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Blackman, R v
Factual and Procedural Background
On 27 February 2024, in the Crown Court at Woolwich before Ms. Recorder Whyte, the Appellant pleaded guilty at the start of his trial to possession of a Class B drug (cannabis). The following day, after a trial, the Appellant was convicted of possession of Class A drugs (cocaine and heroin) with intent to supply. He was sentenced to concurrent terms of four years' imprisonment for the Class A drug offences, with no separate penalty for the Class B drug possession. The Appellant appealed against conviction with leave of the full court.
On 18 March 2022, the Appellant was observed by two police officers leaning into a vehicle in Greenwich, shortly after two men walked away quickly from the scene. Upon search, the Appellant was found in possession of heroin, cocaine, crack cocaine, and cannabis packaged in various ways. He was arrested and made no comment during interview.
The prosecution alleged that the Appellant intended to supply the drugs, supported by evidence of the types, quantities, packaging, and value of the drugs, his silence in interview, and previous convictions for drug supply indicating propensity. The defence argued the drugs were for personal use, bought earlier that day, and contested any inference from silence or the relevance of dated previous convictions.
Evidence included testimony from police officers who described the circumstances of the arrest and search, and a drugs expert who testified on the street value, packaging, and typical consumption patterns indicating intent to supply. The Appellant gave evidence of personal difficulties, drug use, and denied intent to supply.
The prosecution sought to admit evidence of four prior convictions for possession with intent to supply, two from 2009 and two from 2015, under section 101(1)(d) of the Criminal Justice Act 2003. The judge admitted the convictions, finding they showed a propensity to supply the same types of drugs, and ruled their admission would not unfairly prejudice the trial.
The Appellant appealed on grounds challenging the admission of previous convictions and the fairness and strength of the prosecution case.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the previous convictions for drug supply demonstrated a propensity relevant to the current charges and should have been admitted as bad character evidence.
- Whether the age of the previous offences and the Appellant's youth at the time rendered the admission of the 2009 convictions erroneous.
- Whether the admission of the previous convictions unfairly bolstered a weak prosecution case or was otherwise unfairly decisive against the Appellant.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's Arguments
- The previous convictions did not demonstrate a relevant propensity and should not have been admitted.
- The 2009 convictions were too old and involved offences committed when the Appellant was very young, thus should have been excluded.
- The admission of bad character evidence unfairly strengthened a weak prosecution case or was unfairly decisive.
Prosecution's Arguments
- The previous convictions were relevant to establishing propensity to supply Class A drugs, identical to the current charges.
- The judge correctly applied the legal tests under section 101 and the guidance from R v Hanson.
- The prosecution case was strong independently of the bad character evidence, including expert testimony, circumstances of the arrest, and Appellant’s conduct.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| R v Hanson [2005] EWCA Crim 824 | Guidance on admissibility of bad character evidence and assessment of propensity, including consideration of age and datedness of prior offences. | The court applied Hanson to assess whether the previous convictions, despite the Appellant's youth and the time elapsed, were admissible to show propensity to supply drugs. |
| R v Renda [2005] EWCA Crim 2826 | Standard for appellate review of judge's discretion on admissibility of bad character evidence; intervention only if decision was plainly wrong or unreasonable. | The court applied Renda to determine that the judge’s decision to admit the evidence was within a range of reasonable decisions and not plainly wrong. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court acknowledged that the judge correctly directed herself on the legal principles governing the admissibility of bad character evidence under section 101 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 and the relevant case law, notably R v Hanson and R v Renda. The central issue was whether the previous convictions were admissible to show a propensity to supply Class A drugs and whether their admission rendered the trial unfair or the convictions unsafe.
The court noted that the previous offences were of the same nature and involved the same types of drugs as the current charges. The 2015 convictions were not too old or too few to establish a relevant propensity. Although the 2009 convictions were dated and committed when the Appellant was very young, they formed part of a sequence with the 2015 convictions, thereby retaining probative value.
The judge had carefully considered the fairness of admitting the convictions and concluded that the prosecution case was not weak and that the evidence would not unfairly bolster a weak case. The court agreed, finding the judge’s discretion was properly exercised and not unreasonable or plainly wrong.
Further, even disregarding the previous convictions, the prosecution case was sufficiently strong, supported by expert evidence, circumstances of the arrest, the Appellant’s conduct, and other facts. The court found no basis to conclude the convictions were unsafe.
Holding and Implications
The court DISMISSED the appeal against conviction.
This decision confirms the admissibility of prior convictions for similar offences as relevant bad character evidence, even when some are dated and committed at a young age, provided they form part of a sequence and have probative value. The ruling reinforces the principle that appellate courts will not interfere with a trial judge's discretion on such matters unless the decision is plainly wrong or unreasonable. The direct effect is the upholding of the Appellant’s convictions and sentence; no new precedent was established.
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