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B.N. (Georgia) v International Protection Appeals Tribunal and Anor (Approved)
Summary of Judicial Review Opinion
Factual and Procedural Background
The Applicant (born 1988), a national of The State, entered this jurisdiction on 25 February 2023 and applied for international protection on 27 February 2023. In the Applicant's initial questionnaire and in an interview conducted on 21 March 2023 (with interpreter assistance), the Applicant described familial opposition to his relationship with his partner, including verbal threats and assaults, and explained why he had not reported those incidents to local authorities. On 12 September 2023 the Applicant's solicitors submitted further material to the International Protection Office (referred to below as Company C), including an argument that the Applicant had the status of an internally displaced person (IDP) from Region A and that that status materially affected the legal assessment of his protection claim. Company C recommended refusal by letter dated 14 September 2023. The Applicant appealed to the International Protection Appeals Tribunal (referred to below as Company A), requesting an oral hearing and relying both on the family-threats material and on the IDP argument. An oral hearing was held before Company A on 14 March 2024, and post-hearing submissions were filed. Company A issued a decision on 29 April 2024 upholding the recommendation to refuse protection. The Applicant sought statutory review under s.49(7) and then applied for judicial review, seeking (a) certiorari quashing Company A's decision and (b) an extension of time if required. Leave to apply for judicial review was granted on 29 July 2024. The judicial review proceedings were heard by Judge O'Donnell, who considered (i) whether an extension of time should be granted and (ii) whether Company A erred by failing to engage adequately with the Applicant's IDP-based core claim. The court concluded that an extension should be granted and that Company A's decision should be quashed and remitted for fresh consideration because Company A failed to engage with a substantial issue raised on appeal.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the Applicant is entitled to an extension of time to bring the judicial review under section 5 of the Illegal Immigrants (Trafficking) Act 2000 (as amended).
- Whether Company A erred in law and breached constitutional justice by failing to exercise its jurisdiction to examine and decide the Applicant's international protection appeal as made, specifically by not adequately addressing the Applicant's claim that his status as an internally displaced person from Region A made internal relocation analysis of the rest of The State inappropriate or insufficient.
Arguments of the Parties
Applicant's Arguments
- The Applicant narrowed the substantive case to the proposition that Company A fell into illegality by failing to engage with arguments relating to his status as an IDP which formed a core part of his appeal.
- The Applicant contended that the IDP issue was specifically raised in written submissions and in grounds of appeal, and that substantial COI was presented to show risks to ethnic nationals in Region A and that internal relocation within The State would be unreasonable or unduly harsh.
- The Applicant asserted that legal submissions made by his representatives constitute his arguments and that Company A was required to consider those submissions properly.
Respondents' Arguments
- The Respondents (Company A and Company B) maintained a preliminary objection that the proceedings were commenced one day outside the statutory period, arguing against any extension.
- Substantively, the Respondents argued that Company A had considered the IDP submissions (pointing to express references in the decision that the material was "fully assessed") and, in any event, that the IDP issue was not relevant given Company A's factual findings that there was no well-founded fear of persecution or real risk of serious harm.
- The Respondents contended that an applicant cannot obtain protection solely by virtue of IDP status and that the applicable legal tests must be applied to the specific facts and evidence; in their submission the IDP point was manifestly incorrect as a matter of law.
- The Respondents also argued lack of evidential basis in the Applicant's own testimony for a claim of persecution or serious harm on the basis of IDP status, as opposed to the family-threats narrative which was the main factual focus of the Applicant's oral evidence.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Appellant v Company A and Company B [2025] IEHC 403 | Approach to extension of time under section 5 of the Illegal Immigrants (Trafficking) Act 2000; distinction between showing "good and sufficient reason to make the application within" a prescribed period and showing "good and sufficient reason" for extending the period. | The court adopted the approach and factors identified in that judgment when assessing the extension application and found those factors supported granting an extension here. |
| Appellant GK v Company B [2002] 2 IR 418 | Presumption that a decision-maker who expressly states that they have considered the materials should be accepted unless there is reason to believe the statement is incorrect. | The court explained that this presumption can be rebutted by evidence suggesting non-engagement; it declined to treat that presumption as dispositive in the circumstances of this case. |
| Appellant IR v Company B [2015] 4 IR 144 | Principle that decision-makers need not mention every argument or piece of evidence so long as the basis of the decision can be ascertained; a recognition of practical limits on exhaustive reasoning. | The court accepted the general utility of this principle but held it did not justify Company A's apparent failure to engage with a central legal argument that formed a core part of the Applicant's case. |
| Appellant RA v Company A [2017] IECA 297 | Emphasis on the impact of the Qualification Directive and the need for national courts to ensure a "thorough review" of reasons given for rejecting asylum applications; reference to Article 39 of the Procedures Directive. | The court relied on the RA authority to underscore that judicial review in international protection cases requires thorough scrutiny, and that failure to show how a core legal issue was addressed can impair that review. |
| CJEU Cases C-57/09 & C-101/09 (B and D) EU:C:2010:661 | Authority cited for the proposition that asylum is fundamentally governed by EU law and for contextual support to RA's statements about EU obligations. | Used in support of the proposition that EU law informs the required thoroughness of review in asylum decisions. |
| Case NM (DRC) | Referenced as part of the jurisprudence regarding Article 39 of the Procedures Directive and the supervisory role of national courts. | Used to support the court's assertion that national courts must be able to conduct thorough review under EU law. |
| Case C-756/21 Appellant v Company A (CJEU) | CJEU ruling on the duty of cooperation (Article 4(1) of Directive 2004/83/EC); authorities that the determining authority must obtain up-to-date information and carry out assessments with vigilance and care. | The court applied this precedent to underline the obligation on decision-makers to engage actively and cooperatively, and to obtain and consider relevant COI when a core claim raises country-of-origin issues. |
| Appellant PD v Company B [2015] IEHC 111 | Discussion of "core claims" and the need for clearly expressed decisions in relation to those claims; that failure to address core claims may constitute significant error as to jurisdiction. | The court relied on PD to justify the requirement that Company A must adequately address the Applicant's IDP-based core claim and that failure to do so vitiates the decision. |
| Case MAB v Company C & Ors [2014] IEHC 64 | Example where failure to decide a core factual issue (tribal membership) rendered a decision defective because it went to the heart of the claim. | The court cited MAB to illustrate the importance of addressing central elements of an applicant's claim and to support the conclusion that Company A's lack of clear engagement with the IDP issue was material. |
| Case MM v Chief Company C Officer & Ors [2022] IECA 226 | Authority that where the element is "at the very heart" of the application (e.g., sexual orientation), a clear finding is required. | The court used MM to reinforce that where a matter is central to the claim, a decision-maker must address it clearly; the IDP issue here was treated as such a central matter. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court addressed both procedural and substantive questions.
