Anonymized Summary of Judicial Review Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

This judgment was delivered ex tempore by Judge Stack on 19 September 2025. The proceedings concerned two individuals (together, the "Applicants"), a young married couple who arrived in the State in 2023, and an application to restrain their deportation and to compel the Respondent (the Minister) to decide outstanding applications to revoke deportation orders. There was also a challenge to a decision of the international appeals body (the "Tribunal (Entity A)") dated 21 August 2025 refusing to extend time to appeal the refusal of the Applicants' international protection claims.

Key dates and procedural steps stated in the opinion (as pleaded and recited by the Court) are:

• The Applicants arrived at The Airport on 28 February 2023 and applied for international protection on 3 March 2023.
• By letters dated 28 May 2024 the Office (Entity B) notified the Applicants that their international protection applications were refused and informed them of their right to appeal to the Tribunal within fifteen working days.
• The Applicants did not lodge appeals within the prescribed period; the notices of appeal were not presented to the Tribunal until 20 August 2025.
• By letter dated 10 July 2024 the Applicants were advised that they had been refused permission to remain (pursuant to s. 49 of the International Protection Act 2015) and were warned that deportation orders might follow.
• Deportation orders were made by the Respondent on 11 December 2024; the Applicants were notified on 30 December 2024 and were required either to leave the State by 2 February 2025 or to present to The Bureau (Entity E) on 12 March 2025 to arrange departure.
• The Applicants instructed their present solicitors (authority dated) on or about 7 March 2025 and on that date made applications to revoke the deportation orders under s. 3(11) of the Immigration Act 1999.
• The Tribunal refused an application to extend time to appeal on 21 August 2025; the Applicants sought leave in the High Court and an injunction to restrain deportation. The High Court heard the application for leave and the interlocutory injunction on 17 September 2025. The Applicants' deportation had been scheduled for 20 September 2025 but was deferred for operational reasons.
• During the period between the making of the deportation orders and the Tribunal application the Applicants failed to present as required and were classed as evaders. Applicant 1 was arrested on 15 July 2025; Applicant 2 was arrested on 21 August 2025. An application to extend time to the Tribunal was made on 20 August 2025; an interlocutory application in the High Court followed on 21 August 2025.
• A medical report concerning Applicant 2 (relating to anxiety and panic attacks predating arrival in the State) was placed before the Court; a treating general practitioner at The Centre (Entity F) provided a report saying that there was no medical contraindication to flying and that mild sedatives might be prescribed where severe anxiety at flying existed.

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether the High Court should grant an interlocutory injunction restraining the Respondent from deporting the Applicants and whether the Court should compel the Respondent to determine outstanding applications to revoke the deportation orders.
2. Whether the Tribunal misapplied the legal test in regulation 4(5) of the International Protection Act, 2015 (Procedures and Periods for Appeals) Regulations, S.I. No. 116/2017 ("the 2017 Regulations") when refusing to extend time to appeal—specifically, whether the two limbs of the test are to be read as cumulative or as disjunctive.
3. Whether the Applicants' applications to revoke the deportation orders contained fresh material sufficient to support injunctive relief or an order of mandamus.
4. Whether the Applicants' significant delay, and the manner in which information was put forward, precluded interlocutory relief and/or amounted to an abuse of process (including the impermissibility of "drip-feeding" information to frustrate removal).
5. Whether the medical condition of Applicant 2 constitutes a legal impediment to deportation.

Arguments of the Parties

Applicants' Arguments

• The Applicants sought an injunction to restrain deportation and an order compelling the Respondent to decide their s. 3(11) revocation applications.
• They contended that the Tribunal applied an incorrect legal test in refusing to extend time, arguing (as framed in their materials) that the two limbs of regulation 4(5) are disjunctive rather than cumulative.
• They explained the delay in lodging the appeal by reference to difficulty in obtaining supporting reports; the Notice of Appeal and related materials stated that a report/declaration from two religious leaders (here anonymized as "Pastor A" and "Pastor B") had been obtained only very recently.
• The revocation applications relied broadly on fundamental rights instruments (Constitution, EU Charter, ECHR, UN instruments) but, as presented, did not set out detailed facts explaining how those instruments were engaged in the Applicants' circumstances.
• The Applicants (through their then-pleaded grounds) sought mandamus relief in respect of certain administrative decisions and sought leave to challenge the Tribunal's refusal of an extension of time.

