Contains public sector information licensed under the Open Justice Licence v1.0.
Heavey v An Bord Pleanala (Approved)
Factual and Procedural Background
This opinion concerns an application for leave to seek judicial review by the Applicant ("Plaintiff") of a decision by the Respondent ("Defendant") made on 28 May 2024 to confirm a Compulsory Purchase Order ("CPO") of lands and premises owned by the Plaintiff at 17 and 17a North Street, Swords, County Dublin. The Plaintiff represents herself in these proceedings. The CPO was confirmed following an oral hearing and inspector's report. The Plaintiff challenges the Defendant's decision to confirm the CPO, which relates to property that the Plaintiff describes as her home and office, held by her family for up to 100 years. The Plaintiff alleges various forms of wrongdoing by Fingal County Council and challenges the process and decision of the Defendant confirming the CPO. The Court refused leave to seek judicial review and provided detailed reasons for that refusal.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the Plaintiff has established substantial grounds for contending that the Defendant's decision to confirm the CPO is invalid or ought to be quashed.
- Whether the Plaintiff has a sufficient interest in the matter to support the grant of leave to seek judicial review.
- The extent to which the Plaintiff's pleadings comply with the stringent rules applicable in judicial review proceedings.
- Whether the Defendant acted lawfully and fairly in confirming the CPO following the oral hearing and inspector's report.
- Whether the Defendant's 2024 decision was bound by or precluded from confirming the CPO by the Defendant's 2004 decision refusing to confirm a previous CPO in respect of the same lands.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's Arguments
- The Plaintiff alleges historical malfeasance by Fingal County Council, including dishonest and oppressive conduct, unlawful levying of rates, damage to property, and wrongful deprivation of parking spaces.
- The Plaintiff contends the Defendant's 2024 decision is oppressive and should be quashed, asserting that the 2004 refusal to confirm a previous CPO should preclude the current CPO under principles such as res judicata or estoppel.
- The Plaintiff claims the oral hearing and inspector's report were unsatisfactory and that the Council official who signed the CPO lacked authority.
- The Plaintiff asserts an absolute entitlement to develop her lands and challenges the Defendant's decision as arbitrary, corrupt, and disproportionate, characterizing the acquisition process with terms such as "Rachmanist" and "mafia-like."
- The Plaintiff criticizes the refusal of her 2005 planning application and alleges conspiratorial collaboration between the Council and the Defendant to her detriment.
- The Plaintiff alleges procedural unfairness, including lack of access to decision-makers and inadequate time and formality at the oral hearing.
Respondent's Arguments
- The Defendant confirms the CPO was made pursuant to statutory powers and following proper procedure, including an oral hearing and consideration of submissions.
- The Defendant submits that the 2004 decision refusing to confirm a previous CPO does not bind the 2024 decision due to materially different circumstances, including changes in the County Development Plan and broader project purposes.
- The Defendant denies any unlawful collaboration or conspiracy with the Council affecting the decision.
- The Defendant contends that the Plaintiff's complaints regarding the oral hearing and inspector's report lack substance and do not demonstrate procedural unfairness.
- The Defendant argues that the Plaintiff's statement of grounds is deficient, disorganized, and fails to identify clear and precise legal errors in the impugned decision.
