Ordered that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs.
"Pendente lite awards should reflect an accommodation between the reasonable needs of the moving spouse and the financial ability of the other spouse with due regard for the parties' preseparation standard of living" ( Campanaro v. Campanaro, 292 AD2d 330, 330; see Susskind v. Susskind, 18 AD3d 536; DeVerna v. DeVerna, 4 AD3d 323; Najac v. Najac, 12 AD3d 579). Moreover, "[a]n appellate court will rarely modify such an award, unless exigent circumstances exist, such as where a party is unable to meet his or her own financial obligations or justice otherwise requires" ( Taylor v. Taylor, 306 AD2d 401, 401; see Susskind v. Susskind, supra; DeVerna v. DeVerna, supra). Here, the plaintiff failed to establish that the obligations temporarily imposed upon him by the court's pendente lite order will leave him unable to meet his own needs, or that other exigent circumstances warranting modification exist. Accordingly, any perceived inequities in the pendente lite order can best be remedied by a speedy trial, at which the parties' financial circumstances can be thoroughly explored ( see Susskind v. Susskind, supra; Najac v. Najac, supra; Oquendo v. Oquendo, 7 AD3d 687; Chauca v. Chauca, 5 AD3d 421).
Furthermore, in light of the parties' disparate economic circumstances, the Supreme Court properly exercised its discretion in directing the plaintiff to pay the defendant an interim attorney's fee and accountant's fee ( see Domestic Relations Law § 237 [a]; O'Shea v. O'Shea, 93 NY2d 187, 193; Macagnone v. Macagnone, 7 AD3d 680; Levakis v. Levakis, 7 AD3d 678; DeVerna v. DeVerna, supra).
The plaintiff's remaining contentions are without merit.