Lewis-Ranwell v G4S Health Services (UK) Ltd & Ors

Factual and Procedural Background

The Plaintiff, aged 32, was diagnosed with schizophrenia in his mid-twenties and had previous psychiatric intensive care admissions. On 10 February 2019, during a serious psychotic episode, he attacked and killed three elderly men in their homes in The City under delusional beliefs. He was charged with murder but found not guilty by reason of insanity at trial in The City Crown Court, meaning he did not know his actions were wrong due to mental illness. He was detained under a hospital order with restrictions pursuant to sections 37 and 41 of the Mental Health Act 1983.

In the two days before the killings, the Plaintiff was twice arrested and detained by the Police at Barnstaple Police Station for suspected burglary and assault, respectively, and released on bail each time. During detention, he exhibited violent and erratic behaviour and was assessed by mental health professionals from Company A and The Trust. A face-to-face assessment and a Mental Health Act Assessment were discussed but not conducted.

On 4 February 2020, the Plaintiff commenced proceedings in the High Court against Company A, the Police, The Trust, and The Council, alleging negligence and breaches under section 7 of the Human Rights Act 1998. The claim concerns failures to detain him despite clear risk, resulting in his subsequent killings. The Defendants, except the Police, applied to strike out the claims based on the illegality defence (ex turpi causa principle), arguing the claim is founded on the Plaintiff's own unlawful homicides.

The strike-out applications were heard by Judge Garnham at The City Crown Court in March 2022. The Judge dismissed the applications, reasoning that the Plaintiff's verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity meant he lacked the necessary knowledge of wrongdoing ("turpitude") to engage the illegality defence. This decision is now the subject of appeal by Company A, The Trust, and The Council.

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether the illegality defence (ex turpi causa) bars a negligence claim brought by a person found not guilty by reason of insanity for unlawful acts committed during a psychotic episode.
2. What is the effect of the Plaintiff's mental state, specifically the lack of knowledge that his acts were wrong, on the application of the illegality defence?
3. How do established principles distinguishing criminal responsibility and civil liability apply in cases involving mental illness and unlawful acts?
4. Whether public policy considerations, including the consistency principle and public confidence principle, justify barring or allowing the claim.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants' Arguments

• The illegality defence applies because the Plaintiff committed unlawful acts (the killings), even if he lacked criminal responsibility due to insanity.
• The Plaintiff's acts constituted criminal acts with actus reus and mens rea, thus engaging public interest and moral turpitude required to bar the claim.
• Allowing the claim would be inconsistent with criminal law and civil law principles, undermining the integrity of the justice system.
• Allowing recovery would damage public confidence in the law and risk misuse of public resources, including NHS funds.
• The similarity of hospital orders in insanity and diminished responsibility cases suggests the illegality defence should apply similarly.
• Allowing the claim could encourage defensive medicine and improper detention decisions.

Respondent's (Plaintiff's) Arguments

• The verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity means the Plaintiff did not know that his acts were wrong, lacking the necessary culpability for the illegality defence to apply.
• Criminal liability requires knowledge of wrongdoing; mere commission of an unlawful act is insufficient to bar a claim.
• Liability in tort is distinct from criminal liability; the Plaintiff remains a victim of negligence causing his loss and should be compensated.
• Public policy and community values support compensation where the claimant lacked moral culpability due to insanity.
• The law does not generally apply the illegality defence where the claimant lacked knowledge of wrongdoing, consistent with fairness and justice.
• Potential anomalies in victim compensation do not justify denying the Plaintiff recovery for his own losses.

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court undertook a detailed legal analysis of the application of the illegality defence where the claimant was found not guilty by reason of insanity for unlawful acts. It began by distinguishing between criminal liability, which requires knowledge that the act was wrong, and tortious liability, which focuses on the voluntary nature of the act rather than moral culpability.

It was established that the Plaintiff’s special verdict meant he lacked criminal responsibility because he did not know that his acts were wrong, although the acts themselves remained unlawful. The Court noted that tort law imposes liability for deliberate acts causing harm, regardless of the defendant’s mental state, as long as the act was voluntary and directed by the mind.

The Court reviewed the illegality defence principles, emphasizing the Supreme Court’s guidance in Patel v Mirza that the defence requires a flexible, policy-based assessment, including consideration of the claimant’s knowledge and intent. It acknowledged authorities suggesting the defence does not apply where the claimant was unaware of the unlawfulness of their act, a principle supported by older English cases and reinforced by several foreign decisions.

The Court considered relevant case law from England and other jurisdictions, including Clunis, Gray, Henderson, Presland, and Traylor. It recognized that while Clunis, Gray, and Henderson bar claims by those criminally responsible (including diminished responsibility cases), none definitively address insanity cases where criminal responsibility is absent. The majority of authorities, including Traylor and several U.S. cases, suggest the illegality defence should not apply where the claimant was insane and lacked knowledge of wrongdoing.

The Court analyzed public policy considerations under two main principles: the consistency principle (avoiding inconsistency between criminal and civil law) and the public confidence principle (maintaining respect for the legal system). It concluded that the consistency principle is engaged only where the claimant has criminal responsibility, which the Plaintiff lacked. The Court rejected the Appellants’ argument that the mere commission of a criminal act, regardless of responsibility, is sufficient to apply the defence.

Regarding civil law consistency, the Court noted that insanity does not absolve a person from tort liability to victims, and that the Plaintiff would be liable in tort for his acts. However, this does not preclude the Plaintiff from claiming against third parties for negligence causing his losses. The Court found no incoherence in this dual approach.

On the public confidence principle, the Court acknowledged the understandable discomfort in compensating a person who killed others, but emphasized that the Plaintiff’s lack of moral culpability due to insanity aligns with community values and principles of fairness. It held that denying recovery in such cases would be inconsistent with these values and the general approach to the illegality defence.

Other public policy considerations, such as NHS funding impact and deterrence, were found insufficient to outweigh the Plaintiff’s right to recover. The Court stressed the distinction between diminished responsibility and insanity, supporting a principled line based on criminal responsibility rather than moral blameworthiness alone.

In sum, the Court reasoned that the illegality defence does not apply in cases where the claimant was insane at the time of the unlawful act and lacked knowledge that the act was wrong, and that the Plaintiff’s claims should not be barred on this basis.

Holding and Implications

The Court’s final decision is to DISMISS THE APPEAL.

The illegality defence (ex turpi causa) does not bar the Plaintiff’s negligence claims because he was found not guilty by reason of insanity and thus lacked the requisite knowledge that his acts were wrong. The Court emphasized that criminal responsibility, not merely the commission of an unlawful act, is necessary to engage the defence.

This decision means the Plaintiff’s claims against Company A, The Trust, and The Council will proceed, subject to any further appeal, including claims in negligence and under the Human Rights Act 1998. The ruling clarifies that the illegality defence is not applicable where the claimant’s unlawful acts were committed during a state of insanity, aligning with principles of fairness and community values.

No new binding precedent was established to alter existing law on cases involving diminished responsibility or criminal responsibility; rather, the decision affirms a principled distinction for insanity cases within the framework of the illegality defence.