Contains public sector information licensed under the Open Justice Licence v1.0.
Donegal County Council v Quinn (Approved) (Rev1)
Factual and Procedural Background
This opinion arises from a consultative case stated posed by a District Court Judge pursuant to section 52(1) of the Courts (Supplemental Provisions) Act 1961, as amended. The question referred was whether section 1 of the Courts (No.3) Act 1986 (as amended) authorises the issue of a summons on the application of a firm of solicitors, described as an unincorporated body of persons. The High Court delivered a judgment on this question on 1st March 2024, concluding that the statute did not authorise such issuance of summons by an unincorporated body of persons. Subsequently, the Prosecutor applied for leave to appeal that decision to the Court of Appeal. The Notice Party was joined to the proceedings to be heard on the application for leave to appeal. The hearing on leave to appeal took place on 10th May 2024, and this judgment addresses that application.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether section 1 of the Courts (No.3) Act 1986 (as amended) authorises the issue of a summons on the application of a firm of solicitors, being an unincorporated body of persons.
- Whether leave to appeal should be granted to the Prosecutor to appeal the High Court’s determination on that question of law to the Court of Appeal pursuant to section 52(2) of the Courts (Supplemental Provisions) Act 1961, as amended.
Arguments of the Parties
Prosecutor's Arguments
- The starting point is that the term "person" in the relevant statute includes an unincorporated body of persons by virtue of sections 4(1) and 18(c) of the Interpretation Act 2005.
- There was no express statutory displacement of the meaning of "person" in the 1986 Act.
- The construction applied by the High Court was inconsistent with the administrative process and substance of the 1986 Act.
- In the absence of previous authority, it is arguable that the Court of Appeal could reach a different conclusion.
- Legal writs are often issued in the name of a firm of solicitors rather than individually named solicitors, supporting the view that such firms can apply for summonses.
Accused's Position
- The Accused adopted a neutral position regarding the Prosecutor’s application for leave to appeal, responding only through written submissions.
- The Accused opposed the Notice Party’s independent application for leave to appeal and opposed the grounds relied upon by the Notice Party.
Notice Party's Position
- The Notice Party supported the Prosecutor’s application for leave to appeal.
Table of Precedents Cited
Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
---|---|---|
People (AG) v Conmey [1975] 1 I.R. 341 | Principle that statutory provisions regulating appellate jurisdiction must be clear and unambiguous. | Cited as authority for the constitutional requirement that appellate jurisdiction be clearly regulated. |
Canty v Private Residential Tenancies Board [2008] IESC 24; [2008] 4 I.R. 592 | Interpretation of appellate jurisdiction provisions and alignment with other statutory provisions. | Referenced for comparison to section 52(2) of the 1961 Act and its clarity. |
Minister for Justice v Wang Zhu Jie [1993] 1 I.R. 426 | Clarification that regulation of appellate jurisdiction must be express. | Used to support the view that section 52(2) regulates appeal rights by requiring leave, not by subtraction. |
Governey v Financial Services Ombudsman [2015] IESC 38; [2015] 2 I.R. 616 | Standard or threshold for granting leave to appeal is relatively low where a stateable basis exists. | Applied to determine that the Prosecutor met the threshold for leave to appeal. |
Galfer Filling Station Limited v Superintendent Patrick O'Callaghan [2023] IECA 184 | Interpretation of section 52(2) of the 1961 Act regarding appellate jurisdiction and leave to appeal. | Key precedent affirming the presumption in favour of allowing appeals and clarifying the nature of leave to appeal. |
Clinton v An Bord Pleanála [2007] 1 I.R. 272 | Permitting amendment or addition of grounds of appeal after leave is granted. | Supported the proposition that the Prosecutor may add grounds of appeal upon grant of leave. |
L. O'S v The Minister for Health and Children [2015] IESC 61 | Procedural flexibility in appeals and grounds of appeal. | Referenced to support procedural points on adding grounds of appeal. |
The People (DPP) v O'Shea [1982] IR 384 | Requirement that any statutory regulation restricting appellate jurisdiction must be express. | Cited to emphasize that section 52(2) does not restrict appellate jurisdiction by subtraction but regulates it by requiring leave. |
Lough Swilly Shellfish Growers Co-Operative Society Limited & Atlanfish Ltd v Danny Bradley & Anor [2013] IESC 16; [2013] 1 I.R. 227 | Constitutional requirement that appellate courts be able to consider whether the lower court's decision is correct. | Applied to affirm that the Court of Appeal must be permitted to consider the correctness of the High Court's decision. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court began by situating the statutory provision under section 52(2) of the Courts (Supplemental Provisions) Act 1961 within the constitutional framework established by the Thirty-third Amendment of the Constitution Act 2013, which created the Court of Appeal. The court noted that the Court of Appeal’s jurisdiction to hear appeals from the High Court is broad and presumed to exist unless a statute clearly and unambiguously restricts it.
The court emphasized that the statutory provision in question, section 52(2), requires leave of the High Court to appeal to the Court of Appeal but does not expressly restrict the right to appeal. The court relied on established jurisprudence that any limitation on appellate jurisdiction must be explicit and that the threshold for granting leave to appeal is relatively low, requiring only a stateable basis for appeal.
In considering the grounds of appeal presented by the Prosecutor, the court found that these grounds met the low threshold necessary for leave to appeal. The court also clarified that the Prosecutor may add further grounds upon grant of leave. The court limited its consideration to the grounds and facts as initially found by the District Court Judge in the consultative case stated and did not consider additional submissions by the Notice Party beyond their support for the Prosecutor's position.
The court further analyzed the meaning of "person" in the relevant statutory context, noting that the starting point was that it includes unincorporated bodies of persons, and found that the High Court’s prior interpretation could be challenged on appeal.
Finally, the court underscored the constitutional requirement that the Court of Appeal be allowed to consider whether the High Court’s decision was correct, reinforcing the appropriateness of granting leave to appeal in this matter.
Holding and Implications
The court granted the Prosecutor's application for leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal against the High Court’s determination on the question of law posed in the consultative case stated.
Holding: Leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal is GRANTED.
Implications: This decision permits the Prosecutor to challenge the High Court’s interpretation regarding the statutory authority for issuing summonses on behalf of an unincorporated body of solicitors. The decision does not establish new precedent but allows for appellate scrutiny of the prior ruling. The matter will be further addressed at a subsequent mention to consider costs and any ancillary issues.
Please subscribe to download the judgment.
Comments