Summary of Judgment — High Court ([2025] IEHC 587)

Factual and Procedural Background

This judgment, delivered by Judge Egan, is the third in multi-module proceedings between four individual plaintiffs and the defendant company. The dispute arises from wind turbine noise (WTN) from a nearby wind farm operated by the Defendant, which the court previously found to constitute a private nuisance during night hours and quiet waking hours (the court's liability finding was made in an earlier "module 1" judgment). Following that finding, the court made an order in "module 2" providing an injunction to abate the nuisance during sensitive periods, and the present judgment (module 3) addresses monetary relief and related issues.

The plaintiffs comprise two household co-owners at Property A (one of whom continues to live there and the other of whom left in March 2021) and two owners of Property B who sold that property in August 2021. The issues in the present judgment concern (i) the assessment of general damages for nuisance for each plaintiff for the period(s) of exposure; (ii) one plaintiff's claims for past and future accommodation costs after leaving Property A; (iii) claims for diminution/devaluation of the capital value of Property A (stigma damages) and Property B; and (iv) claims for aggravated and exemplary damages based on the Defendant's conduct before and during the proceedings.

The court had previously (module 1) found that one turbine (referred to in the judgment as Turbine 2) caused WTN nuisance to the plaintiffs in sensitive periods. The injunction in module 2 limited the operation of that turbine during sensitive periods; module 3 therefore considers damages and compensation flowing from the established nuisance and the consequences of the litigation and remedial process.

Legal Issues Presented

1. What are the appropriate awards of general damages for private nuisance to each plaintiff for the period(s) during which they were affected by the WTN nuisance?
2. Is Plaintiff 2 (who left Property A in March 2021) entitled to recover past rental payments and/or the cost of future alternative accommodation as either general or special damages arising from the WTN nuisance?
3. Did the WTN nuisance cause compensable devaluation of Property A (stigma damages) and Property B, and if so what is the appropriate quantum?
4. Are aggravated or exemplary damages payable to any plaintiff by reason of the Defendant's conduct before, during and after the trial?

Arguments of the Parties

Plaintiffs' Arguments

• The WTN caused pronounced, prolonged and repeated interference with the ordinary use, comfort and enjoyment of their homes, justifying substantial annual awards of general damages beginning from turbine operation in February 2017.
• Plaintiff 2 claims that he was forced to leave Property A (in March 2021) because of the severity of the WTN and that his rental costs since then (€42,900 in total) and the cost of securing future comparable accommodation (purchase price or reinstatement costs) ought to be recoverable as either general or special damages.
• The owners of Property A contend that even if the injunction abates the nuisance, stigma damages should be awarded because prospective purchasers will be deterred by (a) lingering uncertainty about the effectiveness of the injunction, (b) potential non‑compliance by the Defendant, and (c) the ongoing requirement for purchaser/owner engagement and verification of compliance.
• The owners of Property B allege that the WTN depressed its sale price in August 2021 and now quantify their loss (as amended in the hearing) in different ways, including a claim based on their total expenditure on purchase/renovation versus the sale price.
• The plaintiffs seek aggravated and exemplary damages on the basis of the Defendant's alleged failure to engage meaningfully with complaints, withholding/disclosure failures concerning monitoring data, and other conduct during the proceedings and mitigation phases.

Defendant's Arguments

• The Defendant accepts that nuisance was found in module 1 only in sensitive periods (night and quiet waking hours) and disputes that this justifies the plaintiffs' higher quantum proposals.
• As to Plaintiff 2, the Defendant contends that he is entitled only to damages for the period during which he actually lived at Property A (to March 2021) and that his subsequent rental and future accommodation costs stem from the couple's separation rather than the Defendant's nuisance.
• The Defendant disputes stigma damages where the nuisance will be fully abated by injunction and contends that ongoing engagement/verification concerns are speculative; it also argues that its conduct does not meet the legal threshold for aggravated or exemplary damages and that it engaged with the plaintiffs and ran a reasonable defence on expert advice.
• The Defendant advanced valuation and research evidence to support lower devaluation percentages and explained some discovery oversights while denying deliberate withholding of material evidence.

