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Bukhari & Ors, R. v
Anonymized Summary of Court of Appeal Opinion
Factual and Procedural Background
This anonymized summary is based exclusively on the material contained in the provided opinion. The court author of the opinion is referred to as Judge Warby. The retrial took place before Judge Spencer and a jury in the Crown Court in The City between June and August 2023.
Eight defendants were re-tried on an indictment alleging murder or, alternatively, manslaughter in relation to the deaths of two young men (referred to below as Deceased 1 and Deceased 2) who died in a car crash in the early hours of 11 February 2022 on The Road. At the conclusion of the retrial, four defendants were convicted of murder, three were convicted of manslaughter, and one defendant was acquitted.
Sentences were imposed on 1 September 2023. The judge imposed mandatory life sentences for the murder convictions with specified minimum terms (the opinion records the figure-setting and deductions). For the manslaughter convictions, determinate custodial sentences were imposed, with credit adjustments for qualifying curfew where applicable.
Applications for leave to appeal were made by multiple defendants. Some applications were refused by a single judge; some were renewed before the court of appeal. For convenience the opinion refers to four persons with live applications as "appellants" in the opinion. The court in this judgment considers a series of renewed applications: (1) an appeal against the minimum term imposed on one murder-convicted appellant, and (2) renewed applications for leave to appeal against manslaughter convictions and appeals against the manslaughter sentences imposed on three appellants.
The factual matrix advanced at trial, as relied on by the prosecution, was that the two deceased had been lured from a carpark (referred to below as The Carpark) and that two pursuing vehicles (an Audi and a Seat) engaged in a coordinated high-speed pursuit culminating in a ramming collision that caused the Skoda driven by one of the deceased to leave the carriageway, collide with a tree and burst into flames. The prosecution relied on direct and circumstantial strands: relationship and messaging evidence, call data and telematics, a 999 call by one of the victims, forensic collision investigation, DNA and forensic items, and prison telephone calls.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the minimum term imposed on the appellant convicted of murder (a young adult described in the opinion as having played a leading role) was excessive and should be reduced for reasons including over-weighting of certain aggravating factors and insufficient weight given to youth and immaturity.
- Whether the route to verdict left to the jury for unlawful act manslaughter (as to secondary parties) was legally flawed because it failed to identify and require proof of a specific "base" offence and improperly permitted conviction on alternative bases inconsistent with the legal requirements for secondary participation.
- Whether the judge was wrong to refuse submissions of no case to answer in respect of certain appellants who gave evidence that they had sought to dissuade the principal from dangerous driving (withdrawal/withdrawal-type evidence).
- Whether convictions of certain appellants were perverse or unsafe because they were allegedly inconsistent with the acquittal of another defendant whose case was claimed to be stronger.
- Whether the custodial sentences imposed on appellants convicted of unlawful act manslaughter were manifestly excessive, improperly categorised within the sentencing guideline, and whether mitigation (including evidence of attempts to dissuade the driver, youth and good character) was under-weighted.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellants' Arguments
- One appellant challenged her minimum term for murder on four principal grounds: (a) undue weight was given to her status as a social media influencer; (b) the judge failed to give sufficient weight to provocative behaviour, blackmail and threats by one deceased; (c) insufficient weight was given to youth and immaturity; and (d) the judge struck an unfair balance between aggravating and mitigating factors.
- Three appellants sought leave to appeal their manslaughter convictions arguing (i) the route to verdict for unlawful act manslaughter was wrong in law because it presented multiple alternative routes for secondary participation and failed to identify the required base offence (relying on the legal principle that secondary liability requires intentional assistance or encouragement); (ii) the judge should have upheld no-case submissions because unchallenged evidence indicated they had tried to stop the driver and thus could not properly be found to have been party to a plan or encouraging the dangerous conduct; and (iii) convictions were perverse/inconsistent with the acquittal of another defendant whose case was said to be stronger.
- As to sentence for unlawful act manslaughter, the appellants argued that their culpability was overstated (they fell into a lower guideline category), that evidence of attempts to dissuade the driver should have been treated as mitigation rather than as aggravating, and that youth, good character and other features warranted materially lower determinate sentences.
Prosecution's / Respondent's Position (as described)
- The prosecution case at trial was that the two pursuing vehicles engaged in a coordinated, high-speed pursuit which culminated in a deliberate ramming of the Skoda by the Seat, causing the deaths. It was alleged that all defendants had agreed to events that were intended to cause at least really serious harm to the occupants of the Skoda.
