Debonsu, R. v

Factual and Procedural Background

This appeal concerns the conviction of the Appellant on two counts of murder following a trial before Judge Garnham at Inner London Crown Court. The Appellant was sentenced to detention during His Majesty's Pleasure with a minimum term of 17 years less time spent on remand. The appeal challenges the adequacy of the trial judge’s directions to the jury regarding certain telephone call recordings made by the Appellant while in custody awaiting trial.

The facts of the case involve an incident on 26 November 2022, where two victims were fatally stabbed during a gang-related attack in South East London. The Appellant was present in the vehicle involved and admitted presence but denied participation in the attack or knowledge of a plan to attack. The prosecution case was that the Appellant intentionally participated in a joint enterprise to murder. Evidence included CCTV footage, telephone call recordings from prison, and the Appellant’s varying accounts of the events.

The Appellant was convicted by a majority jury verdict and subsequently appealed on a single ground concerning the judge’s directions about the admission and reliability of the prison telephone call evidence.

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether the trial judge gave adequate directions to the jury regarding the prison telephone call recordings, specifically in relation to the application of section 76(2)(b) of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 concerning confessions obtained by improper means likely to render them unreliable.
2. Whether a Mushtaq direction (a direction to disregard confessions obtained by oppression or improper means) was required in this case, given the nature and source of the alleged improper influence on the Appellant’s statements in the prison calls.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

• The judge’s direction was deficient because it did not identify the correct legal test under section 76(2)(b) PACE, which focuses on whether statements were obtained by anything said or done likely to cause unreliability, not simply on their reliability or truth.
• The judge failed to direct the jury on the appropriate burden and standard of proof regarding whether the admissions may have been obtained by improper means.
• The judge did not instruct the jury to disregard the admissions entirely if they found they may have been so obtained, as required by the Mushtaq direction.
• The Appellant contended that the admissions against interest in the prison calls were made in response to pressure from friends calling him a "snitch" or a "pussy", which he argued should have triggered a Mushtaq direction.

Respondent's Arguments

• The trial judge’s directions were correct and sufficient in law.
• There was no evidence of oppression or improper means by police or authority figures causing the confessions.
• The Appellant’s admissions in the prison calls were lies made voluntarily to protect his street credibility, not as a result of external improper pressure.
• The conviction is safe notwithstanding the alleged deficiencies in the directions.

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court began by clarifying that section 76(2) PACE concerns admissibility of confessions, which was not disputed here as the prison calls were admitted mostly by agreement. The appeal concerned the adequacy of the jury directions following admission.

The Court analysed the legal test under section 76(2)(b), emphasizing that improper means must be external to the confessor and causative of the confession, citing R v Goldenberg. The Court noted that Mushtaq requires a direction to disregard confessions obtained by oppression or improper means, but that this typically applies to pressure from police or authority figures.

The Court observed that the Appellant’s case involved pressure from friends, not police or authorities, and doubted that Mushtaq should be extended to such circumstances. The Court further noted the late timing of the Appellant’s request for a Mushtaq direction after agreeing to the admissibility of the calls, which was unusual and problematic.

On the facts, the Court found no evidence that the Appellant’s confessions were caused by external improper pressure; rather, the Appellant admitted lying voluntarily to protect his street credibility and avoid being labelled negatively. The Court rejected the suggestion that fear of violence due to being called a "snitch" caused the lies, as there was no evidence supporting that.

The Court held that the trial judge’s directions, which invited the jury to consider the reliability and truthfulness of the statements and provided the Appellant’s explanations, were adequate. The jury was properly instructed on the burden and standard of proof.

In considering the safety of the conviction, the Court noted the strong corroborative evidence from CCTV and the Appellant’s admissions independent of the prison calls. Even if a Mushtaq direction were required, the outcome would not have differed.

Holding and Implications

The Court DISMISSED the appeal.

The direct effect is that the Appellant’s convictions for two counts of murder are upheld as safe. The Court found no error in the judge’s directions regarding the prison calls and no basis to extend the Mushtaq principle to confessions influenced by non-authority figures such as friends. No new legal precedent was established beyond reaffirming existing principles on the application of section 76(2)(b) and Mushtaq directions.