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Tucker v Property Registration Authority of Ireland (Approved)
Factual and Procedural Background
This opinion concerns litigation involving a property located at 39 Danesfort, Castle Avenue, Clontarf, Dublin 3, and the Plaintiff's challenges related to the Defendant's registration of a mortgage deed and a subsequent Deed of Conveyance and Assignment concerning that property. The Plaintiff contests the validity of the Defendant's registration of the Deed of Conveyance and Assignment dated 19 June 2015 and registered on 28 January 2016, which is the sole focus of these proceedings.
The Defendant seeks to strike out the Plaintiff's claim on grounds including that it is frivolous, vexatious, discloses no reasonable cause of action, is unsustainable, bound to fail, amounts to abuse of process, and constitutes a collateral attack on prior court orders relating to possession proceedings brought by a third party against the Plaintiff.
The property was purchased by the Plaintiff and his partner in 2003 with a mortgage from Irish Life & Permanent plc, which later became Permanent TSB plc. The mortgage was registered by the Defendant in 2015, and the loan and mortgage were assigned to a third party company by a Deed of Conveyance and Assignment in June 2015. The Plaintiff disputes that this deed validly transferred his interest in the mortgage.
Several related proceedings have taken place, including possession proceedings by the third party, appeals by the Plaintiff, injunctions, and other litigation involving the Plaintiff, his partner, and the third party. The Plaintiff has been unsuccessful in prior appeals and has engaged in extensive litigation concerning the property and mortgage.
The Plaintiff's current claim against the Defendant arises from the Defendant's registration of the mortgage deed and the Deed of Conveyance and Assignment, alleging breaches of statutory duties and registration rules, negligence, and constitutional rights violations.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the Defendant's registration of the Deed of Conveyance and Assignment was improper or unlawful under the Registration of Deeds Rules and related statutory provisions.
- Whether the Plaintiff's claim discloses a reasonable cause of action or is frivolous, vexatious, or bound to fail.
- Whether the Plaintiff's proceedings constitute an abuse of process and a collateral attack on prior court orders.
- Whether the Court should grant an order restraining the Plaintiff from issuing further proceedings related to the property without prior leave.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's Arguments
- The Defendant registered an undated mortgage deed and a transfer of mortgage that did not properly identify the mortgage registration number.
- The registration breached specific rules under the Registration of Deeds Rules 2008, including rules concerning the form, content, and accuracy of the register.
- The Defendant failed to comply with its statutory obligations, causing damage to the Plaintiff’s constitutional rights and exposing him to third party attacks on his property rights.
- The Plaintiff contends that the Deed of Conveyance and Assignment did not transfer his interest in the mortgage because the registration referred only to his partner’s name and omitted his own.
- The Plaintiff alleges that the Defendant’s registration was done in bad faith and that Havbell (the third party) relied on this flawed registration to obtain possession orders.
- The Plaintiff claims damages for breach of statutory duty, negligence, and distress arising from the Defendant's actions.
Defendant's Arguments
- The Defendant contends the claim is frivolous, vexatious, and discloses no reasonable cause of action.
- The Defendant argues that the registration was proper and complied with the statutory rules, including the Registration of Deeds Rules.
- The Defendant asserts that the Plaintiff’s claim is a collateral attack on prior final and binding court decisions relating to possession proceedings.
- The Defendant seeks dismissal of the claim under Order 19 Rule 28 and the Court’s inherent jurisdiction on grounds of abuse of process and lack of merit.
- The Defendant requests an Isaac Wunder-type order to restrain the Plaintiff from initiating further proceedings concerning the property without leave of the Court.
