Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.
The defendant's plea of guilty acts as a waiver of his statutory speedy trial claim (see, CPL 30.30; People v. Howe, 56 N.Y.2d 622; People v. Savage, 54 N.Y.2d 697). Furthermore, it cannot be said that the defendant's constitutional right to a speedy trial was violated. The defendant's motion to dismiss was limited to the 8 1/2-month period when he was wanted on a bench warrant. The hearing court's finding that the defendant voluntarily absented himself from court and therefore was responsible for the delay is supported by the evidence and should not be disturbed. Accordingly, the motion was properly denied (see, People v. Taranovich, 37 N.Y.2d 442, 445; People v O'Shaughnessy, 118 A.D.2d 876, 877, lv denied 68 N.Y.2d 759).
We have considered the defendant's claim that he was improperly adjudicated a second felony offender and find it to be meritless (see, People v. Depeyster, 115 A.D.2d 613; People v. Boyle, 111 A.D.2d 826, 827). Mangano, J.P., Bracken, Spatt and Harwood, JJ., concur.