- At the single-judge stage the refusal to grant leave and the judge's rulings on no case to answer were grounded on evidence from which a jury could infer voluntary presence, awareness, encouragement and assistance in the conduct leading to the collision. The prosecution relied on circumstantial and direct evidence (messages, call data, telematics, the 999 call and collision investigation) to support those inferences.
- At this hearing the Crown opposed quashing the minimum term and opposed the contention that the route to verdict was defective in a way that would render convictions unsafe, save that the appellate court should hear the legal point raised by the defence in relation to identification of a base offence for unlawful act manslaughter.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| R v Jogee [2017] AC 387 | Confirms that secondary liability requires intentional assistance or encouragement of the principal's criminal conduct; there is a single route to secondary liability based on such assistance/encouragement and the necessary mental element (see [89]-[90] as cited). | The court relied on Jogee to criticise the route to verdict that allowed convictions on the basis of mere agreement to a plan to expose the deceased to risk of harm without the necessary identification of assistance/encouragement and the requisite mental element. The court held that this point raised an arguable ground for appeal. |
| R v Grey (Auriol) [2024] EWCA Crim 487 | Reinforced the need for the Crown to identify and prove the specific "base" offence on which unlawful act manslaughter is constructed; failure to identify a base offence can render a conviction unsafe. The Crown Court Compendium was amended to reflect this point. | The court treated Grey as authoritative support for the proposition that an unlawful act manslaughter conviction must be built on a specified base offence; this development strengthened the view that the route to verdict at the trial might have been deficient and justified granting leave to appeal on that point. |
| Andrews v DPP [1937] AC 576 | Discussed (as referenced in argument) the requirement or significance of actual collision/impact in certain contexts; cited by defence argument to support a contention that criminal damage (reflecting collision) rather than dangerous driving might properly be identified as a base offence. | The court noted that counsel and the trial judge had treated an actual collision causing death as an essential ingredient of the principal offence, an approach said by counsel to be supported by Andrews v DPP. The court directed that argument on which base offence(s) could be relied upon would assist the appeal hearing. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court divided its reasoning into two principal parts: (A) the challenge to the minimum term imposed for murder on one appellant, and (B) the renewed applications and sentencing challenges in relation to unlawful act manslaughter.
A. Murder: analysis of sentence for the appellant described as a leading participant
- The trial judge had adopted the statutory starting point for multiple murder (30 years) and applied uplift for six identified aggravating factors (resulting in an uplifted starting point to 36 years), then identified three mitigating factors (absence of intention to kill, youth/immaturity, and previous good character) and reduced the term to 32 years before deductions for curfew and remand. The opinion records the judge's sentencing remarks and the factors relied on.
- The single-judge of the appeal court had given leave to appeal on the basis that the minimum term might be disproportionate for several reasons including over-weighting of influencer status, failure to give weight to provocative conduct by one deceased, and inadequate weight to youth and immaturity.
- The Court of Appeal examined the judge's approach. It agreed that the judge had correctly identified the statutory starting point and that the appellant had played a leadership role. However, the court found the judge placed excessive weight on the appellant's status as a social media influencer and, crucially, had given too little weight to the appellant's youth and immaturity (recognised as highly material for adults below 25).
- The court also considered whether blackmail by the deceased could mitigate culpability. It accepted that, even if blackmail could for principle mitigate, on the facts there was insufficient causal link between the blackmail-related material and the fatal events and the appellant was not herself the target of the blackmail in a way that would materially reduce culpability for the deaths.
- On balance the court concluded the trial judge had struck the wrong balance between aggravation and mitigation and that the overall proper assessment took the case below the statutory starting point.
- Accordingly, the court quashed the minimum term as imposed and substituted a reduced minimum term (see Holding below for precise figures and deductions as set out in the opinion).
B. Manslaughter: convictions and legal-route challenge
- The court identified a discrete legal argument (ground one) that the route to verdict in the trial was legally defective because it permitted conviction by reference to an unspecified common plan to expose the deceased to risk of harm without identifying or proving a specific base offence and without isolating the required mental element for secondary participation. The court observed that unlawful act manslaughter law requires identification of a base crime and that the Crown Court Compendium has been amended post-trial to reflect that principle.
- Applying the reasoning in Jogee and the post-Grey clarification of the need to identify a base offence, the court concluded that ground one raised an arguable point that merited a full appeal hearing; leave to appeal on this ground was granted. The court directed that representation and preparatory materials be provided for the appeal hearing, including skeleton arguments, reading lists and a bundle of authorities, and representation orders for leading counsel were made.
