Summary of Judgment

Factual and Procedural Background

This opinion concerns applications for permission to appeal and related relief arising from private law proceedings under the Children Act 1989 concerning a child (referred to in the papers as "E" and hereafter as "Child"). The Appellant was a witness in the Children Act proceedings and seeks permission to appeal a decision by Judge [Last Name] to publish the fact-finding judgment (the "Judgment") without anonymising the Appellant. The Appellant also sought an extension of time to apply for permission to appeal some substantive findings in the Judgment and permission to amend the appellant's notice.

The Children Act proceedings were commenced by the Father; the respondents to those proceedings were the Mother and the Child (represented by a Guardian). The Appellant is a psychotherapist who gave evidence at the fact-finding hearing and was cross-examined. The Judgment contains adverse findings about the Appellant's professional conduct (not set out in detail here), including principal criticisms located in the Judgment at paragraphs noted in the original text.

Procedurally: a draft of the Judgment was circulated to parties on 16 April 2025. A case management hearing to consider publication and related directions was fixed. The Judgment was handed down in private on 2 May 2025 in the Appellant's absence; argument about publication was adjourned and heard on 10 June 2025 after the Appellant had obtained legal representation and made written and oral submissions. On 16 July 2025 the judge issued a reserved decision concluding that the Judgment should be disclosed to the Appellant's regulator and employers and that the published version should identify the Appellant (i.e. not anonymise her). The Appellant filed an appellant's notice on 29 July 2025 challenging the 16 July 2025 decision and seeking, by way of extension, to challenge parts of the substantive findings in the Judgment itself.

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether permission to appeal should be granted in respect of the judge's decision to publish the Judgment identifying the Appellant (anonymisation issue), including whether publication would breach the Appellant's rights under Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights.
2. Whether an extension of time should be granted to permit the Appellant to challenge substantive adverse findings in the Judgment and to amend the appellant's notice accordingly.
3. Whether the Appellant can raise for the first time on appeal complaints of procedural unfairness (including reliance on Article 6) about the hearing and fact-finding that produced the adverse findings.
4. Whether naming the Appellant in the published judgment would have a broader public interest harm (the alleged "chilling effect" on therapists and other mental health professionals engaging with family proceedings).

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

• The Appellant sought anonymisation of the Judgment on three main grounds: (1) she acted as a private therapist and thus did not have the public accountability associated with state-based professional roles; (2) naming her risked identifying the Child or other family members; and (3) publication would interfere with her Article 8 rights by creating a permanent online profile linking her to profoundly damaging findings reached, which would be disproportionate to the needs of open justice and unnecessary for transparency.
• The Appellant also sought, by extension and amendment, to challenge the substance of certain adverse findings on grounds that they were unfairly made and wrong (procedural unfairness and merits objections).

Respondents' and Other Parties' Arguments

• The Father and the Guardian resisted the applications to anonymise; the Mother took a neutral position. Written and oral submissions were provided by the Father, the Guardian and the Local Authority. Counsel for those parties argued that publication naming the Appellant was appropriate, that disclosure to regulator and employers was within the court's discretion and acceptable, and that the Appellant had not raised the substantive complaints below.
• It was submitted on behalf of respondents that the Appellant had adequate opportunity to respond during the fact-finding hearing and after circulation of the draft Judgment, and that inviting new factual complaints on appeal would be unfair.
• The Local Authority and respondents relied on precedent and established principles concerning appellate review, delay, and the requirements for permitting new grounds on appeal (as elaborated in the reasoning summarized below).

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court refused permission to appeal and dismissed the other applications. The principal strands of reasoning were:

1. Article 6 (right to a fair trial) was inapposite because Article 6 protects the determination of civil rights and obligations and the Judgment did not determine any rights or obligations of the Appellant. However, Article 8 was relevant because adverse judicial findings can interfere with private life where they damage reputation and are widely published.
2. The court emphasised that a person who timely objects to publication may raise complaints about unfairness; if such complaints are well-founded the court can quash or withhold publication. That principle underlies Re W and related Strasbourg authorities.
3. The court found that the Appellant did not raise the substantive fairness complaints in time before the trial judge. The Appellant had multiple opportunities to challenge the findings (during cross-examination, when provided with a draft of the Judgment, and after receiving the full Judgment). The Appellant had legal advice and representation prior to the expiry of the time to appeal but did not advance the procedural or substantive challenges below; indeed, she made written submissions that were characterised in the judge's process as "contextualisation" rather than a challenge to the findings, which the court treated as implicit acceptance of the findings.
4. The court applied appellate principles (Notting Hill Finance) and concluded it would be unfair to respondents to allow the Appellant to raise new factual complaints on appeal that were not raised below, particularly where those complaints would require fresh factual investigation and where the Appellant had had opportunities to raise them earlier.
5. The court considered the particular facts required to engage Re W and found the present case materially different. In Re W, highly adverse findings were novel and "came out of the blue"; by contrast, here the Appellant had been cross-examined about the matters and had seen the draft judgment and full judgment and had legal advice. The present case did not fall within the rare, exceptional circumstances where Re W should lead to quashing or suppression.
6. The "chilling effect" argument was treated as a new point that should have been raised below and, in any event, lacked evidential foundation. The court applied the authorities requiring compelling evidence for class claims of that kind (citing Re Ward and Abbasi) and concluded no such evidence had been provided.
7. On the merits challenge to the substantive findings, the court expressed doubt as to whether it even had jurisdiction to entertain an appeal by a witness against findings of fact where those findings were reached after fair challenge at trial. The court also noted the appellant's notice was out of time for challenging the judgment handed down on 2 May 2025 and applied the Denton/Hysaj principles to refuse extension of time (delay of at least eight weeks, inadequate explanation, and presence of legal advice before expiry of time).
8. Overall, the court concluded that the Appellant's proposed grounds lacked substance and that permitting the new points and extension of time would be unfair to respondents and without real prospect of success.

Holding and Implications

HOLDING: Permission to appeal is refused, and the other applications (including the application for an extension of time and to amend the appellant's notice insofar as they sought to challenge substantive findings) are dismissed.

Implications:

• The reporting restriction previously made may be discharged; the court indicated it could refer to the Appellant by name in the judge's papers (the summary here uses anonymised placeholders in accordance with the instruction for this summary).
• The court authorised disclosure of the Judgment to the Appellant's regulator and employers (this was not opposed and the judge had concluded disclosure was appropriate).
• The Appellant's proposed new factual and procedural complaints were not permitted because they were not raised below, would require fresh factual inquiry, and the Appellant had had relevant opportunities and legal advice; consequently, no extension of time was granted to permit a late challenge to substantive findings.
• The court reiterated that the decision does not establish a new broad precedent displacing Re W; rather, it emphasised that Re W remains an exceptional authority applicable only in rare cases where highly adverse findings truly "come out of the blue" and procedural fairness has been fundamentally lacking.
• No new legal rule for wider publication or anonymity was established; the effect is direct and particular to these applications: the decision to publish the Judgment naming the Appellant stands and the appeal is not permitted to proceed on the grounds advanced.

Note: This summary is based exclusively on the material contained in the provided opinion. Sections and statements reflect only that material and no additional facts or inferences have been added.