Director of Public Prosecutions (at the suit of Garda Robert O'Grady) v Robert Hodgins (Approved)

Factual and Procedural Background

The Defendant was arrested on suspicion of drink-driving under the Road Traffic Act 2010 (“the 2010 Act”), brought to a Garda station, and required to provide two breath specimens using an intoxilyser machine. The machine produced two statutory statements pursuant to s. 13(2) of the 2010 Act. Both the Garda officer and the Defendant signed the statements, but in the wrong sequence: the Defendant signed before the Garda officer. At trial the prosecution sought to rely on the statements; the Defendant objected, citing the Supreme Court decision in Director of Public Prosecutions v. Freeman. The District Court excluded the statements, the High Court upheld that ruling, and the Court of Appeal dismissed the prosecution’s appeal. The Appellant (the Director of Public Prosecutions) obtained leave to appeal to the Supreme Court, asking it to revisit the correctness of Freeman.

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether non-compliance with the prescribed sequence of signatures required by s. 13(2) of the 2010 Act and the 2015 Regulations renders the intoxilyser statements inadmissible.
2. Whether the Supreme Court should overrule its earlier decision in Director of Public Prosecutions v. Freeman in light of subsequent and prior authority on “technical slips” in statutory certificates.
3. How the doctrine of precedent applies when a prior Supreme Court decision is alleged to be “clearly wrong” in the sense identified in Mogul of Ireland Ltd v. Tipperary (N.R.) County Council.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant’s Arguments

• The incorrect signing sequence is a harmless, purely technical error that should not affect admissibility.
• A long line of Supreme Court authority (Kemmy, Collins, Somers, among others) establishes that minor or “peripheral” defects in statutory certificates do not invalidate them.
• Freeman failed to engage with this earlier case-law and is therefore “clearly wrong” under the Mogul standard and should be overruled.

Defendant’s Arguments

• The statutory wording and the 2015 Regulations make the signing sequence mandatory; breach removes the statutory presumption of admissibility.
• Freeman is a binding Supreme Court decision directly on point; lower courts (and, absent special circumstances, the Supreme Court) are obliged to follow it.

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

Judge Hogan, delivering the judgment of the Court, began by emphasising the centrality of the doctrine of precedent but noted that fidelity to earlier decisions has limits. The Court adopted the two-part test in Mogul: (i) Is the precedent “clearly wrong”? and (ii) Was the issue fully argued and answered in that precedent?

Applying that test, the Court concluded:

• Freeman failed to engage with a substantial body of Supreme Court authority—Kemmy, Collins, Somers, Littlejohn, and others—which treats minor procedural defects as harmless.
• The incorrect signing sequence does not impugn the authenticity of the statements, both of which were in fact signed by the Garda officer and the Defendant.
• Earlier decisions show a consistent judicial approach that “peripheral or superficial defects” do not invalidate statutory certificates absent demonstrable prejudice.
• Consequently, Freeman is “clearly wrong” and cannot stand.
• The Court of Appeal had correctly followed Freeman, but the Supreme Court is free to depart from it when satisfied it is erroneous.

Holding and Implications

Appeal ALLOWED; the statements are admissible and Director of Public Prosecutions v. Freeman is overruled.

Immediate Effect: The prosecution may rely on the breath-test statements, and the case proceeds without the evidential exclusion previously ordered.

Broader Implications: The judgment confirms that minor, non-prejudicial errors in completing statutory certificates under the Road Traffic Acts will not bar their admission, and clarifies the circumstances under which the Supreme Court will depart from its own precedent.