- As to the separate grounds (no-case submission and claimed perversity/inconsistency with the acquittal of another defendant), the court found no arguable basis for appeal. The court agreed with the single judge that there was sufficient evidence for a jury to infer voluntary presence, joint enterprise to cause at least some harm, encouragement or assistance, and that withdrawal evidence was addressed by the route to verdict's question 9. On the inconsistency point the court emphasised material distinctions between the cases and that juries may accept some witnesses and reject others.
C. Manslaughter: sentencing analysis
- The trial judge had placed the three appellants sentenced for manslaughter into Category B of the unlawful act manslaughter sentencing guideline, with a starting point of 12 years for a single offence (range 8–16 years), and enhanced overall sentences to reflect totality and the fact of two deaths. The judge relied on the view that the unlawful act carried a high risk of death or grievous bodily harm which should have been obvious to the offenders.
- The Court of Appeal accepted that the car chase carried a high risk of death or really serious harm and that this should have been obvious. However, the court considered that the judge under-weighted the significance of the appellants' relatively minor roles (a Category D factor) which ought to have had a powerful downward effect on sentence and taken the sentence below the category starting point and towards the lower end of the range before further adjustments.
- The court also recognised aggravating features relied on by the trial judge (failure to summon assistance, attempts to cover up) but concluded the trial judge erred in the overall balancing exercise, producing manifestly excessive sentences given the mitigating features (youth, good character and other personal mitigation). The court held that the judge should have moved further down the guideline scale at the intermediate steps, and that totality did not justify the levels imposed.
- The Court of Appeal therefore allowed the appeals against sentence for the three appellants convicted of manslaughter and substituted materially lower determinate custodial terms (see Holding below for the substituted sentences and deductions for qualifying curfew).
Holding and Implications
The court delivered the following final decisions and immediate consequences (all anonymized).
1. Murder sentence (Appellant described in the opinion as a leading young participant):
- The court quashed the minimum term imposed at first instance and substituted a minimum term of 28 years, from which 4 months were deducted to reflect time spent on qualifying curfew. From the resulting period of 27 years and 8 months a further deduction of 332 days spent on remand in custody was ordered. The opinion calculates the net term as 26 years and 285 days.
2. Manslaughter convictions (renewed applications):
- The court granted each of the three appellants leave to appeal against conviction on the legal ground that the route to verdict for unlawful act manslaughter may have been defective for failing to identify and require proof of a specific base offence and the necessary mental element for secondary participation. The court ordered representation by Leading Counsel to prepare for the appeal hearing and directed the parties to propose a timetable, provide skeleton arguments, a reading list, and a bundle of authorities.
- The court refused leave or dismissed the other factual grounds relied on in the renewed applications (no-case and perversity/inconsistency with an acquittal) as without arguable merit based on the evidence presented at trial.
3. Manslaughter sentences (substitutions):
- The court quashed the sentences imposed at first instance for the three appellants sentenced for unlawful act manslaughter and substituted the following determinate sentences (each figure reflects the court's arithmetic and includes deductions for qualifying curfew as stated in the opinion):
- For Appellant (Ameer Jamal): substituted sentence of 13 years' imprisonment, less 4 months for qualifying curfew, resulting in 12 years and 8 months.
- For Appellant (Gulammustafa): substituted sentence of 13 years' imprisonment, less 3 months for qualifying curfew, resulting in 12 years and 9 months.
- For Appellant (Natasha Akhtar): substituted sentence of 10 years' imprisonment, less 4 months for qualifying curfew, resulting in 9 years and 8 months.
Implications: The direct effects of the judgment are (a) a reduced minimum term for the convicted murder appellant described in the opinion, (b) leave granted to pursue a legal appeal on the specific legal issue identified in relation to unlawful act manslaughter (identification of the base offence and proper route to verdict for secondary liability), and (c) substituted lower determinate sentences for the three appellants convicted of manslaughter. The court ordered preparation for a full appeal on the legal point and representation by Leading Counsel. The opinion does not purport to establish a novel binding precedent in and of itself beyond the grant of leave; rather it identifies an arguable legal point requiring full appellate consideration in light of recent authority and Crown Court practice guidance.
Note: This summary is strictly confined to information contained in the provided opinion and does not invent or infer facts beyond that source. All personal names and identifying information have been replaced with standardized anonymized labels for consistency.
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