The sole argument raised on appeal is that the defendant, who fled to the Virgin Islands shortly after the commission of the crime for which he stands convicted, was denied his constitutional right to a speedy trial, as distinguished from any claim of a statutory speedy trial violation, which was waived by defendant's plea of guilty. (People v Friscia, 51 N.Y.2d 845.)
Defendant was arrested on separate murder charges in the Virgin Islands, pleaded guilty, and was eventually lodged in a Federal detention facility in Terre Haute, Indiana, from which he was eventually returned to New York. Of those periods which defendant claims should be counted against the People, we find that only a period of 18 months, during which defendant was made available by Federal authorities but no efforts were made to secure defendant's return, should be charged to the People. Although the People's excuse, which amounted to nothing more than that the trial assistant was engaged in other matters, was insubstantial, it is apparent that the delay was inadvertent, and was not designed to gain a tactical advantage over the defendant (see, People v Johnson, 38 N.Y.2d 271). Further, the reason for the delay is but one of the five factors set forth in People v Taranovich ( 37 N.Y.2d 442). While the length of the delay was extensive (see, People v Moore, 47 N.Y.2d 872 [18 1/2-month delay warranting dismissal of the indictment]; but see, People v Nocerino, 159 A.D.2d 358, lv denied 76 N.Y.2d 740 [20-month pre-indictment delay does not per se warrant dismissal]), defendant would have been incarcerated in any event, and the charge against him, that of murder, is the most grave offense recognized at law. Nor has defendant substantiated his claim of prejudice arising from the delay (People v Gonzalez, 177 A.D.2d 418). Under these circumstances, we conclude that defendant's constitutional right to a speedy trial was not violated.
Concur — Sullivan, J.P., Wallach, Kupferman, Asch and Rubin, JJ.