Contains public sector information licensed under the Open Justice Licence v1.0.
The Director of Public Prosecutions v Graham Dwyer (Approved)
Factual and Procedural Background
The Appellant was convicted of the murder of a Victim who disappeared in August 2012. The Victim’s remains were discovered in The Mountains in September 2013. Around the same time, the Police recovered items from The Reservoir, including two mobile telephones and clothing later linked to the Victim. The prosecution’s case relied heavily on:
- Text messages found on the recovered telephones, attributed to exchanges between the Appellant and the Victim.
- Traffic and location (metadata) associated with those telephones, used to place both users geographically.
The Appellant appealed to the Supreme Court, arguing that the mobile telephony evidence was obtained in breach of Article 8 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights and should therefore have been excluded.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether mobile telephony evidence obtained in breach of Article 8 of the EU Charter is nonetheless admissible under Irish law.
- Whether the Supreme Court’s recent majority decision in The People (Director of Public Prosecutions) v. Smyth [2024] IESC 23 is binding and dispositive of the present appeal under the doctrine of stare decisis.
Arguments of the Parties
The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| The People (Director of Public Prosecutions) v. Smyth [2024] IESC 23 | Admissibility of telephone metadata obtained in breach of Article 8, applying JC principles. | Treated as binding authority; its reasoning deemed dispositive of the present appeal. |
| The People (Director of Public Prosecutions) v. JC [2015] IESC 31; [2017] 1 IR 417 | National test for admitting unconstitutionally obtained evidence (reckless or grossly negligent breach). | Forms the domestic framework, applied through the doctrine of equivalence to Charter breaches. |
| GD (Case C-140/20, CJEU, 2022) | Confirmed that Ireland’s 2011 data-retention regime violated Article 8 of the Charter. | Background authority demonstrating the breach of EU law. |
| Digital Rights Ireland Ltd (Case C-293/12, CJEU, 2014) | Annulled the Data Retention Directive on privacy grounds. | Used to show that legal vulnerability of the 2011 Act was foreseeable. |
| Mogul of Ireland Ltd v. Tipperary (NR) County Council [1976] IR 260 | Leading authority on when the Supreme Court may depart from its own precedent (“clearly wrong” test). | Quoted to justify adherence to Smyth absent clear error. |
| Smith v. Cavan and Monaghan County Councils [1949] IR 322 | Earlier decision left undisturbed in Mogul; illustrates respect for precedent. | Referenced historically in the Mogul discussion. |
| Director of Public Prosecutions (O'Grady) v. Hodgins [2024] IESC 36 | Example where a prior precedent was not followed because it was delivered ex tempore and lacked full analysis. | Contrasted with the fully reasoned nature of Smyth. |
| Director of Public Prosecutions v. Freeman (Unreported, Supreme Court, 25 March 2014) | Example of limited precedential weight due to summary delivery. | Used by analogy to highlight why Smyth carries higher precedential force. |
| ACC v. Connolly [2017] IECA 119; [2017] 3 IR 629 | Application of stare decisis within the Court of Appeal. | Illustrates the author-judge’s prior adherence to majority views. |
| Bank of Ireland v. Curran [2016] IECA 399 | Duty of banks toward guarantors; part of sequence leading to Connolly. | Cited in discussion of deference to precedent. |
| Ulster Bank (Ireland) Ltd v. De Kretser [2016] IECA 371 | Same sequence as above. | As above. |
| Finucane v. McMahon [1990] 1 IR 165 | Supreme Court judge accepting a majority view for certainty of law. | Analogy for current judge’s acceptance of Smyth. |
| O'Meara v. Minister for Social Protection [2024] IESC 1 | Remarks on flexibility of precedent in constitutional matters. | Quoted to acknowledge, but ultimately reject, departure from Smyth. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
Judge Hogan delivered a concurring judgment. While personally adhering to the views expressed in his earlier dissent in Smyth, he accepted that:
- Binding Precedent: Smyth was decided by a seven-judge Supreme Court after full argument and exhaustive consideration of relevant materials. Under the standard articulated in Mogul, a prior decision should not be overruled unless it is “clearly wrong,” which had not been established.
- Stare Decisis: The judge adopted the approach of Chief Justice Finlay in Finucane — an individual judge should yield to clear majority authority to ensure coherent jurisprudence.
- Application of JC Principles: Because Smyth held that telephone metadata obtained in breach of the Charter remains admissible under national law unless acquired recklessly or with gross negligence, the same reasoning applies a fortiori to data accessed in 2013, before key CJEU rulings highlighted the illegality of the 2011 regime.
- Dispositive Nature of Smyth: Given the binding effect of Smyth, no further analysis of alternative grounds (e.g., the statutory proviso in s. 3(1)(a) of the Criminal Justice Act 1993) was necessary.
Holding and Implications
APPEAL DISMISSED.
The Supreme Court upheld the admissibility of the mobile telephony evidence and, consequently, the Appellant’s conviction. The judgment reinforces the authoritative status of Smyth and affirms that, under current Irish law, evidence obtained in breach of Article 8 of the EU Charter may be admitted unless the JC exclusionary rule is triggered by reckless or grossly negligent conduct. No new legal test was fashioned, but the Court underscored the strength of the doctrine of precedent in criminal evidence cases.
Please subscribe to download the judgment.

Comments