DECISION ORDER
ORDERED that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs.
"Pendente lite awards should reflect an accommodation between the reasonable needs of the moving spouse and the financial ability of the other spouse with due regard for the parties' preseparation standard of living" ( Campanaro v. Campanaro, 292 A.D.2d 330; see Landau v. Landau, 258 A.D.2d 508, 509). "An appellate court will rarely modify such an award, unless exigent circumstances exist, such as where a party is unable to meet his or her own financial obligations or justice otherwise requires" ( Taylor v. Taylor, 306 A.D.2d 401). The husband failed to demonstrate that such circumstances exist. Therefore, modification of the award is unwarranted. "Rather, perceived inequities in pendente lite orders are best addressed via a speedy trial at which the parties' economic circumstances may be thoroughly explored" ( Campanaro v. Campanaro, supra at 331).
Contrary to the husband's contention, the Supreme Court did not award a double shelter allowance ( see Hondros v. Hondros, 259 A.D.2d 592; cf. Krantz v. Krantz, 175 A.D.2d 863, 864). Moreover, the Supreme Court correctly declined to impute income to the wife, since there was no evidence in the record which would permit the calculation of her potential earnings ( see Hunter v. Hunter, 290 A.D.2d 535).
In light of the parties' disparate economic circumstances, the award of an interim counsel fee to the wife was a provident exercise of discretion ( see Domestic Relations Law § 237[a]; O'Shea v. O'Shea, 93 N.Y.2d 187, 193; DeVerna v. DeVerna, 4 A.D.3d 323; Shanon v. Patterson, 294 A.D.2d 485, 486).
The husband's remaining contention is improperly raised on this appeal.
ALTMAN, J.P., S. MILLER, LUCIANO and CRANE, JJ., concur.