Campbell, R (On the Application Of) v London Borough of Ealing

Factual and Procedural Background

This appeal arises from the judgment and order of Upper Tribunal Judge O'Connor, sitting as a deputy judge of the High Court (Administrative Court), dated 9 January 2023. The judge dismissed an application for judicial review of the decision by the London Borough of Ealing ("the Defendant") dated 28 February 2022, which withdrew funding for the Appellant's temporary bed and breakfast accommodation at a specified address ("the temporary accommodation").

The Appellant, born in 1982, suffers from retinitis pigmentosa causing partial sight, obsessive compulsive disorder, and depression. He was initially placed in temporary accommodation by another borough under housing duties and later had his accommodation funded by the Defendant’s adult social services, exercising powers under the Care Act 2014. The Defendant conducted assessments confirming eligible domiciliary needs but the Appellant declined direct payments or managed care, relying on family support.

Over several years, the Appellant was moved between temporary accommodations and placed on the Defendant’s social housing register with priority Band B. Despite multiple assessments confirming ongoing eligible needs, the Appellant rejected offers of alternative accommodation and assistance to secure permanent housing.

On 28 February 2022, the Defendant decided to cease funding the temporary accommodation, citing the Appellant’s failure to take proactive steps to secure permanent housing and the absence of a Care Act duty to fund accommodation where housing duties under the Housing Act 1996 applied. The Appellant sought judicial review of this decision, which was refused by the judge below. Permission to appeal was granted on grounds concerning the interpretation of section 23 of the Care Act 2014 and the rationality of the Defendant’s decision.

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether section 23 of the Care Act 2014 prevents the Defendant from funding the Appellant’s accommodation under Part I of the Care Act when housing duties under the Housing Act 1996 apply.
2. Whether the Defendant’s decision to withdraw funding of the Appellant’s accommodation was irrational or taken for an improper purpose.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

• The Appellant contended that he had "accommodation-plus" needs under the Care Act 2014 that required provision or funding of accommodation to effectively deliver care and support.
• He argued that the Defendant erred in concluding no duty existed under the Care Act to provide or fund accommodation and failed to conduct a proper assessment on this issue.
• The Appellant submitted that section 23 of the Care Act should not bar provision of accommodation under the Care Act where the local authority has not accepted a housing duty under the Housing Act 1996.
• It was argued that the decision below led to perverse consequences, allowing persons subject to immigration control to access Care Act accommodation but excluding others eligible under the Housing Act.
• The Appellant relied on case law supporting the provision of accommodation under the Care Act for care needs, citing decisions under previous statutes as persuasive.

Respondent's Arguments

• The Defendant argued that the Appellant was eligible for housing under Parts VI or VII of the Housing Act 1996, and therefore section 23 of the Care Act barred provision of accommodation under the Care Act.
• It was submitted that the Appellant had never been assessed as having a care and support need specifically for accommodation, and his care needs could be met in any suitable accommodation.
• The Defendant maintained that providing accommodation under the Care Act in such circumstances would undermine the statutory housing scheme and priorities established under the Housing Act.
• Reliance was placed on the decision in R (Idolo) v Bromley LBC, which interpreted section 23 as giving priority to the Housing Act scheme over the Care Act in relation to accommodation.
• The Defendant contended that the decision to withdraw funding was rational, aimed at encouraging the Appellant to pursue housing options available under the Housing Act, and was not influenced by the Appellant’s Equality Act claim.

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court undertook a detailed statutory interpretation of section 23 of the Care Act 2014, which excludes from the Care Act’s duties anything a local authority is required to do under the Housing Act 1996. The court emphasized that while the Care Act provides a power to meet urgent care needs with accommodation, this power is not unfettered and does not override the housing allocation and homelessness schemes established under the Housing Act.

The court distinguished the decision in R (Aburas) as obiter dicta insofar as it suggested the Care Act power extended where section 23 applies. The binding authority in R (Idolo) was accepted as correctly interpreting section 23 to give priority to the Housing Act’s statutory scheme, including allocation schemes and homelessness duties.

The court noted that the Appellant was eligible for housing under Part VI and Part VII of the Housing Act and had been placed on the housing register with priority. The Defendant had made multiple offers of accommodation under the Housing Act, which the Appellant had rejected. This confirmed that the Defendant was fulfilling its housing duties and that the Care Act did not impose an additional duty to provide or fund accommodation.

The court also reasoned that allowing accommodation provision under the Care Act in these circumstances would disrupt the statutory housing allocation scheme, potentially leading to unfair queue-jumping and administrative confusion between social care and housing functions.

Accordingly, the decision to withdraw funding was lawful, rational, and not taken for an improper purpose. The alleged victimisation under the Equality Act was found unsupported by evidence and thus not interfering with the decision.

Holding and Implications

The court’s final decision was to DISMISS THE APPEAL.

The court held that section 23 of the Care Act 2014 prevents a local authority from providing or funding accommodation under the Care Act where the local authority is required to provide housing under the Housing Act 1996. The Defendant was not under a duty or had the power to fund the Appellant’s accommodation under the Care Act because the Appellant was eligible for housing under the Housing Act and had been placed on the housing register with priority.

The decision confirms the statutory boundary between housing and social care functions, reinforcing that housing needs must be addressed through the Housing Act’s allocation and homelessness schemes. It prevents the Care Act from being used as a "back-door" to circumvent the housing allocation process, thereby preserving the integrity and balance of statutory housing priorities.

No new precedent was established beyond affirming the correct interpretation and application of section 23 of the Care Act 2014 as previously decided in R (Idolo) v Bromley LBC.