Anonymised and Structured Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

This is an appeal by the Appellant against an order made by Judge Sheldon on 16 September 2025 following a rolled-up hearing on 23 September 2025. The Respondent (an individual from State C, born 2 January 2000) arrived in the State on 12 August 2025 and claimed asylum. The Respondent was detained and gave an asylum screening interview on 13 August 2025.

The Respondent raised allegations of exploitation and trafficking to legal advisers on 13 September 2025 and was referred to the National Referral Mechanism (NRM). Company E (the Competent Authority within Company F, Immigration Enforcement) was asked to make a reasonable grounds decision. Company E issued a negative reasonable grounds decision by email on 16 September 2025, stating there were no reasonable grounds to conclude the Respondent was a victim of modern slavery, while explicitly advising that the Respondent could request a reconsideration within 30 days of that decision.

The Appellant had, prior to that, issued a notice of intent on 14 August 2025, made a readmission request to State B on 15 August 2025 (accepted by State B on 4 September 2025), issued two decisions on 5 September 2025 (one declaring the asylum claim inadmissible and indicating how the Respondent could seek legal advice, and a notice of liability to removal to State B), and on 8 September 2025 set directions for removal on a flight to State B on 17 September 2025.

The Respondent's current solicitors (Company C) raised the trafficking referral on 13 September 2025 and provided further representations on 14–16 September 2025. Company E asked for further information on 15 September 2025 and received additional material on 16 September 2025. Company E's negative reasonable grounds decision was delivered on 16 September 2025 during the hearing before Judge Sheldon.

At a hearing before Judge Sheldon on 16 September 2025, counsel for the Appellant indicated that if the Respondent were removed to State B the Competent Authority would not reconsider the decision or receive further evidence from the Respondent in State B. The Respondent applied for urgent interim relief to prevent removal. Judge Sheldon granted interim relief preventing removal to State B pending reconsideration of the trafficking decision, directing the Respondent's solicitors to use their best endeavours to provide representations to Company E within 14 days. The Appellant sought permission to appeal that order; the appeal court (panel including Judge Arnold) refused permission to appeal on 23 September 2025 and provided reasons in the written judgment.

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether there was a serious issue to be tried that the Appellant would act unlawfully in removing the Respondent to State B when Company E's negative reasonable grounds decision expressly allowed a 30-day reconsideration request and the Appellant indicated Company E would not reconsider if the Respondent were removed.
2. Whether the Judge erred in law or principle in granting interim relief (injunction) preventing removal pending reconsideration, including the assessment of the balance of convenience.
3. Whether the Appellant could rely on the fact that State B is a signatory to ECAT or on the availability of judicial review from State B as a substitute for a reconsideration request in the State.
4. Whether the Judge irrationally shortened the 30-day reconsideration window to 14 days in the interim order.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

• The Appellant relied on the fact that State B is a Tier 1 signatory to ECAT and so protections for potential victims of trafficking would be available there; accordingly, there was no serious issue under Article 4 ECHR that warranted preventing removal.
• The Appellant submitted that an application for judicial review of Company E's decision could be brought from State B, which would constitute an effective remedy even if a reconsideration request could not be made from State B.
• The Appellant argued the Judge should have given decisive weight to the public interest in timely removals and in maintaining the deterrent effect of the policy for unsafe crossings; any deferral would harm that public interest.
• The Appellant contended that the Judge was irrational in requiring the Respondent to make representations within 14 days rather than the 30 days stated in the statutory guidance and Company E's decision.

Respondent's Arguments

• The Respondent argued (and Company C submitted) that Company E had invited further representations to address evidential gaps and that a reconsideration request made from inside the State, with access to Company C and to evidence-gathering, was materially more valuable than seeking judicial review from State B.
• The Respondent emphasised that if a positive reasonable grounds decision were reached that would trigger statutory bars to removal under the 2022 Act (section 61(2)), and that removal before reconsideration risked depriving the Respondent of that statutory protection.
• The Respondent argued the reconsideration process, as described in the statutory guidance in force at the time, was intended to be meaningful and effective, and that removal to State B would prevent effective participation in that process and the opportunity to provide evidence such as medical reports.