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court's analysis proceeds by applying established causation and remoteness principles, and recent guidance on WTN nuisance damages, to the facts and the competing expert evidence.

Causation and foreseeability:

• The court distinguishes factual causation (the "but for" test) from legal causation (remoteness/foreseeability). It reiterates that while some consequences of WTN (annoyance, sleep disturbance, mental distress) are ordinarily foreseeable, the onset of a recognisable psychiatric illness or the breakdown of a relationship are not generally foreseeable consequences of noise nuisance unless evidence establishes such foreseeability.
• Applying that test, the court accepted that Plaintiff 2 sustained a recognisable psychiatric injury that was factually caused by WTN but held that such psychiatric injury was not a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the WTN; accordingly, personal injury damages for that psychiatric injury were not recoverable.
• The court therefore examined separately what foreseeable harms flowed from the WTN (e.g., sleep disturbance, irritability, loss of enjoyment), and confined compensable general damages to those foreseeable harms and to periods of actual exposure.

Assessment of general damages:

• The court adopts the approach in Byrne, together with Hanrahan, as the correct guide for assessing general damages in WTN nuisance cases: awards should reflect the impact of the nuisance on each plaintiff's use and enjoyment of home (restitutio in integrum), be proportionate, and take account of the plaintiff's relation to the property and the character/duration of the wrongful act.
• The court rejected any approach which fixes compensation by reference solely to capital value; instead it considered the individual circumstances and impact on each plaintiff.
• Applying these principles to the facts, the court found: (a) Plaintiff 1 (the occupant remaining at Property A) experienced disturbance comparable to the first Byrne plaintiff and awarded €10,000 per year from February 2017 until abatement; (b) Plaintiff 2 (who left Property A in March 2021) suffered effects more severe than other plaintiffs while he lived at Property A and was awarded €18,500 per year from February 2017 to March 2021, but no award for the psychiatric injury or for the period after March 2021; (c) each of Plaintiff 3 and Plaintiff 4 (owners of Property B) were awarded €7,500 per year from February 2017 to August 2021, reflecting their lesser exposure and use of Property B.

Claims for past and future accommodation (Plaintiff 2):

• The court examined whether Plaintiff 2's rental payments (€42,900) and claimed future accommodation costs were caused by the WTN or instead flowed from the couple's separation.
• Although the WTN and Plaintiff 2's psychiatric illness put pressure on the relationship, the court found on the balance of probabilities that the relationship had already broken down prior to the psychiatric deterioration and that the primary cause of Plaintiff 2 leaving Property A was the relationship breakdown rather than the WTN. The court also found no sufficient evidence that the Defendant could reasonably have foreseen that WTN would cause the relationship to end.
• Consequently, the court denied recoverability of past rental payments and costs for future alternative accommodation as either general or special damages attributable to the Defendant's nuisance.

Property devaluation and stigma damages:

• The court accepted that devaluation caused by WTN nuisance is compensable where the diminution in value is attributable to the tortious acts; the dispute is over quantum.
• Regarding Property A (where the injunction will abate the nuisance), the court rejected stigma arguments premised on non‑compliance with the injunction or persistence of nuisance post‑order, but accepted that ongoing requirements for engagement and verification (imposed by the form of the injunction and monitoring obligations) will deter some purchasers and therefore reduce the pool of buyers. The court treated that effect as a foreseeable, compensable cause of diminution in market value even after abatement.
• Because the expert valuation evidence was imperfect and partially inconsistent, the court adopted a conservative estimation method: using the agreed notional pre‑nuisance value (€400,000) and reasoning from available studies (notably the Gillespie study) and valuers' evidence, the court assessed stigma damages at approximately 7.35% of €400,000 — awarding €30,000 for Property A.
• Regarding Property B (sold in August 2021), the court concluded the sale price was depressed by the ongoing WTN nuisance. After weighing the two valuers' opinions and adjusting for house price inflation and relevant studies, the court found that the market value of Property B absent the nuisance would likely have been €350,000 and therefore awarded €55,000 as the loss on sale (sale proceeded for €295,000 plus €10,000 for contents).
• The court explained why it rejected a claim by Plaintiff 3 and Plaintiff 4 framed as total expenditure less sale price — emphasizing proper measure is diminution in market value at time of sale.