Table of Precedents Cited
Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
---|---|---|
Barry v Buckley [1981] IR 306 | Principles governing striking out claims under Order 19 Rule 28 and inherent jurisdiction | Referenced as establishing the high threshold for dismissal and distinguishing between different jurisdictions |
Salthill Properties Limited v Royal Bank of Scotland plc [2009] IEHC 207 | Application of Order 19 Rule 28 and inherent jurisdiction to dismiss claims | Used to explain the distinction between dismissal under the Rules and inherent jurisdiction |
Lopes v Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform [2014] IESC 21 | Clarification of inherent jurisdiction and Order 19 Rule 28 distinctions | Applied to support the approach to assessing pleadings and factual analysis |
Keohane v Hynes [2014] IESC 66 | Extent of factual analysis permissible under inherent jurisdiction | Supported the Court’s limited engagement with documents to assess whether claim is bound to fail |
Clarington Developments Limited v HCC International Insurance Company plc [2019] IEHC 630 | Principles for striking out claims | Referenced as part of the established principles governing dismissal applications |
Kearney v Bank of Scotland [2020] IECA 92 | Application of Isaac Wunder Orders and striking out principles | Guided the Court’s approach to granting restrictive orders against vexatious litigants |
Scotchstone Capital Fund Ltd & anor v Ireland & anor [2022] IECA 23 | Recent restatement of principles governing dismissal and inherent jurisdiction | Used to confirm the high threshold and abuse of process considerations |
McAndrew v Launceston Property Finance DAC & anor [2023] IECA 43 | Further restatement of dismissal principles under inherent jurisdiction | Supported the Court’s approach to assessing pleadings and abuse of process |
Fox v McDonald [2017] IECA 189 | Meaning of "frivolous and vexatious" in the context of Order 19 Rule 28 | Guided the Court’s interpretation of frivolous and vexatious litigation |
Murray and Air Ambulances Services Ltd v Fitzgerald [2012] IEHC 20 | Use of inherent jurisdiction to prevent vexatious litigation | Referenced to support abuse of process analysis |
Morrissey v Irish Bank Resolution Corporation [2015] IEHC 200 | Principle of res judicata and abuse of process | Applied to determine that re-litigation of matters already decided is an abuse of process |
Henderson v Henderson | Rule against re-litigation of issues that could have been raised earlier | Not fully considered but acknowledged as relevant to abuse of process |
Údarás Eitlíochta na hÉireann & DAA Public Limited Company v Monks [2019] IECA 309 | Principles governing Isaac Wunder Orders | Guided the Court’s decision to impose restrictions on further litigation |
Kearney v Bank of Scotland [2020] IECA 92 | Isaac Wunder Orders and balancing access to courts with abuse of process | Supported the proportionality and necessity analysis for restrictive orders |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court commenced by narrowing the Plaintiff's claim to focus exclusively on the registration of the Deed of Conveyance and Assignment, as the Plaintiff conceded that claims regarding the mortgage deed registration were incorrect. The claim was inadequately particularised but could be remedied by amendment, and the Court took into account the Plaintiff's litigant-in-person status and significant litigation experience.
The Plaintiff's central contention was that the Defendant improperly registered the Deed of Conveyance and Assignment, failing to comply with the Registration of Deeds Rules, particularly rules requiring accurate identification of the deed's grantors and grantees and precise indication of the interest or land affected. The Plaintiff argued that the Excel spreadsheet accompanying the registration only referenced his partner's name, omitting his own, thus invalidating the transfer of his interest.
The Court analyzed the statutory framework and the Rules, noting that the registration correctly recorded Permanent TSB as grantor and Havbell as grantee, satisfying Rule 4(5) and 5(2). The Plaintiff's complaint about Rule 6(2) and (4) was rejected because the spreadsheet included sufficient identifying information, including the property address, mortgage date, and registration number, allowing the Defendant to properly assess the application.
The Court emphasized that the registration of the Deed of Conveyance and Assignment does not equate to registering a transfer of mortgage in the manner applicable to registered land and that the Plaintiff’s complaint about the effect of the deed itself was not a matter for the Defendant.
The Court further considered the history of extensive litigation involving the Plaintiff, including possession proceedings and appeals, and found that the current proceedings amounted to a collateral attack on final and binding decisions of the Circuit Court and High Court. The Plaintiff’s own statements revealed the proceedings were brought for an improper purpose, seeking to undermine earlier judgments.
Applying established principles, the Court found the proceedings frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process. The Court also found that the Plaintiff’s conduct, including repeated litigation and attempts to appeal orders without jurisdiction, justified an Isaac Wunder-type order to restrain further proceedings without leave.
Holding and Implications
The Court's final decision was to DISMISS the Plaintiff's proceedings under both Order 19 Rule 28 of the Rules of the Superior Courts and the Court's inherent jurisdiction.
Additionally, the Court granted an Isaac Wunder-type order restraining the Plaintiff from initiating any further proceedings against the Defendant or its agents relating to the property without prior leave of the President of the High Court or a nominated judge.
This decision directly terminates the Plaintiff's current claim and imposes procedural controls on future litigation concerning the property to prevent abuse of process. The Court did not establish new precedent but applied well-established principles to the facts of the case.
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