.2d 610; People v Jackson, 178 A.D.2d 305). Therefore, regardless of whether the defendant consented to his attorney's waiver of the statutory time period, his subsequent plea of guilty operated to waive any claim he may have had to seek dismissal of the action based upon the People's alleged violation of CPL 30.30.
The defendant's constitutional right to a speedy trial was not violated since he failed to demonstrate that his defense was in any way impaired by reason of the delay (see, Barker v Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530; People v Lawrence, 64 N.Y.2d 200; People v Taranovich, 37 N.Y.2d 442; People v Calamese, 150 A.D.2d 474).
We have considered the defendant's remaining contentions, including those raised in his supplemental pro se brief, and find them to be without merit. Thompson, J.P., Rosenblatt, Ritter and Santucci, JJ., concur.