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Start Mortgages Designated Activity Company v Sullivan & Anor (Approved)
Summary of Judgment (Anonymised)
Factual and Procedural Background
This judgment was delivered by Judge Heslin on 28 November 2025 following a hearing on 12 November 2025. The original possession proceedings began with a Civil Bill issued on 20 July 2017 by Company B. On 14 October 2019 the Circuit Court substituted Company A as plaintiff. On 7 December 2021 the Circuit Court (Judge Comerford) made an order granting the Plaintiff possession of the property at [Number] Main Street (the "property") with a three-month stay on execution (the "possession order"). The defendants did not appear at that hearing and did not appeal the possession order within the time permitted.
An Execution Order for the possession order issued on 1 March 2024 and was executed on 17 April 2024, after which possession was delivered to the Plaintiff. The Defendants later re-entered the property.
In July 2024 the Defendants issued a motion in the Circuit Court seeking to vacate the earlier Circuit Court orders, including the possession order. The Circuit Court dismissed that motion on 8 April 2025 (Judge McAleese). The Defendants appealed that dismissal to the High Court. The Defendants also sought to adduce fresh evidence in the appeal by motion dated 25 June 2025. The High Court (Judge Heslin) considered the appeals and the application to admit new evidence.
The Defendants had not retained legal representation and had, instead, produced a range of statutory declarations, letters to third parties and other documents outside the Circuit Court process. The Plaintiff was represented in the High Court by Attorney Newman. The Plaintiff obtained costs against the Defendants to be taxed in default of agreement.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the High Court should exercise an exceptional jurisdiction to set aside or treat as a nullity a final, un-appealed Circuit Court possession order that has been executed.
- Whether the Defendants should be permitted to adduce fresh evidence on appeal under Order 61, r. 8 of the Rules of the Superior Courts and section 37 of the Courts of Justice Act (i.e. whether special leave should be granted for evidence not given in the Circuit Court).
- Whether the Defendants' factual and legal allegations (including alleged absence of Plaintiff title, alleged divestment by the Defendants of their interest in the property, and alleged statutory or constitutional breaches by the Plaintiff) amount to exceptional circumstances (for example fraud going to the root of the matter) justifying reopening final orders.
- Whether the Defendants' delay, non-participation in the Circuit Court proceedings, and their private processes impact the availability of relief and the application of doctrines such as res judicata/Henderson v Henderson.
Arguments of the Parties
Plaintiff's Arguments
- The Circuit Court had jurisdiction properly to hear and determine the possession claim; the Pleadings expressly pleaded market value within the Circuit Court limit and statutory presumptions apply.
- The possession order became final because no appeal was taken and no extension of time to appeal was sought; consequently the High Court is functus officio with respect to setting aside a final executed order in the ordinary way.
- The execution of the possession order in April 2024 meant the order had served its purpose (was "spent"); subsequent re-entry by the Defendants was trespass and did not re-open the order.
- The Defendants' application to adduce new evidence did not satisfy Order 61 r.8 or the "Murphy" test: the evidence was created after the Circuit Court hearing but was based on publicly available material that could have been obtained with reasonable diligence; no adequate explanation was provided for late disclosure.
- The Defendants advanced arguments and allegations that could and should have been ventilated in the Circuit Court and are now barred by res judicata and the rule in Henderson v Henderson; no fraud on the court was shown that would justify reopening final orders.
- Admission of new evidence at the High Court stage would cause substantial prejudice because the High Court hearing of a Circuit Court appeal is final and not further appealable.
Defendants' Arguments
- The Defendants contended that the Plaintiff never held legal or beneficial title to the mortgage and therefore had no standing to obtain or to execute a possession order.
- The Defendants asserted that they had divested themselves of any interest in the property in 2018, so the possession proceedings were void and the Circuit Court lacked jurisdiction.
- The Defendants alleged statutory and constitutional breaches by the Plaintiff, and alleged misrepresentations, fraud, concealment and perjury in the procurement of the possession order.