Aggravated and exemplary damages:

• The court applied Conway's tripartite framework and Shortt's emphasis on the higher threshold for exemplary awards. It acknowledged numerous examples of unneighbourly, unconstructive and at times careless conduct by the Defendant (including discovery oversight, delayed mitigation of shadow flicker, and a mitigation strategy the court found inadequate) which aggravated the plaintiffs' distress.
• However, the court held these failings did not satisfy the legal threshold for aggravated damages (conduct sufficiently oppressive, arrogant or outrageous) nor for exemplary damages (deliberate conscious violation of rights requiring public denunciation/punitive sanction). The court emphasized that a defendant is entitled to defend proceedings and that unwise or partisan litigation choices, standing alone, do not automatically justify aggravated or exemplary awards.
• Accordingly the court declined to award aggravated or exemplary damages, although it expressed strong criticism of aspects of the Defendant's conduct and noted its continuing displeasure with the Defendant's engagement and mitigation strategy.

Holding and Implications

Holding (core rulings):

• General damages awarded:
  • Plaintiff 1 (occupant remaining at Property A): €10,000 per year from 1 February 2017 until the injunctive abatement takes effect (total to date approximately €87,500).
  • Plaintiff 2 (left Property A in March 2021): €18,500 per year from 1 February 2017 to March 2021 (total awarded approximately €77,000). No award for psychiatric injury or for the period after leaving the property.
  • Plaintiff 3 and Plaintiff 4 (owners of Property B): €7,500 per year each from February 2017 to August 2021 (each awarded approximately €34,000).
• Property devaluation awards:
  • Property B (sold August 2021): €55,000 (diminution in capital value attributable to WTN nuisance at time of sale).
  • Property A (stigma damages due to ongoing engagement/verification requirements even after abatement): €30,000.
• No aggravated or exemplary damages: The court refused awards in those categories.

Implications:

• The court awards compensatory relief tailored to the duration and individual impact of the WTN nuisance on each plaintiff rather than measuring compensation solely by reference to capital value. This follows the Byrne approach and Hanrahan principles: damages are assessed by reference to the reasonable enjoyment of property and to restitutio in integrum where practicable.
• Plaintiff 2's inability to return to Property A and his rental/future housing expenses were held not to be compensable because the court found the breakdown of the relationship (the primary cause of his departure and continued absence) was not shown to be factually and legally caused by the Defendant's nuisance in a foreseeable way.
• The court recognises that a court‑ordered abatement can still produce residual, compensable stigma effects where the remedy itself (and any continuing engagement/verification obligations) is likely to deter a segment of purchasers; the award of stigma damages for Property A reflects that approach.
• The court declines to use reinstatement costs as a general rule where such an award would be disproportionate to diminution in value; Munnelly and Byrne guided the court's reluctance to award full reinstatement except in clear circumstances.
• The court expressly criticises aspects of the Defendant's conduct but concludes that those failings do not reach the high threshold required for aggravated or exemplary damages. Compensatory awards together with the injunction and the court's criticisms were considered sufficient response.
• The awards recorded are subject to the Defendant's appellate rights; the judgment notes potential stays or appeals and links the continuation or quantification of some awards to the timing of final orders taking effect.

Note on anonymisation and scope: This summary is produced exclusively from the provided judgment text. All personal names and identifying details in the original have been replaced with generic placeholders for confidentiality and consistency (e.g., "Plaintiff 1", "Plaintiff 2", "Plaintiff 3", "Plaintiff 4", "Property A", "Property B", "Turbine 2", "The Wind Farm", "Defendant"). No information has been invented or inferred beyond what is contained in the supplied opinion.