Mechita, R. v

Factual and Procedural Background

On 28 November 2024 the Appellant was sentenced for multiple offences of drug possession with intent to supply, possession of counterfeit currency and possession of criminal property. The Appellant received a sentence of three years and two months' imprisonment for possession of a Class A drug (cocaine) with intent to supply; that sentence was ordered to run consecutively to a sentence already being served for an earlier conviction of conspiracy to murder. Additional concurrent sentences were imposed for possession with intent to supply Class B drugs (ketamine and cannabis), possession of counterfeit currency, and possession of criminal property.

The underlying facts, stated briefly, are that police searching for the Appellant in connection with a 2019 drugs-related shooting and conspiracy to murder located the Appellant leaving a property in The City on 3 August 2022. A search of that property recovered 341 grams of cocaine (purity stated as 88%), just over one kilogram of ketamine, 18.8 grams of cannabis, counterfeit currency attributed a value of £32,640, genuine sterling of £20,590 and €1,080, multiple phones and SIM cards, and packaging and paraphernalia consistent with supply.

The Appellant had previously been sentenced in December 2022 to 20 years' imprisonment for conspiracy to murder; the drugs and related offences were dealt with later, in November 2024. The Appellant was then aged 33 and had no other previous convictions recorded other than the conspiracy offence. The sentencing judge (Judge Lewis) declined to order a pre-sentence report and the court of appeal considered that none was necessary. The Appellant appealed against sentence with leave granted by a single judge.

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether the judge was entitled to categorise the Appellant's role in the drug supply as a "leading" role rather than a "significant" role under the Sentencing Council guidelines.
2. Whether the overall sentence (including the consecutive term to the earlier conspiracy to murder sentence and the concurrent terms for other offending) was manifestly excessive or breached the principle of totality.
3. Whether the sentences imposed for the money / criminal property offences reflected appropriate culpability (high culpability for possession of criminal property given the sums involved) and were manifestly excessive.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments (represented by Attorney Chinner)

• Challenged the appropriateness of the starting points adopted by the judge (nine years and six months for the cocaine offence; six years for the ketamine offence) as too high.
• Contended there was no direct evidence that the Appellant performed a "leading" role: no texts, ledgers, or direct evidence of directing or organising buying and selling on a commercial scale.
• Argued that the inference of close links to the original source based on purity alone was unsafe because there was no evidence about the purity at street level.
• Submitted that possession of cash did not necessarily demonstrate an expectation of a substantial gain (it might show a significant, but not substantial, financial position, particularly given the Appellant's period on the run).
• Regarding the money-laundering/possession of criminal property offences, argued that harm from the drug dealing had already been accounted for in the drug offence categorisation and should not have been used again to elevate culpability for the money offences.

Prosecution's Position

• Placed the Appellant's role at the top end of "significant" (and effectively argued for high culpability), noting the absence of telephone evidence to show precise conduct but relying on the quantity, purity and packaging and the sums of money found.

Table of Precedents Cited

No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court's analysis focused on whether the judge's factual findings and application of the Sentencing Council guidelines were sustainable and whether the resulting sentences were manifestly excessive.

The Sentencing Council guidelines identify features that may indicate a "leading" role, including (inter alia) directing or organising buying and selling on a commercial scale, close links to the original source, and expectations of substantial financial advantage. The appellate court reviewed the factual findings in light of those features.

On the question of role, the court concluded that the judge was entitled to find a "leading" role on the evidence presented. The factors the judge was entitled to rely upon included:

• The large quantity of drugs present (particularly c.341g of cocaine at 88% purity and just over 1kg of ketamine), together with packaging and paraphernalia consistent with commercial supply;
• The high purity of the cocaine, which the judge was entitled to treat as supporting an inference of close links to the original source (on the premise that drugs typically dilute as they move through supply chains); and
• The presence of substantial sums of money (£20,590 sterling and other cash) which, coupled with the drug quantities, supported an inference of an expectation of substantial financial advantage.

The court accepted that these factors, taken together, justified elevating the starting point for sentence to reflect a leading role.

On sentencing calculations, the judge's approach was explained and endorsed: he adjusted starting points according to category (with reference to indicative amounts and starting points in the guidelines), upwardly adjusted a category 3 starting point to reflect the scale and purity of the cocaine, and then applied reductions for delay and mitigation (one third for delay and other mitigation) followed by the maximum one third reduction for the guilty plea. The appellate court found those adjustments to be within permissible sentencing discretion.

The court also analysed the alternative scenario advanced by the Appellant (that the role should have been treated as "significant"). It calculated the likely outcome under that analysis and observed that, after appropriate adjustments and having regard to concurrency between sentences, the effective sentence would still have been in the same region as that imposed. Thus, even if the role had been categorised as "significant" rather than "leading," the final outcome would not have been materially different on the facts of the case.

Regarding the possession of criminal property (notably the £20,590), the court accepted the judge's assessment that the sum placed the offence in category 5 of the relevant guidelines for that offence, making a starting point of three years' imprisonment appropriate before reductions for mitigation and plea were applied.

The court addressed the principle of totality and the decision to order the cocaine sentence to run consecutively to the earlier conspiracy to murder sentence. It observed that the offences were different in kind and committed at different times and concluded that a consecutive sentence was appropriate. The judge had not treated the earlier conviction as an aggravating feature but had made substantial allowance for the delay in bringing the later offences to trial.

Holding and Implications

APPEAL DISMISSED.

Holding: The court dismissed the Appellant's challenge to sentence. It held that the judge was entitled to treat the Appellant as performing a "leading" role for the purposes of sentencing on the cocaine offence; the starting points and subsequent adjustments made by the judge were within the range of reasonable sentencing discretion; the sentences imposed (including the consecutive term to the existing conspiracy to murder sentence and concurrent sentences for other offences) were not manifestly excessive; and the judge's approach to the possession of criminal property offences was justified by the sums involved.

Implications: The immediate consequence is that the sentences imposed below stand as pronounced (including the consecutive service of the sentence for the cocaine offence to the earlier conspiracy to murder sentence). The court stated that the aggregate period of imprisonment was just, proportionate and merited on these facts. The opinion does not purport to establish any new principle of law beyond the application of the Sentencing Council guidelines and established sentencing methodology; no new precedent was created by this decision.