Summary of Judgment

Factual and Procedural Background

The Applicants are nationals of Country A who married in May 2022. They arrived in the State on 21 May 2022 and applied for international protection on 24 May 2022. Their protection claims were rejected at first instance by the International Protection Office. They appealed to the first respondent and that appeal was dismissed on 29 February 2024 on the ground that state protection would be available to them in Country A.

The Applicants commenced judicial review proceedings on 26 March 2024 and were granted leave to apply for judicial review on 22 July 2024. Leave was granted to challenge, by certiorari, the part of the first respondent's decision finding that the Applicants had not submitted serious grounds for considering Country A not to be a safe country of origin in their particular circumstances, and to remit that issue for reconsideration. The Applicants subsequently abandoned the remittal relief and confined their case to certiorari quashing the first respondent's decision on the basis of an alleged failure to cooperate in the assessment of their claims.

Two separate but identical proceedings (in substance) were heard together and a single judgment was delivered by Judge Gillane.

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether the first respondent breached its duty to cooperate with the Applicants in assessing their international protection claims, as derived from Article 4 of Council Directive 2004/83/EC and related authorities.
2. Whether the Applicants had submitted, or at least indicated, serious grounds or serious counter-indications that Country A should not be treated as a safe country of origin in their particular circumstances, thereby triggering the respondent's duty to cooperate.
3. If a breach of the duty to cooperate is established, whether the decision might have been different (the "might have been different" test) and thus whether certiorari should issue.

Arguments of the Parties

Applicants' Arguments

• The Applicants contended that the first respondent relied unduly on the designation of Country A as a safe country of origin and failed to discharge its duty to cooperate in the assessment of their appeal.
• They argued that the duty to cooperate does not require the applicant to adduce everything first and relied on the CJEU statement that "if, for any reason whatsoever" elements provided by an applicant are incomplete, the State must cooperate to assemble the missing elements.
• The Applicants submitted that if cooperation had been properly carried out, the outcome "might have been different" and they sought to rely on country of origin material (a Freedom House report, a Public Defender report, and a Council of Europe report) to support that submission. Extracts of these reports were referred to in affidavit material rather than being formally exhibited.

Respondents' Arguments

• The Respondents contended that the Applicants failed to submit any serious grounds for considering Country A not to be a safe country of origin in their particular circumstances, which is a statutory prerequisite under section 33 of the International Protection Act 2015 and the Procedures Directive.
• They argued the duty to cooperate is a shared duty and is triggered only where the applicant has at least raised, even in a rudimentary way, a serious ground; the duty does not arise in a vacuum.
• The Respondents submitted that the first respondent considered the country of origin material that had been submitted and addressed the Applicants' claimed facts; the Applicants were attempting to recast their case on judicial review rather than relying on matters actually raised before the Tribunal.
• The Respondents relied on authority holding that decision-makers cannot be expected to determine issues not raised by an applicant and that the applicant bears an obligation to submit grounds that meet the threshold test in section 33.

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court began by identifying the statutory and European-law framework: Country A had been designated a safe country of origin under section 72 of the International Protection Act 2015 and section 33 creates a rebuttable presumption of safety for designated countries unless the applicant has submitted serious grounds specific to their circumstances.

The Court analysed the duty to cooperate as derived from Article 4 of Directive 2004/83/EC and as expounded by the CJEU in M.M. and by domestic authorities (A.A.L., S.H.I.). That duty is shared: applicants generally must submit the elements needed to substantiate their claim, while the State must cooperate and may be better placed to obtain certain country-of-origin documentation. However, the Court emphasised that the duty of cooperation is not unlimited or wholly inquisitorial. In particular, the Court adopted the view that the duty will be engaged only where the applicant has at least identified or indicated strong grounds or serious counter-indications that the safe-country presumption should not apply.

Applying that legal framework to the facts, the Court examined the Applicants' interview responses and questionnaires. The Applicants described threats and assaults by members of the wife's family and stated reluctance to approach the police because family members were dangerous. I.A.'s parents were recorded as Jehovah's Witnesses and religion was referenced in the Tribunal's nexus findings. However, the Court found that neither the questionnaire, the interview, nor the filed notice of appeal ever specifically advanced the proposition that state protection was unavailable because of the religious faith of I.A.'s parents; nor did the appeal notices refer to Country A being unsafe in those terms.

The Court concluded that the Applicants did not, at any stage before the Tribunal, submit the requisite serious grounds or serious counter-indications to unsettle the presumption of safety. The Court found the obligation to "submit" such grounds significant: the duty to cooperate presupposes a contribution by the applicant and cannot be activated in a purely theoretical manner. The Court rejected the Applicants' emphasis on the CJEU phrase "if, for any reason whatsoever" as being taken out of context—the phrase addresses incomplete elements supplied by an applicant, not a licence to require the State to investigate issues the applicant never presented.

Because the Court found that the duty of cooperation was not engaged, it held there was no breach of duty by the first respondent. Consequently, the Court did not consider whether the additional country of origin material referenced in affidavit extracts would have made the decision "might have been different."

The Court also noted that certain affidavits did not substantively engage with the asserted link between the religious faith of I.A.'s parents and the Applicants' particular circumstances, reinforcing the conclusion that the Tribunal had not been put on notice to investigate that issue.

Holding and Implications

APPLICATION REFUSED

Holding: The Court refused the Applicants' application for judicial review. The Court held there was no breach of the duty to cooperate because the Applicants had not submitted, in their questionnaire, interviews, or notices of appeal, any serious grounds specific to their circumstances to rebut the presumption that Country A is a safe country of origin. Accordingly, certiorari was not warranted.

Implications: The direct effect is that the Tribunal's decision dismissing the Applicants' appeal stands. The Court emphasised that the duty to cooperate is triggered by applicant-specific grounds and is not an abstract or theoretical obligation. No new legal principle was established beyond the application of existing Directive and domestic authority: applicants must at least indicate serious counter-indications before the State's duty to cooperate in assembling additional material arises.

The Court further indicated it would make an order for costs in favour of the Respondents under section 169 of the Legal Services Regulation Act 2015, stayed for two weeks, and directed that any dispute about the terms of that order be notified within that period for relisting.

Judge Gillane delivered the judgment on 1 December 2025.