Respondent's Arguments

• The Respondent opposed injunctive relief, submitting that the Applicants had engaged in egregious delay and that the deportation orders were lawfully made after proper consideration (including consideration of the prohibition on refoulement under s. 50 of the 2015 Act).
• The Respondent contended that the revocation applications contained nothing new that had not already been considered and rejected in the international protection process, so they could not found an injunction or mandamus.
• On the Tribunal decision, the Respondent supported the Tribunal's approach to regulation 4(5) and submitted that the Tribunal's refusal to extend time was rational and supported by the Applicants' inaction and the inadequate explanation for delay. Other grounds of challenge (alleging failure to give reasons, irrationality or fettering of discretion) were said to be unarguable.
• The Respondent also relied on medical evidence obtained by the State-in-custody practitioner at The Centre to the effect that Applicant 2 did not have a condition that legally contraindicated air travel and that management measures (including mild sedatives, if appropriate) could be considered.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
Precedent A ([2005] IEHC 380; [2011] 2 I.R. 1)	Explains that, absent evidence of a new threat arising after a rejected international protection claim, rejection of that claim generally means no risk of refoulement arises.	The Court relied on this authority (per Judge Clarke in that case) to uphold the Respondent's view that s. 50 (refoulement) did not apply where Applicants' protection claims had failed and no new risk had been shown.
Precedent B ([2007] 2 I.R. 133)	Addresses limits on granting interlocutory relief where prior administrative decisions have considered the relevant matters (authority of the Supreme Court on when injunctions should be refused).	The Court treated this decision as supporting the proposition that revocation applications which repeat matters already considered and rejected do not give grounds for injunctive relief.
Precedent C ([2013] IESC 4)	Further Supreme Court authority on the limits of interlocutory relief in immigration-related contexts and on the requirement for substantive new material to justify relief.	The Court cited this decision alongside Precedent B to refuse leave and interlocutory relief in respect of the Applicants' revocation applications.
Precedent D ([2003] IEHC 75)	Principle (per Judge Peart) that applicants are not entitled to "drip-feed" information to the authorities so as to frustrate removal processes; late disclosure designed to delay deportation is impermissible.	The Court relied on this authority to support its view that the Applicants' delay and the timing of the materials (including late production of supposed supporting documents) weighed heavily against granting an injunction.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court's reasoning proceeded in a series of analytically distinct stages, each tied to the facts as pleaded and to statutory or regulatory provisions cited in the materials.

1. Approach to the applications to revoke the deportation orders

The Court examined the s. 3(11) revocation applications and found them to be derivative of the earlier international protection claims: they contained general references to constitutional and human-rights instruments but little or no factual detail explaining how any such right was engaged in the Applicants' circumstances. The Court observed that the applications repeated in basic terms the claims already rejected by the international protection decision-maker and by the Respondent when considering refoulement prior to making the deportation orders.

On that basis, and having regard to established authorities (Precedent B and Precedent C), the Court concluded that the revocation applications did not disclose new material sufficient to justify injunctive relief, and that there were no even arguable grounds for mandamus requiring the Respondent to reconsider matters that had already been considered as part of the refoulement exercise.

2. Respondent's refoulement consideration

The Respondent had considered s. 50 (the prohibition on refoulement) before making the deportation orders and concluded it did not apply. The Court accepted that conclusion as lawful and correct because the Applicants had not raised any new risk intervening since the protection decisions. The Court expressly relied on Precedent A (Judge Clarke's explanation) for the proposition that, absent evidence of a new threat, rejection of an international protection claim means no refoulement risk arises.

3. The Tribunal's decision on extension of time (regulation 4(5)) and the arguability test

The Court analysed the statutory/regulatory timetable: notification letters dated 28 May 2024 triggered a fifteen-working-day appeal period under Regulation 3(c) of the 2017 Regulations, so the time for appeal expired in mid-June 2024. The Applicants' application for extension of time to the Tribunal was not made until 20 August 2025, some fourteen months out of time.

Regulation 4(5) was quoted and framed the Tribunal's power to extend time where it is satisfied that:

(a) the applicant has demonstrated that there were special circumstances as to why the notice of appeal was submitted after the prescribed period had expired, and
(b) in the circumstances concerned, it would be unjust not to extend the prescribed period.

The Applicants argued that the two limbs were disjunctive; the Tribunal had stated on the face of its decision that it applied a cumulative test. The Court accepted that the legal point (the proper construction of regulation 4(5)) was arguable and that it was a point on which other cases were awaiting final determination.

On the facts, the Applicants' supporting material for extension was sparse: the Notice of Appeal indicated delay was due to difficulty obtaining reports and a "report/declaration" from two religious leaders, but that document was dated only as "2019" with no explanation as to when it had been received by the Applicants or why it could not have been submitted earlier. The Court explained that, given the length of the delay, it was incumbent on the Applicants to explain precisely when and how the report had been obtained and why it could not have been produced earlier, and to show why refusal to extend would produce injustice.

