Anonymized Summary of Judicial Review Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The Plaintiffs challenged the grant of planning permission for a 13-turbine windfarm and associated works located near the village of The City in The State. The challenge alleged that the Respondent's approval process failed to comply with the environmental impact assessment requirements of Council Directive 2014/52/EU (the "EIA Directive") as implemented in domestic law and that the Habitats Directive had not been properly applied. The Plaintiffs sought declarations of non-compliance and an order of certiorari quashing the Respondent's decision.

The Plaintiffs advanced multiple grounds under the Planning and Development Act 2000, the Planning and Development Regulations 2001, the EIA Directive and the Habitats Directive. The Court delivered an extensive judgment in a related pair of cases. In that earlier judgment (reported at [2025] IEHC 367 in the source text) the claims were examined across many grounded arguments. The Court dismissed most grounds but found in favour of the Plaintiffs on a fundamental ground: the failure to give public notice of the environmental impact assessment of the integrated project, which included both the windfarm works and a separate grid-connection phase.

The earlier judgment concluded that public notice had omitted any reference to the grid connection route (a 26 km route through 21 townlands in the source text) even though the Environmental Impact Assessment Report and the Inspector's assessment had considered the integrated project. The omission meant the published notice did not comply with Article 6(2) of the EIA Directive and the corresponding domestic provisions.

Following delivery of that judgment, the Court invited submissions on the form of final relief (including costs). The Respondent and the principal developer (the notice party referred to in the judgment) applied to revisit the form of relief and asked the Court to limit relief to a declaration of non-compliance rather than also ordering certiorari. The Court heard submissions on whether it had jurisdiction to revisit the form of relief, whether it was appropriate to do so, and whether certiorari should be granted or withheld.

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether the Respondent's decision to grant planning permission complied with the EIA Directive and the Habitats Directive, in particular whether public notice of the integrated environmental impact assessment was given as required by Article 6(2) of the EIA Directive and domestic implementing measures.
2. Whether the Court had jurisdiction, after delivery of the substantive judgment but before final orders were perfected, to revisit the form of relief previously indicated in the judgment.
3. If the Court has jurisdiction, whether it is appropriate to reconsider and, in the exercise of its remedial discretion, to limit relief to a declaration rather than to grant certiorari quashing the planning permission.

Arguments of the Parties

Plaintiffs' Arguments

• The Court had already decided in the substantive judgment that the public notice requirement was not complied with and that this was a fundamental defect; therefore certiorari must follow and the decision could not stand.
• The earlier reasoning in the judgment (including statements that the Respondent “had no jurisdiction” and that “the decision must be quashed”) constituted a concluded decision on remedy that should not be revisited, invoking principles of finality.
• The question of remedy was considered at the hearing and the notice party had opportunities then to argue against certiorari; it should not be permitted to advance further submissions on remedy after the judgment (relying on Henderson v Henderson principles).
• The defect was grave because public participation is central to the Directive; the Court had reasoned that lack of public notice deprived the decision-maker of the benefit of public submissions and that this affected the validity of the process.

Respondent and Notice Parties' Arguments (including Company A, the developer, and Local Authority)

• There is jurisdiction for the Court to revisit the form of relief prior to perfection of the final order, particularly where the Court had expressly invited submissions on the form of order after delivering reasons.
• The defect identified was procedural in the wording of published notices (a failure to identify the grid connection townlands/route) rather than a substantive lacuna in the environmental assessment itself, because the EIAR and the Inspector's report had in fact considered the grid connection.
• Even if an omission occurred, it may be a harmless error: the totality of the file, including numerous original submissions to the planning authority (112 submissions) and further observations to the Respondent (37 observations), demonstrates that issues relevant to the grid connection were aired and assessed; thus the outcome would not have been different.
• Phase two (the grid connection) has not and will not commence unless and until planning permission for it is granted; when an application for the grid connection is made it will be accompanied by an EIA and valid public notice, which will give interested third parties the opportunity to participate and cure any prejudice caused by the original notice.
• Established authorities allow the Court to exercise discretion and, in appropriate cases, to limit relief to a declaration rather than quashing a decision where an error can be shown to be harmless.

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court's analysis proceeded in distinct stages. First, the Court reaffirmed the legal principle (derived from O'Grianna) that environmental impact assessment for a windfarm project must be of the integrated single project, including the grid connection: the windfarm without a grid connection cannot function and so the two phases must be assessed together for EIA purposes. The developer's EIAR and the Inspector's report had in fact assessed the grid connection as part of the integrated project.

