Summary of Judgment

Factual and Procedural Background

This judgment, delivered by Judge Humphreys on 28 November 2025, concerns an appeal under national regulations transposing Directive 2003/4 on public access to environmental information and related provisions of the Aarhus Convention. The Appellant made a request to Company A on 12 July 2023 for correspondence relating to a May 2022 certification audit. An implied refusal arose on 11 August 2023. An internal review granted access subject to a €30 charge on 11 September 2023; Company A invoiced €30 on 13 September 2023 for 1.5 hours of staff time for search, retrieval and compilation (no material copying costs). The Appellant paid the invoice around 9 October 2023 and received the information on 18 October 2023. The Appellant appealed the fee to the Respondent on 22 October 2023. Company A reduced the charge to €15 in submissions to the Respondent. The Respondent affirmed the €15 fee on 10 March 2025. The Appellant then appealed that decision to the referring court (filed 27 March 2025). The referring court heard the matter on 26 September 2025 and gave an initial judgment on 22 October 2025 identifying questions for reference to the Court of Justice. The Amicus Curiae was joined by order on 10 November 2025 and made submissions. The referring court stayed the proceedings and referred questions to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling.

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether, in light of Decision VII/8n of the Meeting of the Parties endorsing findings of the Aarhus Convention Compliance Committee (ACCC) in relation to ACCC/C/2017/147, Article 5(2) of Directive 2003/4 and/or Article 4(8) of the Aarhus Convention must be interpreted, as applied after the date of that decision, so as to preclude charging any part of the cost of staff time overheads (in particular costs attributable to search, retrieval and collation) when supplying environmental information in response to a request.
2. If the answer to Question 1 is No, whether the principle of equivalence (as part of EU law) precludes a Member State, when implementing those provisions in transposing legislation, from imposing a charge that includes any part of staff time overheads for an EU request where a similar charge would not be lawful for a domestic request under national freedom of information legislation; and, if engaged, whether specified factors (i)-(iii) preclude a finding of sufficient similarity between the procedures for EU requests and domestic requests.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant

• Proposes the answer to Question 1 is "Yes": Decision VII/8n means Article 5(2) of Directive 2003/4 must be interpreted to preclude charges that include staff time overheads (notably search, retrieval and collation costs).
• Proposes the answer to Question 2 is "Yes": the principle of equivalence requires that if such time costs cannot be charged under domestic FOI law, they may not be charged under transposing AIE law; the factors (i)-(iii) do not prevent a conclusion of sufficient similarity.

Respondent

• Takes a neutral position on Question 1 and will apply CJEU law as decided.
• Argues for Question 2 that the AIE and domestic FOI fees regimes are conceptually different and not sufficiently similar to trigger the principle of equivalence; differences include the deterrence test under AIE and the fixed fee structure under FOI, different proactive publication duties, and that the notice party is not covered by FOI.

Company A (Notice Party)

• Answers Question 1 "No": relies on the CJEU judgment in Case C‑71/14 (East Sussex) which held Article 5(2) may include staff time costs; submits that East Sussex is binding and unaffected by the Moldova-related decision.
• Answers Question 2 "No": contends equivalence is not engaged; the AIE and FOI regimes do not pursue the same objective or share essential characteristics; factors (i)-(iii) preclude sufficient similarity.

Company B / The State (Notice Party)

• Answers Question 1 "No": the MOP decision endorsing the ACCC findings is an international-law act and cannot bind EU law; East Sussex remains authoritative for Directive 2003/4.
• Answers Question 2 "No": submits equivalence does not apply where EU law has legislated in the field and where rights are not directly effective such that domestic procedural rules must be adapted; in any event, factors (i)-(iii) preclude sufficient similarity.

Amicus Curiae

• Answers both Questions 1 and 2 "Yes": Decision VII/8n supports an interpretation excluding staff time overheads from chargeable costs, and the principle of equivalence applies so that domestic FOI limitations on charging should prevent such charges under transposing legislation; factors (i)-(iii) do not defeat comparability.

Referring Court

• Proposes Question 1 be answered "Yes": although East Sussex was a valid earlier interpretation, the CJEU may revise its interpretation in light of developments with interpretative significance (MOP endorsement of ACCC findings), and the MOP endorsement should be read as endorsing the ACCC reasoning.
• Proposes Question 2 (if required) be answered "Yes": the principle of equivalence applies and the FOI and AIE regimes are sufficiently comparable; statutory provisions in transposing legislation should be disapplied where they permit fees that domestic FOI would not permit.

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The referring court framed the dispute around the interpretation of Article 5(2) of Directive 2003/4 and Article 4(8) of the Aarhus Convention, in light of an international decision (Decision VII/8n endorsing ACCC findings concerning ACCC/C/2017/147). The court proceeded by:

1. Setting out the applicable interpretative framework, including Article 31 of the Vienna Convention (treaty interpretation), Article 216(1)-(2) TFEU on international agreements, and the relationship between the Aarhus Convention and EU law as discussed in prior CJEU case law.
2. Reciting the ACCC findings and the subsequent endorsement by the Meeting of the Parties (Decision VII/8n) that charges for supplying environmental information must be transparent, must not include initial production or indirect costs, and must not have a deterrent effect.
3. Examining prior CJEU authority (notably Case C‑71/14) which had permitted inclusion of staff time costs in Article 5(2) charges, while excluding database maintenance costs and requiring a reasonable amount overall.
4. Identifying a potential interpretative tension between the CJEU's earlier approach and the ACCC/MOP findings. The referring court reasoned that the MOP endorsement of ACCC findings constitutes a subsequent practice/agreement with interpretative significance under Article 31 of the Vienna Convention and that, in view of the desirability of alignment, the CJEU could revise its earlier interpretation to reflect that development.
5. Considering the doctrine of equivalence: the court analysed whether domestic FOI rules and AIE/transposing rules are sufficiently similar such that domestic restrictions on charges (for example prohibitions on certain time charges under FOI) should preclude such charges for EU requests under the principle of equivalence. The court found arguments for comparability strong, noting both procedures' essence of facilitating access to information/records, and observed that technical differences or the fact a particular body is not covered by FOI are not necessarily sufficient to defeat equivalence.
6. Concluding that the questions identified for the CJEU are material to the outcome and that a preliminary reference is appropriate; accordingly the referring court stayed the proceedings pending the CJEU's ruling.

Holding and Implications

HOLDING: The referring court ordered that the questions set out in the judgment be referred to the Court of Justice pursuant to Article 267 TFEU and that the substantive determination of the domestic proceedings be adjourned pending the CJEU's judgment, without prejudice to procedural or interlocutory matters.

Implications:

• The immediate practical effect is a stay of substantive domestic proceedings and referral of legal questions to the CJEU.
• The court noted that, depending on the CJEU's answers, domestic transposing legislation may need to be disapplied insofar as it permits fees of the type challenged (staff time charges for search, retrieval and collation). In the present factual context, if the CJEU were to find in the Appellant's favour, that could entail allowing the appeal and directing refund of the €15 fee paid.
• The court did not itself determine whether domestic statutory provisions are incompatible; it posed the interpretative and equivalence questions to the CJEU for authoritative resolution.