4. Other grounds against the Tribunal and the application of regulation 4(2)

The Applicants advanced other criticisms of the Tribunal's decision (including alleged failure to invite further representations under regulation 4(2), failure to give reasons, irrationality and purported fettering of discretion). The Court analysed regulation 4(2), noting that it addresses the situation where a notice of appeal is received after the prescribed period and does not contain a request for extension or reasons; in those circumstances the Tribunal must inform the applicant that it intends to reject the appeal and give three working days to make the necessary application. The Court found regulation 4(2) inapplicable here because the Applicants had, by completing the relevant part of the Notice of Appeal, indicated they were seeking an extension of time and thus regulation 4(2)’s procedural warning mechanism did not arise.

The Court further found allegations of irrationality, failure to give reasons or fettering unarguable: the Tribunal's conclusion that the Notice of Appeal could have been lodged without supporting documentation (documentation could be supplied later) and that the delay was due to the Applicants' inaction was a manifestly reasonable conclusion on the material before it.

5. Delay, "drip-feeding" and the discretionary refusal of injunctive relief

The Court emphasised the Applicants' substantial and prolonged delay: they were warned of possible deportation in summer 2024, deportation orders were made in December 2024, and they did not take the step of applying for an extension of time to the Tribunal until 20 August 2025. Even after consulting solicitors in March 2025 and applying to revoke the deportation orders, they still did not pursue the Tribunal extension until mid-August 2025.

The Court applied the established principle (Precedent D per Judge Peart) that applicants must not withhold information or "drip-feed" materials so as to frustrate removal. The Court held that the Applicants' conduct (late submission of evidence and prolonged inaction) strongly weighed against the grant of an interlocutory injunction. Promptness is an important discretionary consideration in interlocutory applications, and the Court concluded that, on grounds of delay alone, an injunction should be refused.

6. Abuse of process

The Court observed that the combination of lack of substance in the Applicants' grounds and the extreme delay suggested the proceedings might be an abuse of process—an attempt to manufacture grounds to obtain injunctive relief—although the Court did not determine that issue in that judgment and left it for another case.

7. Medical evidence regarding Applicant 2

The Court considered the medical report relied on by the Applicants together with the report from the general practitioner at The Centre obtained by the Respondent. It noted that the Applicant 2's anxiety and panic attacks predated arrival in the State and that the in-custody doctor stated there was no medical contraindication to flying; sedatives could be considered for severe anxiety about flying. The Court concluded that the medical material did not establish a legal impediment to deportation.

8. Overall disposition reasoning

Applying the above analysis, the Court found that the Applicants had one arguable ground of legal challenge (relating to the construction of regulation 4(5)) but that all other grounds were unarguable and that the Applicants' delay and conduct made injunctive relief inappropriate. The Court therefore granted narrowly framed leave to seek judicial review of the Tribunal decision on a single ground, refused leave on other grounds and refused the interlocutory injunction restraining deportation.

Holding and Implications

The Court made the following orders and findings:

• Leave granted (limited): The Court granted leave to apply for judicial review (certiorari) of the Tribunal's decision dated 21 August 2025, limited to a single arguable ground. The Court ordered that the Tribunal (Entity A) be joined as a respondent to the proceedings.
• Formulation of the single permitted ground: The Court recorded the single ground on which leave was granted in the following terms (anonymized):

  "The Tribunal (Second Respondent) has misdirected itself in determining that the first and second limbs of the statutory test are disjunctive, i.e., that the existence of special circumstances must be assessed in the first instance and in isolation from the question of injustice/the balance of justice."

  (That formulation appears in the judgment as the single arguable ground of challenge.)
• Leave refused (other grounds): The Court refused leave to seek any other relief and refused leave to rely on any other grounds advanced by the Applicants.
• Interlocutory injunctive relief refused: The Court refused the application for an injunction to restrain the Respondent from deporting the Applicants, concluding that the Respondent is entitled to deport them and would act lawfully in doing so.

Immediate practical consequences

• The Tribunal is joined as a respondent and the Applicants have narrowly-focused permission to seek certiorari on the single quoted ground relating to the statutory test for extension of time under the 2017 Regulations.
• The grant of leave on that limited ground does not operate as a stay of the deportation orders in this judgment; the Court expressly found that the Respondent is entitled to proceed with deportation lawfully.
• The Court refused all other forms of relief and did not decide several wider issues (including abuse of process) which were left for future determination if raised in other proceedings.

The opinion therefore gives the Applicants a narrowly circumscribed procedural entitlement to challenge the Tribunal's approach to regulation 4(5), but it denies injunctive relief and leaves the deportation framework intact pending any further orders from this Court or the outcome of the permitted judicial review. The Court did not purport to lay down a final rule on the cumulative/disjunctive issue; it accepted only that the point was arguable and merited limited leave for judicial review.