Baker, R. v

Factual and Procedural Background

This opinion concerns an application by His Majesty's Solicitor General under section 36 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 for leave to refer sentences as unduly lenient. The offender was sentenced on 16th February 2024 at the Crown Court at Maidstone by Judge Branston to a total of 46½ months' detention in a young offender institution for multiple offences including aggravated burglary, assault occasioning actual bodily harm, burglary involving dogs, and possession of cannabis. The offender was 18 at the time of the offences and 19 at sentencing.

The offences involved three distinct sets of conduct: a domestic assault causing significant bruising to the victim (the offender's partner), theft and attempted sale of three Doberman puppies from a garden kennel, and an aggravated burglary involving the offender threatening and assaulting a third party in the victim's home while armed with a knife. The offender pleaded guilty to most offences at the Crown Court, following initial pleas and proceedings at the magistrates' court.

The sentencing judge applied relevant Sentencing Council guidelines, taking into account aggravating factors such as the presence of a young child during offences, the domestic context, previous convictions, and the offender being on bail. Mitigating factors included the offender's youth, immaturity, mental health issues including ADHD and trauma history, and credit for guilty pleas. The judge imposed concurrent sentences resulting in a total custodial term of just under four years in a young offender institution. The Solicitor General sought leave to refer the sentences as unduly lenient, challenging the judge's reductions and concurrency decisions.

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether the sentences imposed on the offender were unduly lenient within the meaning of section 36 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988.
2. Whether the sentencing judge failed to adequately consider aggravating factors, including the offender’s previous convictions, bail status, presence of a child, and the domestic and dwelling context of offences.
3. Whether the principle of totality was correctly applied, specifically the appropriateness of concurrent sentences versus consecutive sentences.
4. The extent to which the offender’s youth, immaturity, and mental health issues justified reductions in sentence length.

Arguments of the Parties

Solicitor General's Arguments

• The judge failed to sufficiently account for aggravating factors, leading to an excessive one-third reduction in sentence for youth and immaturity.
• The principle of totality was misapplied; consecutive sentences should have been imposed except for the assault by beating, as offences committed on bail rarely merit concurrent sentences.
• The lead offence of aggravated burglary had multiple aggravating features: previous burglary conviction, commission while on bail, presence of a child, dwelling offence, and attempts to prevent reporting.
• The sentencing judge underestimated the planning involved in the aggravated burglary, as shown by text message evidence.
• If concurrency was appropriate, the lead sentence should have been uplifted to reflect overall gravity.

Offender's Arguments

• The sentence was not unduly lenient; the judge carefully structured the sentence and was entitled to impose concurrent sentences with aggravated burglary as the lead offence.
• The judge took full account of all aggravating features, placing the lead offence in the lower bracket before applying reductions for youth and guilty pleas.
• The offender’s age and maturity justified reductions; the age of 18 is not a "cliff edge" in sentencing.
• Mitigating factors included the offender’s difficult childhood, mental health issues, and emotional complexity, supported by a psychological report.
• The judge used appropriate starting points and gave credit for guilty pleas; the offender had no prior custodial sentences.

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court began by reaffirming the well-established principles governing applications under section 36 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988, emphasizing that leave to refer sentences should only be granted in exceptional circumstances where the sentence falls outside the range reasonably open to the sentencing judge.

Reviewing the sentencing judge’s remarks, the court found that the judge had carefully considered all aggravating and mitigating factors, including the offender’s youth, immaturity, mental health issues, and guilty pleas. The judge appropriately applied the Sentencing Council guidelines and made reasoned adjustments to reflect the offender's circumstances.

The court rejected the Solicitor General's submission that the one-third reduction for youth was excessive, noting that the offender’s age and mental health justified a lower total sentence than that for a fully mature adult. The court also found the concurrency of sentences justified given the circumstances, including the principle of totality and the offender’s personal mitigation.

The court distinguished the present case from precedent concerning offenders sentenced after turning 18 for offences committed while under 18, confirming that the offender’s age at offence was 18 and thus the "cliff edge" principle did not apply. The court also applied principles recognizing continued maturity beyond 18 and the relevance of mental health to culpability and sentencing.

Ultimately, the court held that although the sentence was severe, it was not unduly lenient and fell within the range reasonably open to the sentencing judge.

Holding and Implications

The court REFUSED the application for leave to refer the sentences as unduly lenient.

The direct effect of this decision is that the sentences imposed by the Crown Court remain undisturbed. The court did not establish any new precedent but reaffirmed existing principles concerning youth, mental health, and the limits of appellate intervention on sentence severity under section 36 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988.