Summary of Anonymised High Court Judgment

Factual and Procedural Background

This opinion records the judgment of Judge Ferriter dated 21 November 2025 in a High Court personal injuries action. The Plaintiff's vehicle was rear-ended by the Defendant's vehicle at traffic lights in The City on 9 December 2017. The collision was described as a relatively minor rear-end impact. The Defendant's insurers admitted liability and the matter proceeded as an assessment of damages only. The principal factual disputes related to causation and remoteness: whether the Defendant was liable for psychiatric injury (including symptoms said to be consistent with PTSD) allegedly arising from the accident, and the extent to which the Plaintiff's ongoing physical and psychological problems were attributable to the accident as opposed to other factors.

The assessment hearing took place in February 2024; the court received oral and written submissions from counsel and heard live evidence from the Plaintiff, Doctor Corby (consultant psychiatrist), and Doctor O'Riordan (consultant orthopaedic surgeon). Agreed medical reports and GP records were admitted into evidence. The case was decided on the balance of probabilities and led to an award of damages for the Plaintiff.

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether, on the evidence, the Defendant can be held causally responsible for the Plaintiff's psychiatric injuries (including symptoms described by an expert as consistent with PTSD) arising from a relatively minor road traffic collision.
2. Whether the legal tests for recovery of psychiatric injury (including the "nervous shock" / sudden event criteria) preclude recovery where psychiatric injury accompanies physical injury.
3. How to attribute and apportion causation where multiple external factors (including homelessness, prior vulnerability and other life events) contributed to the Plaintiff's psychiatric state; and, relatedly, what discount (if any) should be applied to damages to reflect non-accident contributors.
4. Appropriate assessment of general damages in a multi-injury case (psychiatric injury plus neck, shoulder and back injuries) having regard to proportionality principles and comparative guidance.

Arguments of the Parties

Plaintiff's Arguments

• The Plaintiff alleged she developed ongoing physical pain and psychiatric symptoms, including flashbacks, nightmares and panic attacks, attributable to the accident and that these symptoms led to an inability to continue employment and eventual receipt of long-term disability benefit.
• The psychiatric expert evidence (from Doctor Corby) supported a diagnosis consistent with PTSD under DSM‑V and that the plaintiff's ongoing symptoms were causally related to the accident.
• The Plaintiff contended that, although vulnerable to psychiatric illness, she was not suffering a psychiatric disorder at the date of the accident and that the accident therefore precipitated her subsequent psychiatric condition.

Defendant's Arguments

• The Defendant submitted that the psychiatric injury alleged by the Plaintiff was not caused by the accident but pre‑existed it; the accident was too minor to have caused PTSD.
• The Defendant relied on the late introduction of a PTSD claim and the Plaintiff's late disclosure of prior mental health history to cast doubt on causation and credibility.
• The Defendant argued that, if the psychiatric claim were a "nervous shock" type claim unaccompanied by physical injury, established criteria (as in Kelly v Hennessy and related authorities) would preclude recovery because the event was not objectively horrifying or terrifying; the submission was that the accident could not meet those criteria.
• The Defendant challenged the extent of the Plaintiff's claimed physical disability on the basis of objective clinical findings and activities (e.g. gym attendance) that were inconsistent with the level of disability claimed.

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded through a structured factual and legal analysis:

1. Evidence and credibility: The court accepted much of the Plaintiff's account and found her generally credible, but concluded she had a tendency to overstate her symptoms. The court was unimpressed by the late disclosure of relevant prior mental health history and regarded that non-disclosure as undermining the plaintiff's presentation to some extent.
2. Medical evidence: The court accepted the expert psychiatric evidence of Doctor Corby that the Plaintiff had ongoing symptoms consistent with PTSD under DSM‑V when assessed in November 2023. The court also accepted that the claimant had been vulnerable to psychiatric illness prior to the accident but was not suffering a psychiatric illness at the date of the accident.
3. Causation (but-for): Applying the but-for test, the court found that but for the accident the Plaintiff would not have suffered anxiety, depression and symptoms consistent with PTSD from January 2018 onwards. Thus the accident was a causal contributor to the psychiatric condition.
4. Legal categorisation of psychiatric injury: The court distinguished authorities on pure "nervous shock" psychiatric claims (which require a sudden, shocking event) from cases where psychiatric injury accompanies physical injury. Because the Plaintiff suffered physical injuries in the collision, the strict "sudden event" criterion for pure psychiatric claims did not bar recovery for the psychiatric injuries sustained.
5. Eggshell skull principle: The court applied the eggshell skull principle (defendant takes claimant as found) to hold that the defendant cannot escape liability merely because the claimant's psychiatric reaction was more severe due to vulnerability.
6. Multi-factorial causation and apportionment: The court accepted evidence that the plaintiff's psychiatric state in the years following the accident was influenced by multiple non-accident factors (moving home owing to housing pressures, the COVID-19 pandemic and lockdowns, stressful family litigation relating to a relationship breakdown, and a homelessness episode beginning in March 2023). The court found these factors materially exacerbated the plaintiff's condition and were not caused by the accident. On the evidence, the court apportioned 50% of the psychiatric symptoms over the period from the accident to trial to the accident itself, with the remaining 50% attributable to external factors.
7. Application to damages assessment: The court identified the psychiatric injury as the most significant injury. It derived an initial psychiatric figure for past and future suffering, reduced that figure by 50% to reflect non-accident contributors, and then uplifted to account for the physical neck, shoulder and back injuries in accordance with proportionality principles and comparative guidance.

Holding and Implications

Core Ruling: The court awarded the Plaintiff a total sum of €90,000 (general damages of €65,000 plus agreed special damages and loss of earnings of €25,000).

Details of the award as explained by the court:

• The court assessed psychiatric damages for a multi-year mild-to-moderate PTSD picture at a pre-discount figure of €60,000 (past €50,000; future €10,000), then reduced that by 50% to €30,000 to reflect other contributing non-accident factors.
• The court added €35,000 (past €30,000; future €5,000) for neck, shoulder and back injuries, resulting in general damages of €65,000.
• Special damages and agreed loss of earnings were €25,000, giving a total award of €90,000.

Implications:

• Direct effect: The Plaintiff recovers €90,000 in total; the judgment allocates the award between psychiatric and physical injuries and applies a 50% apportionment for psychiatric symptoms attributable to non-accident factors.
• Legal principle application: The court reaffirmed that psychiatric injury accompanying physical injury can be compensable without the claimant having to show the high-threshold "sudden shocking event" required in pure nervous shock cases, and applied the eggshell skull principle in the context of psychiatric vulnerability.
• No new precedent was created: the decision applies and reconciles existing authorities to the facts before the court; the judgment does not purport to establish a novel legal test beyond the authorities it applied.

Administrative note: The judge indicated that the precise terms of the order would be discussed with counsel before finalisation.