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded by first acknowledging the limited scope of appellate interference with a discretionary interim order (Hadmor). It then applied the American Cyanamid framework, as developed in subsequent authority for public law claims, to evaluate whether Judge Sheldon had been in error.

Key factual and legal observations that informed the court's reasoning were:

• Company E is part of Company F and specialises in trafficking decisions. Company E issued a negative reasonable grounds decision that expressly offered the Respondent a 30-day opportunity to request reconsideration in accordance with the statutory guidance (version 4.1 then in force).
• During the hearing before Judge Sheldon the Appellant effectively told the court that, if the Respondent were removed to State B, Company E would not accept reconsideration requests or further evidence from State B. That position meant that removal would likely preclude the reconsideration route which Company E had itself offered.
• The court accepted the Judge's view that Company E's invitation to make further representations "might tip the balance" because a reconsideration request made from inside the State, with access to legal advisers and to evidence-gathering, was materially more valuable than the option to pursue judicial review from State B.
• The court observed that the statutory guidance (version 4.1) permitted a 30-day window for reconsideration requests and that the Appellant's repudiation of the practical effect of Company E's offer (by asserting the Respondent could be removed notwithstanding) raised a serious issue as to whether the Appellant could lawfully depart from her own published policy and from the decision of her specialist officials without articulating a good reason at the time of departure.
• The court found no error of law or principle in Judge Sheldon's approach. Given the absence of a relevant factual dispute and the nature of the materials, Judge Sheldon could properly conclude there was a serious issue to be tried and that the balance of convenience justified interim relief to preserve the status quo pending reconsideration.
• The court rejected the Appellant's submission that the availability of judicial review from State B or the fact that State B was a signatory to ECAT meant there was no serious issue: the domestic right to request reconsideration in the State, and the practical ability to present new evidence domestically, could not be displaced by those considerations in the circumstances of the case.
• On the point that Judge Sheldon directed that the Respondent should use best endeavours to provide reconsideration representations within 14 days (shorter than the statutory 30-day window), the court considered the Judge's decision to shorten the period was not irrational in the very specific and time-pressured circumstances of the hearing and was not a ground for successful appeal.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The court refused permission to appeal and dismissed the Appellant's application for permission to appeal on all grounds.

Implications:

• The immediate practical effect was to uphold Judge Sheldon's interim order preventing the Respondent's removal to State B pending the Respondent's attempt to secure reconsideration of Company E's negative reasonable grounds decision. The Respondent was to use best endeavours to make representations to Company E within a 14-day period as ordered by Judge Sheldon (subject to further directions thereafter).
• The court confirmed that a domestic statutory and policy framework (including the statutory guidance in force at the time) confers a meaningful opportunity to request reconsideration inside the State, and that the Appellant cannot lightly repudiate an offer made by Company E in accordance with published guidance without addressing the common law duty to follow policy or articulating and recording a good reason for a departure.
• The court held that the availability of recourse from State B (including the fact State B is a signatory to ECAT) and the theoretical possibility of judicial review from abroad do not, in the circumstances of this case, substitute for the immediate domestic reconsideration process which Company E had invited.
• The court noted that the Appellant amended the relevant statutory guidance shortly after Judge Sheldon's order (version 4.2 coming into force on 17 September 2025) to limit reconsideration requests where the Appellant proposes removal to a signatory State; the court recorded that it was not aware of a significant number of other pending cases to which the earlier version applied, and declined to grant permission to appeal on a wider public-law ground given the narrowness of the issues and the circumstances of this case.
• No new precedent beyond application of established principles of interim relief and deference to discretionary judgments was created by this decision; the court applied familiar tests (Hadmor and American Cyanamid) and reaffirmed that compliance with an authority's own published statutory guidance is central in considering lawfulness of departures from policy in public law contexts.

Note on anonymisation: All personal names, legal firms and identifiable entities in the opinion have been replaced with consistent generic placeholders to preserve anonymity while accurately reflecting the content of the provided opinion. No facts have been invented or inferred beyond the material contained in the opinion text provided.