On the extension of time: the court adopted the approach articulated in the recent authority on section 5 of the 2000 Act (Appellant v Company A and Company B [2025] IEHC 403). It distinguished the statutory test under the 2000 Act from other tests and considered analogous principles under the Rules of the Superior Courts. Relevant factors included the very minimal delay (caused by an attempt to file during a court vacation and closure of the stamping office), the Applicant's prompt steps to progress the matter, absence of prejudice to the Respondents, lack of contribution of the delay to any listing delay, hearing of the extension with the substantive hearing, and absence of manifest weakness in the Applicant's case. Balancing these factors, the court found good and sufficient reason to grant the extension.
On the substantive issue: the court's reasoning proceeded from several interrelated legal principles expressly referenced in the opinion:
- The need to treat legal submissions made by an applicant's representatives as the Applicant's arguments; an artificial distinction between factual evidence given by an applicant and legal submissions made by counsel could undermine effective access to representation.
- The duty on decision-makers in international protection matters to undertake an individualised assessment in cooperation with the applicant (statutory reflection of EU law duties), specifically referencing sections 28(3) and 28(4) and s.61(3)(a) of the 2015 Act and the CJEU duty of cooperation (Case C-756/21).
- Precedent establishes that courts should not demand that a decision-maker mention every argument (I.R. v Company B), and there is a presumption that matters expressly stated to have been considered have in fact been considered (G.K.). However, those principles do not permit a decision-maker to fail to address a "core claim" such that the reasoning is unclear or suggests the decision-maker addressed a different question (PD; MAB; MM).
- Given the Qualification and Procedures Directives and associated jurisprudence (as explained in RA and related authorities), national courts must be able to conduct a "thorough review" of the legality of international protection decisions; opaque or non-engagement with a central issue undermines that review.
Applying those principles to the facts, the court found that the IDP issue was clearly and repeatedly presented to Company A (in submissions, the grounds of appeal and post-hearing submissions, including relevant COI and a confirming certificate of IDP status from a governmental source). The court concluded that Company A's decision, although it mentioned facts such as the Applicant having lived outside Region A and referred to COI, did not adequately engage with the legal proposition that the Applicant's IDP status might alter the applicable assessment (i.e., that as an IDP the Applicant needed only to show a real risk in Region A together with unreasonableness of internal relocation elsewhere in The State). The court held that the presumption of consideration (G.K.) and the practical rule that not every argument must be separately addressed (I.R.) were insufficient to cure this failure because the IDP argument was a core legal contention whose resolution could be determinative or at least significantly influential on the outcome. The court therefore concluded there was a jurisdictional error in Company A's decision for failure to engage and determine that core claim, and that remittance for fresh consideration was required.
Holding and Implications
Core Rulings:
- The Applicant's application for an extension of time is granted.
- The decision of Company A dated 29 April 2024 is quashed.
- The matter is remitted to Company A for fresh consideration, with directions that the fresh Tribunal must engage properly with the Applicant's IDP-based core claim.
Implications:
- The direct consequence is that the Applicant will have his appeal reconsidered by a freshly constituted Tribunal which must address the IDP issue substantively. The court made clear that it does not pre-judge the merits of the IDP argument; that is for the Tribunal on re-hearing.
- The decision reinforces that in international protection appeals decision-makers must give adequate consideration to core claims advanced by applicants (including legal propositions advanced by representatives) and that failure to do so may amount to jurisdictional error requiring quashing and remittal.
- The court made a provisional costs ruling in favour of the Applicant, directing that costs be adjudicated in default of agreement and listing a final costs hearing; the judgment did not purport to set any novel or binding legal precedent beyond application of existing principles.
Judge: Judge O'Donnell
Date of Decision in Opinion: 28 November 2025
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