Table of Precedents Cited
Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
---|---|---|
Hall v Stepstone Mortgage Funding Ltd [2016] IEHC 110 | Principles on assisting litigants in person and the latitude afforded to them. | Used to frame the court's approach to the Plaintiff's self-representation and the level of assistance appropriate. |
FG v Child and Family Agency [2016] IEHC 156 | Support for principles relating to litigants in person. | Referenced to support the court's consideration of the Plaintiff's status as a litigant in person. |
Talbot v Hermitage Golf Club [2014] IESC 57 | Standards for pleadings by lay litigants and judicial assistance. | Guided the court's evaluation of the Plaintiff's pleadings and the limits of judicial assistance. |
Donlon v Burns [2022] IECA 159 | Fairness to self-represented litigants and their responsibilities. | Applied to emphasize the Plaintiff's responsibility to be prepared and the court's duty to ensure fairness without conferring advantage. |
Munnelly v Hassett [2023] IESC 29 | Equality of rules for represented and unrepresented litigants; requirement for clarity and precision. | Supported the court's expectation of clarity in the Plaintiff's pleadings given her legal background. |
Jones v South Dublin County Council [2024] IEHC 301 | Judicial review rectifies legal error, not merits appeal; pleadings must identify legal error. | Underpinned the court's strict application of pleading rules in judicial review to the Plaintiff's case. |
Concerned Residents of Treascon and Clondoolusk v An Bord Pleanála [2024] IESC 28 | Strict pleading requirements and the purpose of leave to seek judicial review. | Emphasized that leave to seek judicial review permits challenge on identified grounds only, not general inquiry. |
Environmental Trust Ireland v An Bord Pleanála [2022] IEHC 540 | Importance of strict pleading rules in judicial review. | Reinforced the necessity for precise and clear statement of grounds, which the Plaintiff failed to meet. |
McNamara v An Bord Pleanála [1995] 2 ILRM 125 | Substantial grounds threshold for leave to seek judicial review under PDA 2000 s.50. | Applied to determine that the Plaintiff failed to meet the demanding threshold of substantial grounds. |
Morris v An Bord Pleanála [2020] IEHC 276 | Substantial grounds threshold for judicial review leave. | Supported the court's analysis of the required weightiness of grounds for leave. |
Fitzpatrick v An Bord Pleanála [2018] IESC 60 | Leave application is not a dress rehearsal; burden on applicant to prove substantial grounds at leave stage. | Guided the court's insistence that the Plaintiff prove substantial grounds at the leave stage. |
Murphy v Greene [1990] 2 I.R. 566 | Requirement that facts relied upon must be clearly deposed to in affidavit evidence. | Supported the court's view that mere exhibition of documents is insufficient without clear narrative. |
Perrigo Pharma International DAC v McNamara [2020] IEHC 552 | Statement of grounds defines scope and parameters of judicial review. | Used to highlight the importance of pleadings in defining issues for review. |
Casey v Minister for Housing [2021] IESC 42 | Pleadings set parameters and limit jurisdiction of court in judicial review. | Supported the court's reasoning on the strict limits imposed by pleadings on the scope of judicial review. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court began by noting the Plaintiff’s status as a litigant in person who is also legally qualified, requiring a balanced approach to fairness and expectations of precision and clarity in pleadings. The Court emphasized the stringent and clear rules governing pleadings in judicial review, referencing multiple precedents to underline that an applicant must identify substantial and weighty legal errors in the impugned decision at the leave stage. The Court noted that judicial review is not an appeal on the merits but a review of legality, and that the Plaintiff’s pleadings were deficient, disorganized, repetitive, and largely unsupported by evidence.
The Court addressed the Plaintiff’s allegations of malfeasance by the local council and found them unsupported by evidence and irrelevant to the Defendant’s decision made many years later. The Court rejected the Plaintiff’s claim that the Defendant’s 2024 confirmation of the CPO was bound by its 2004 refusal to confirm a previous CPO, noting the materially different circumstances, changes in planning policy, and the broader purposes of the 2022 CPO. The Court found no substantial grounds that the 2024 decision was legally unsound.
Regarding procedural fairness, the Court found the time and resources allocated for the oral hearing adequate and the procedure fair. The Court rejected the Plaintiff’s complaints about the oral hearing’s brevity and informality as unsupported by particulars or evidence of prejudice. The Court found no basis to conclude that the Plaintiff was denied fair procedures or access to decision-makers.
The Court also dismissed the Plaintiff’s allegations of conspiracy or collusion between the Council and the Defendant as unsubstantiated. The Court highlighted that the Plaintiff’s essential complaint was a disagreement with the merits of the decision rather than identifiable legal error, which is insufficient in judicial review absent irrationality, which was not pleaded.
Finally, the Court found the Statement of Grounds incapable of supporting leave to seek judicial review either as pleaded or by amendment, and noted the Plaintiff’s scandalous allegations lacked evidential basis and were inappropriate given her professional background.
Holding and Implications
The Court REFUSED LEAVE TO SEEK JUDICIAL REVIEW of the Defendant’s decision confirming the Compulsory Purchase Order dated 28 May 2024. The Court found no substantial grounds for contending that the decision was invalid or ought to be quashed. The Plaintiff’s statement of grounds was deficient and incapable of supporting the grant of leave, and no amendment was likely to remedy this. The decision directly affects the parties by concluding the Plaintiff’s challenge at the leave stage, but it sets no new legal precedent beyond the application of established principles governing judicial review, pleadings, and the threshold for leave in compulsory purchase matters.
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