Anonymized Summary of Appellate Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

This is an appeal under section 26 of the Extradition Act 2003 from an order made on 29 May 2025 by a sheriff in Court B directing the extradition of the Appellant to The State to serve an outstanding 15 year sentence imposed by Court A on 30 December 2013 for the murder of her infant daughter shortly after birth in April 2009.

The Appellant was born in 1985 in The City. The opinion records a history of multiple births and family moves between jurisdictions. In April 2010 the Appellant gave birth to a son who was found dead the following day in a holdall in the common stair of the property where she lived. Two weeks earlier the body of the Appellant's daughter (born April 2009) had been found in the attic of her previous home in The State. The Appellant was previously convicted in a domestic criminal court in respect of the first death and sentenced to life imprisonment with a punishment part of 15 years on 9 June 2011.

After extradition to The State for the second prosecution, and following conviction and an unsuccessful appeal there, the Appellant was returned to continue serving the domestic life sentence. Subsequently the domestic conviction for the first death was quashed following a reference by Agency A and authority was given for a new prosecution. In that fresh prosecution the Crown accepted a plea of guilty to culpable homicide and on 20 June 2023 the Appellant received an 8½ year sentence backdated to 15 April 2010. She had already served more than that period and was released on immigration bail on 4 July 2023.

On 6 July 2023 the Appellant appeared in Court B on a Part 1 extradition warrant (the warrant that is the subject of this appeal) and was remanded in custody; she has remained in custody since then and, if extradited, each day in custody from 6 July 2023 will count towards the sentence to be served in The State.

The Appellant seeks leave to appeal the sheriff's order on two main grounds: (i) that extradition would breach her rights under Article 3 ECHR / section 25 of the 2003 Act because of her psychiatric condition and risk of suicide; and (ii) that extradition should be barred by reason of the passage of time.

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether extradition is incompatible with the Appellant's Convention rights (Article 3 ECHR) or should be refused under section 25 of the Extradition Act 2003 on the basis that the Appellant's physical or mental condition renders extradition unjust or oppressive.
2. Whether extradition is barred by reason of the passage of time under section 14 of the Extradition Act 2003 (i.e. whether it would be unjust or oppressive to extradite the Appellant by reason of the passage of time).
3. Whether the sheriff made errors of law or fact such that leave to appeal should be granted and, if granted, whether the appeal should be allowed under section 27 of the 2003 Act.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

• The sheriff erred in refusing the Appellant's challenges under section 21 (compatibility with Convention rights/Article 3) and section 25 (unjust or oppressive to extradite due to mental condition). The Appellant relied on expert evidence that she suffers from CPTSD, PTSD and depressive disorder and that extradition would expose her to a substantial risk of suicide.
• There is a joint factual minute accepting that the Appellant suffered CPTSD/PTSD at material times and had a prior suicide attempt; the issue is whether extradition would cause relapse and whether appropriate treatment would be available in Prison A. The sheriff failed to make relevant factual findings and should have accepted the evidence of Attorney Bett (expert psychiatrist) that the Appellant presented a high or very high suicide risk and that the required specialised treatment would not be available in Prison A.
• On passage of time, the Appellant argued that the sheriff misunderstood aspects of The State's law (Article 444 of its Criminal Procedure Code) on reopening convictions and on diminished responsibility. The Appellant contended that newly available psychiatric evidence could provide a basis to re-open or reduce liability under The State's law and that it was oppressive to require her to serve a further 15 years without deduction of 4 years, 8 months and 23 days she spent in custody after the expiry of the later Scottish sentence.
• The Appellant urged that the sheriff should have either found extradition would be oppressive or sought an assurance from The State regarding crediting of time, or else concluded that the passage of time rendered extradition unfair.

