Tallington Lakes Ltd v South Kesteven District Council

Factual and Procedural Background

This appeal concerns the interpretation and application of provisions of the Caravan Sites and Control of Development Act 1960 ("the 1960 Act"). The appellant, Company A, owns land known as Company A Lakes and Leisure Park, part of which is used as a caravan site ("the site"). The respondent, Local Authority, issued a site licence for the site, but Company A did not pay the annual site licence fee. The Local Authority applied to the First-tier Tribunal ("the FTT") for an order requiring payment.

The FTT dealt with four preliminary issues at a hearing and the remaining issues on the papers without a hearing. An appeal to the Upper Tribunal followed on three grounds: (1) whether a proper hearing with requisite evidence took place; (2) whether Company A or Company B was the occupier of the site; and (3) whether the site was a relevant protected site under the 1960 Act.

The Upper Tribunal held that Company A was the occupier, that the FTT should not have decided the application without an oral hearing but remade the decision itself, and that the site was a relevant protected site liable for an annual licence fee. Company A obtained permission to appeal to this Court on the same three grounds.

Company A's director, Mr. Morgan, represented the appellant throughout proceedings, including before this Court.

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether a properly convened hearing with requisite evidence and documentation took place in the FTT or Upper Tribunal when deciding the site's relevant protected site status.
2. Whether Company A or Company B is the occupier of the site for the purposes of the 1960 Act.
3. Whether the site qualifies as a relevant protected site under section 5A of the 1960 Act.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

• There was procedural unfairness as no properly convened hearing occurred with necessary evidence and submissions.
• Company B, under a management and trading licence agreement dated 16 July 2004, is the occupier of the site, holding an interest in land amounting to exclusive possession.
• The site is not a relevant protected site because the site licence and planning permissions restrict use to holiday purposes or impose conditions preventing year-round habitation on most of the site.
• The 2016 revised site licence is invalid.

Respondent's Arguments

• The FTT directions required parties to produce all relevant documents, including planning permissions; the respondent produced all known relevant permissions.
• The management and trading licence agreement creates only a licence, not a lease, and does not confer exclusive possession on Company B, so Company A remains the occupier under section 1(3) of the 1960 Act.
• The site licence and planning permissions do not restrict the site to holiday use only across the entire site; some permissions allow year-round residential use, making the site a relevant protected site liable for an annual fee.
• The 2016 revised site licence was valid, and no appeal was made against its conditions.

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court began by considering the procedural fairness of the hearings below. The Upper Tribunal had set aside the FTT decision made without an oral hearing because the appellant had objected in time. The question was whether the Upper Tribunal erred in re-making the decision rather than remitting it. The court found the Upper Tribunal was entitled to conclude it had all relevant documentary material, including the site licence and planning permissions, and that the appellant had ample opportunity to present arguments. The appellant's late reference to a purported "blanket" planning permission was not part of the case before the FTT or the Upper Tribunal and was rightly disregarded.

Regarding who was the occupier, the court applied section 1(3) of the 1960 Act, which defines "occupier" as a person entitled to possession by virtue of an estate or interest in land. Company A was the registered freehold owner and thus prima facie the occupier. The management and trading licence agreement with Company B was examined in detail and found to be a licence, not a lease, because it did not confer exclusive possession. The agreement’s language emphasized management and control "as Licensee" for specific purposes, and the payment of a management fee by Company A confirmed the nature of the arrangement. Therefore, Company A remained the occupier for the purposes of the 1960 Act.

On whether the site was a relevant protected site, the court analyzed the site licence and the seven planning permissions listed in the 2003 licence. The 2003 licence and the 2016 revised licence were not expressed to be for holiday use only, nor did they impose conditions restricting caravan habitation at certain times of the year. The planning permissions were mixed: five arguably imposed such restrictions, but two did not impose any conditions limiting residential use. The court agreed with the Upper Tribunal that the entire land subject to the site licence must fall outside the definition of a relevant protected site for the exception to apply. Because some parts of the site had no such restrictions, the site qualified as a relevant protected site liable for an annual fee under section 5A of the 1960 Act.

The court rejected the appellant’s argument that government guidance or silence in planning permissions could affect the status, emphasizing that the statutory language controls and requires express conditions. The appellant’s challenge to the validity of the 2016 revised licence was not before the court, as no appeal was permitted on that issue.

Holding and Implications

The court DISMISSED the appeal.

The holding confirms that Company A is the occupier of the site for the purposes of the Caravan Sites and Control of Development Act 1960 and is liable to pay the annual site licence fee as the site qualifies as a relevant protected site under section 5A of the Act. The decision upholds the Upper Tribunal’s re-making of the FTT’s decision without remitting the matter. No new precedent was established beyond the application of existing statutory interpretation principles and case law on leases versus licences.