- The Defendants sought permission to adduce an accountant's affidavit prepared after the Circuit Court hearing, based on audited accounts, to demonstrate that the Plaintiff did not own the mortgage assets and therefore lacked locus standi.
- The Defendants relied at various times on private statutory declarations and other letters and notices they had sent to third parties (including a regulator and a purported trust) which, they said, established or preserved their position outside the court process.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent (anonymised) | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Precedent A [2015] IEHC 304 | Authority supporting the Circuit Court's jurisdiction to hear possession claims where statutory market-value pleading was made. | The court relied on this decision to conclude the Circuit Court unquestionably had jurisdiction to deal with the 2017 possession proceedings. |
| Precedent B [2018] IECA 334 | Principle that, once a possession order is executed and possession taken, the order has served its purpose and subsequent acts by a dispossessed party are trespass rather than re-taking possession; no re-execution is required. | The court applied this reasoning to conclude the December 2021 possession order had been executed in April 2024 and was therefore spent before the Defendants issued the motions to set it aside. |
| Precedent C (Murphy) [1991] 2 IR 161 | Guidance on admitting fresh evidence on appeal (existence at time, reasonable diligence, probable influence, credibility). | The court applied the Murphy criteria and found the proposed new evidence failed the test (it could have been obtained earlier and would not probably have important influence on the result). |
| Precedent D [2022] IECA 87 | Guidance that applications to admit further evidence late in the process require a full, detailed explanation and should only be made in exceptional circumstances. | The court relied on this authority to find the Defendants had not provided the required "complete picture" explaining the late application and thus failed to justify admission of fresh evidence. |
| Precedent E [2023] IEHC 37 | Discussion of the exceptional jurisdiction to re-open final judgments and the high threshold for doing so. | The court adopted the analysis and emphasised that the jurisdiction to revisit final orders is exceptional and constrained. |
| Precedent F [2021] IESC 35 | Supreme Court exposition that reopening final judgments is permissible only where a fundamental denial of justice would otherwise occur. | The court applied this principle, holding the Defendants had not shown any such fundamental denial of justice. |
| Precedent G (Greendale) [2000] 2 I.R. 514 | Source authority recognising an exceptional jurisdiction to reopen final judgments in extreme cases. | Used to frame the exceptional nature of the jurisdiction to set aside final orders, reinforcing the high threshold required. |
| Precedent H (Henderson v Henderson) (1843) | The rule preventing re-litigation of matters that could and should have been advanced earlier. | The court applied the Henderson principle (res judicata/Henderson rule) to bar arguments that ought to have been raised in the original proceedings. |
| Precedent I [2015] IEHC 525 (Vico) | Restatement of res judicata and the Henderson v Henderson rule and the policy of finality in litigation. | The court relied on Vico (and related passages) to explain the public-policy basis for finality and to conclude the Defendants were estopped from re-litigating issues. |
| Precedent J [2008] IESC 18 (Kenny) | Standards for proving fraud sufficient to set aside a judgment: deliberate dishonesty affecting the impugned decision in a fundamental way. | The court applied this standard and found no evidence of fraud of the requisite kind that would undermine the final possession order. |
| Precedent K [2025] IECA 77 (Howley) | Commentary on the serious reputational and practical consequences of unsubstantiated allegations of fraud in litigation. | The court cited the decision to condemn the Defendants' serious but unsupported allegations as scandalous and inappropriate. |
| Precedent L [2023] IECA 251 (Kavanagh - CA) | Authority criticising attempts to re-litigate long-final matters and identifying such conduct as an abuse of process. | The court drew parallels to Kavanagh and characterised the Defendants' applications as an abuse of process and a cynical attempt to delay the Plaintiff's rights. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court's analysis proceeded in a structured manner, addressing chronology, procedural finality, the effect of execution, the admissibility of fresh evidence on appeal, and the principles governing exceptional reopening of final judgments.
Chronology and finality: The Court set out the detailed timeline (Civil Bill 2017; substitution of plaintiff 2019; possession order 7 December 2021; execution 17 April 2024; Defendants' re-entry; issuing of motions to set aside in July 2024; Circuit Court dismissal 8 April 2025; appeals and application to adduce new evidence). The Court emphasised that the Defendants did not appeal the 2021 possession order and did not seek an extension of time to appeal, so the order is final.