Respondent's Arguments

• The sheriff's findings disclosed no error of law or fact and the appeal should be refused. The sheriff was entitled to reject the evidence for the Appellant (notably that of Attorney Bett) as partial and unreliable and to uphold the presumption (from authority) that the requesting state will provide required medical/psychiatric treatment.
• The Appellant failed to discharge the burden of adducing clear and cogent evidence that would displace the presumption that appropriate facilities exist; the evidence led was insufficient to establish a substantial risk of suicide or Article 3 breach.
• Regarding passage of time, there was no culpable delay on the part of The State. The sheriff properly considered the chronology and the exceptional procedural history (including the quashing of the domestic conviction and the later plea) and concluded that the overall circumstances did not make extradition unjust or oppressive.
• The sheriff correctly concluded that a mechanism exists in The State (Article 444) for possible review or re-opening of the case and that the merits of any such application are for the courts of the requesting state to decide; it was not appropriate for the domestic court to predict the outcome of that process.

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The panel (delivered by Judge Wise, sitting with Judge Clark and Judge Ericht) reviewed the sheriff's detailed factual findings, the expert evidence led on behalf of the Appellant and the additional material obtained through judicial dialogue with the requesting state's judicial authorities (in particular, answers provided by Judge Remeika of The State).

On the Article 3 / section 25 challenge the court stressed the starting presumption (from authority) that a requesting state in the relevant category will provide necessary medical and psychiatric care. The Appellant bore the burden of adducing clear and cogent evidence to displace that presumption. The sheriff had found the Appellant's expert psychiatrist (Attorney Bett) to be partial and had concerns about the age and speculative aspects of the other expert's (named in the sheriff's report) evidence. The sheriff also properly sought and obtained information from the requesting state's judicial authorities about available services and about the availability of a procedure under Article 444 to re-open proceedings if new mental-health evidence affected classification of the offence.

The appellate court concluded that the sheriff was entitled to reject the Appellant's expert evidence where he found it unreliable or partisan and that, on the totality of the material (including responses from the requesting state), the presumption was not displaced. The sheriff was also entitled to make enquiries of the requesting state and to place weight on the responses received (including confirmation that Prison A had medical and psychiatric staff and that forensic psychiatric examination and hospital treatment were available where appropriate).

On the passage of time challenge, the court noted the unusual procedural history and observed that it was unnecessary to resolve definitively the precise legal starting point for the relevant period under section 14. Even adopting a broad approach to the chronology, the sheriff's view was that there had been no culpable delay by the requesting state and that the overall circumstances did not make extradition unjust or oppressive. The sheriff had also been entitled to conclude that there is a mechanism under the requesting state's law (Article 444) to seek review or re-opening based on new psychiatric evidence; the merits of any such application were for the requesting state's courts to decide, not for the domestic extradition court to predict.

The appellate court emphasized that the sheriff's assessment of witness reliability and factual findings were matters of judgment for him. The court declined to interfere with those findings: it accepted the sheriff's rejection of the Appellant's primary expert evidence, his reliance on the information obtained from the requesting state and his conclusion that neither Article 3 nor section 25 was realistically engaged. Similarly, the court agreed that the additional time served in domestic custody beyond the backdated 8½ year sentence, while unfortunate in its consequences, did not render extradition oppressive in the circumstances.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The court granted leave to appeal but, on the merits, the appeal and the associated Devolution Minute were refused. In short: APPEAL REFUSED.

Implications:

• The sheriff's order for extradition stands: the domestic court upheld the decision that neither Article 3 ECHR nor section 25 of the Extradition Act 2003 were engaged such as to bar extradition on the psychiatric/ suicide-risk evidence presented.
• The court accepted the sheriff's factual findings about the reliability and weight of the Appellant's expert evidence, and accepted that judicial dialogue with the requesting state provided sufficient information about available medical and psychiatric services in Prison A.
• The court found no culpable delay by the requesting state and concluded that the passage of time did not make extradition unjust or oppressive in the particular circumstances, including taking account of the unusual procedural history and the possibility (for determination by the requesting state's courts) of applications under Article 444 of its procedure code.
• The court did not require assurances from the requesting state about credit for periods in domestic custody; the matters concerning credit and any re-opening or reclassification under the requesting state's law were left to the relevant authorities and courts in that state.
• No wider domestic precedent was established beyond applying settled authorities on the burden of proof to rebut the presumption of adequate treatment in the requesting state, the high threshold for establishing an Article 3 risk on psychiatric grounds, and the correct approach to passage of time enquiries in extradition proceedings.