Ordered that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed and cross-appealed from, without costs or disbursements.
"Pendente lite awards should reflect an accommodation between the reasonable needs of the moving spouse and the financial ability of the other spouse with due regard for the parties' preseparation standard of living" ( Campanaro v. Campanaro, 292 AD2d 330; see Macagnone v. Macagnone, 7 AD3d 680). "An appellate court will rarely modify such an award, unless exigent circumstances exist, such as where a party is unable to meet his or her own financial obligations or justice otherwise requires" ( Taylor v. Taylor, 306 AD2d 401). Here, the husband failed to demonstrate the existence of such circumstances. Therefore, modification of the award is unwarranted. "Rather, perceived inequities in pendente lite orders are best addressed via a speedy trial at which the parties' economic circumstances may be thoroughly explored" ( Campanaro v. Campanaro, supra at 331).
Contrary to the husband's contention, given the financial circumstances of the parties, the Supreme Court properly exercised its discretion in directing him to pay one half of the wife's counsel fees ( see Tayar v. Tayar, 250 AD2d 757). The wife was not required to exhaust her own capital in order to qualify for an interim counsel fee award ( see Mitzner v. Mitzner, 228 AD2d 483; Lieberman v. Lieberman, 187 AD2d 567). However, since the wife failed to demonstrate that she lacked sufficient funds of her own to compensate counsel at this state of the litigation, the Supreme Court properly awarded her only half of the attorney's fees sought ( see Grant v. Grant, 299 AD2d 521).
Finally, the record clearly establishes the husband's repeated failure to comply with the wife's discovery demands and prior orders of the Supreme Court was willful and contumacious ( see Maillard v. Maillard, 243 AD2d 448). Thus, the Supreme Court was justified in conditionally precluding him from submitting evidence relating to his finances unless he complied with the wife's discovery demands ( see Pearl v. Pearl, 266 AD2d 366).