Effect of execution: The Court applied the reasoning in the cited Court of Appeal authority to hold that once the possession order was executed (possession taken on 17 April 2024), the order had served its purpose and was "spent". Subsequent acts by the Defendants (re-entry) constituted trespass rather than a procedural ground for un-executing the order. On that basis the Court concluded it had no jurisdiction to re-visit the executed possession order and that the appeals must fail on that ground alone.
Admissibility of new evidence: Turning, in the alternative, to the application to adduce new evidence on appeal, the Court applied the text of Order 61 r.8 and section 37 of the Courts of Justice Act and the familiar "Murphy" criteria. The Court found the proposed affidavit from an accountant was created after the Circuit Court hearing but based on publicly available company accounts that were available before the Circuit Court hearing. The Defendants provided no adequate explanation of sufficient efforts made to obtain that evidence earlier and thus failed to satisfy Order 61 r.8 and the Murphy factors (existence at trial/obtainable with reasonable diligence and probable influence). The Court also considered the authorities emphasizing that late applications to admit fresh evidence require a full explanation and only exceptional circumstances justify them; the Defendants' affidavit did not supply the "complete picture" required by those authorities.
Reopening final orders and exceptional jurisdiction: The Court reviewed the jurisprudence on the exceptional jurisdiction to set aside a final judgment (Greendale, Student Transport Scheme and related authorities). The Court emphasised that reopening is permissible only where a fundamental denial of justice would otherwise occur or where a judgment was procured by fraud of the gravest kind that goes to the root of the order. The Court found no evidence of such exceptional circumstances: the Defendants deliberately chose not to engage in the Circuit Court proceedings, did not appeal the possession order, delayed bringing their applications, and relied on a private "process" (statutory declarations and letters) outside the court process. The Court treated those choices as decisive under the rules of finality and res judicata (Henderson v Henderson) and concluded the Defendants had not established any ground (such as proven fraud affecting the impugned decision) that would justify treating the final order as a nullity.
Abuse of process and scandalous allegations: The Court also addressed the many serious allegations advanced by the Defendants against the Plaintiff and named individuals (allegations of misrepresentation, perjury, concealment, and fraud). The Court found these allegations to be wholly unsupported by evidence and described them as scandalous, wholly inappropriate and a misuse of court processes. The Court noted the improper use of law-like language in private instruments and the Defendants' persistent refusal to test those allegations within the court process when they had the opportunity.
Conclusion of reasoning: The Court concluded that (i) the possession order had been validly made and executed; (ii) the Defendants had not shown any exceptional circumstances to justify reopening the final orders; (iii) the application to admit new evidence failed for reasons of lateness, lack of explanation and lack of relevance; and (iv) the Defendants' applications were an abuse of process and must be dismissed.
Holding and Implications
CORE RULING: The Defendants' appeals and related motions are dismissed.
Holding (concise): The High Court refused the Defendants' application to vacate or set aside the Circuit Court's possession order and refused leave to adduce the additional evidence sought on appeal. The Circuit Court's order of 7 December 2021 stands and the Defendants' attempts to reopen final orders were rejected as an abuse of process. Costs were awarded to the Plaintiff to be taxed in default of agreement. The matter was listed for formal orders.
Implications:
- Direct effect: The Defendants' motions are dismissed; the Plaintiff's possession order remains final and the Plaintiff succeeded in its applications for costs.
- No broad new precedent: The judgment applies established principles concerning finality, execution of possession orders, the narrow exceptional jurisdiction to reopen final judgments, the test for admitting fresh evidence on appeal, and the doctrine against re-litigation (Henderson v Henderson). The Court did not purport to create new legal principles beyond reaffirming and applying existing authorities.
Additional Note
This summary has been prepared strictly on the basis of the material contained in the provided judgment and has been fully anonymised in accordance with the instructions given. No information has been invented or inferred beyond what appears in the judgment text.
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