Second, the Court analysed the statutory and Directive-based requirement that public notice of the EIA process be given (Article 6(2) of the EIA Directive and section 171A of the Planning and Development Act as pleaded in the source text). The published notices in this case described in detail the windfarm site works and certain associated works and townlands, but they did not identify or refer to the grid connection works or their route (a 26 km route through 21 townlands as described in the factual findings). The Court concluded that omission meant the notices did not comply with the Directive's requirement to give public notice of the entire integrated project.

Third, the Court considered remedies. In the earlier substantive judgment the Court had stated that, because a valid EIA is mandatory before permission is granted, the Respondent lacked jurisdiction to grant permission and an order of certiorari would follow. After noting that the Court had invited submissions on the form of order, the Court heard further argument on whether it had jurisdiction to revisit the remedy and whether, in the exercise of discretion, certiorari remained appropriate.

On jurisdiction, the Court accepted binding authorities establishing that a judge retains power to revisit or alter a decision before final orders are perfected, especially where the Court has explicitly reserved the form of final relief and invited submissions.

On the substance of remedial discretion and the "harmless error" doctrine, the Court reviewed a body of domestic authorities (notably Doyle and Carrownagowan) and EU authority (Altrip). Those authorities establish that (i) a court may decline to quash a decision where an identified error was harmless (did not affect the outcome), (ii) the onus to show harmlessness lies on the party asserting it once error has been demonstrated, and (iii) where public participation rights are concerned, courts should be cautious before treating procedural defects as harmless.

Applying these principles to the facts, the Court found the following:

• The omission to identify the grid connection in the public notice was not a minor, technical or cosmetic defect. It was a total omission of any reference to an integral component of the assessed project and therefore implicated the public participation guarantees at the heart of the Directive.
• Evidence before the Court (an affidavit sworn on behalf of the Plaintiffs by Attorney Pilkington in the source text) established that landowners whose land would be traversed by the grid connection were not aware of the application; this supported the view that third-party participation was likely compromised by the omission.
• The notice party's submission that the large number of original submissions and appeals meant that the grid connection had effectively been considered did not suffice to exclude a reasonable possibility that the outcome could have been different if valid notice had been given to all potentially affected persons.
• However, the Court also accepted as an established fact that no construction of the windfarm would commence unless and until planning permission for the grid connection (phase two) was obtained, and that any future application for the grid connection would entail an EIA and valid public notices that would allow all interested persons to participate in the assessment of the integrated project.

Balancing these considerations, and mindful of the remedial discretion available to the Court, the judge concluded that although the EIA process had been defective and the Respondent lacked jurisdiction to grant permission at the time the decision was made, the particular factual circumstance that the windfarm cannot be commenced until a valid assessment and permission for the grid connection are obtained means that any prejudice caused by the defective notice will be remedied by the inevitable future process. The Court therefore exercised its discretion to withhold certiorari and limit relief to a declaration of non-compliance with the EIA Directive.

The Court also corrected terminology in its earlier judgment to make clear that the failure to publish a valid notice was the failure of the developer (Company A) rather than of the Respondent; the Respondent's error was purporting to complete the assessment without valid public notice having been given.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Court made a declaratory order and declined to grant certiorari. In the Court's words (as anonymized here): There will be a declaration that by reason of the failure to inform the public of the environmental impact assessment of the project, as required by Article 6 of Council Directive 2014/52/EU, the assessment did not comply with the Directive and the Respondent lacked jurisdiction to grant planning permission for the project.

Implications:

• The declaration records that the EIA procedure was defective because published notices did not refer to the grid connection element of the integrated project.
• Despite this finding of invalidity in the assessment process, the Court exercised its remedial discretion and did not quash the planning permission by certiorari. The practical consequence—driving the Court's discretionary decision—was that no works on the windfarm will begin unless and until valid planning permission for the grid connection (phase two) is obtained following a valid EIA process with proper public notice; that future process will afford an opportunity for public participation and thus remedy the prejudice caused by the original omission.
• The Court explicitly declined to remit the matter to the Respondent in the manner of O'Grianna and considered that such remittal would serve no useful purpose in the particular circumstances.
• No novel legal rule was established beyond the application and reconciliation of existing authorities: the decision applies established principles on project-splitting, public participation under the EIA Directive, the Court's jurisdiction to revisit relief prior to final orders, and the remedial "harmless error" approach. The Court emphasised that where public-participation rights are implicated, greater caution is required before concluding an error was harmless.

Note: This summary is strictly confined to and derived from the material contained in the provided opinion. All personal and identifying information has been replaced with consistent anonymized placeholders.