Braintree District Council v (Secretary of State for the Home Department & Anor

Factual and Procedural Background

The case concerns the proposed development by the Government to provide accommodation for up to 1,700 asylum seekers on approximately 6.5 hectares of a former RAF airfield, which is Crown land, located in the district of Braintree. The local planning authority, referred to as the council, contended that this development would constitute a breach of planning control and sought an injunction under section 187B of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 ("the 1990 Act") to restrain the Secretary of State for the Home Department ("the Home Secretary") from proceeding with the development. The land is owned by the Secretary of State for Defence.

The council issued Part 8 proceedings on 30 March 2023 seeking injunctive relief to prevent breaches of planning control and to restrain residential occupation of the land by asylum seekers. The Home Secretary applied to strike out the council's application the following day. Waksman J. struck out the council’s application on 24 April 2023 on the basis that the council had not obtained consent from the "appropriate authority" under section 296A(2) of the 1990 Act.

Permission to appeal was granted, and three interveners—two district councils and a local resident—were permitted to intervene by written submissions only. There are concurrent judicial review proceedings related to the same site and other "pathfinder" sites under consideration for asylum seeker accommodation. No final decision had been made regarding one of these other sites.

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether the High Court has jurisdiction to grant an injunction under section 187B of the 1990 Act to restrain an apprehended breach of planning control on Crown land without the consent of the appropriate authority.
2. Whether the Government’s proposed development qualifies as permitted development under Class Q, Part 19 of Schedule 2 to the Town and Country Planning (General Permitted Development) (England) Order 2015 ("the GPDO"), thereby obviating the need for planning permission.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments (The Council)

• The judge erred in concluding that the High Court lacked jurisdiction to grant an injunction under section 187B without consent from the appropriate authority.
• The application for an injunction under section 187B is not a "step taken for the purposes of enforcement" within the meaning of section 296A, and thus is not subject to the consent requirement.
• The judge misunderstood the scope of section 296A by conflating high-level requirements (such as the general requirement for planning permission) with specific enforcement steps.
• Parliament’s removal of the express prohibition on section 187B injunctions against the Crown indicated an intention to allow such injunctions without requiring consent.
• The interpretation adopted by the judge would unduly empower the "appropriate authority" to block the court's jurisdiction over injunctive relief.

Respondent's Arguments (The Home Secretary)

• The judge’s interpretation of section 296A is correct and that a section 187B injunction is indeed a "step taken for the purposes of enforcement".
• The statutory language of section 296A is deliberately wide and includes injunction applications as enforcement steps requiring consent from the appropriate authority.
• The legislative history shows that while enforcement notices may be issued against Crown land, injunctions remain prohibited without consent to prevent local planning authorities from impeding Crown development.
• The prohibition on court proceedings without consent is consistent with the statutory scheme and intended to protect Crown land from enforcement actions initiated by local authorities without approval.

Intervener Arguments (Local Resident)

• Supported the judge’s conclusion that the court lacks jurisdiction to grant injunctions under section 187B without consent.
• Asserted that the council should have pursued enforcement notices or judicial review rather than seeking an injunction precluded by section 296A.

Neither of the other interveners made submissions on the jurisdiction issue.

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court focused primarily on the interpretation of section 296A of the 1990 Act, which restricts local planning authorities from taking enforcement steps in relation to Crown land without consent from the appropriate authority. The key question was whether an application for an injunction under section 187B constitutes a "step taken for the purposes of enforcement" under section 296A(4).

The court noted that the language of section 296A is deliberately broad, encompassing "anything done in connection with the enforcement of anything required to be done or prohibited by or under this Act," and explicitly includes bringing proceedings and making applications as enforcement steps. The court distinguished this from the narrower concept of "taking enforcement action" defined elsewhere in the Act.

It was held that an injunction under section 187B is manifestly an enforcement provision, intended to restrain breaches of planning control, which itself arises from the requirement under section 57 that planning permission must be obtained before development. Thus, an application for such an injunction is clearly a step connected to enforcement and is subject to the consent requirement.

The court rejected the appellant's argument that the consent requirement should not apply to high-level requirements or to injunctions as distinct from enforcement notices. It found no basis in the statutory language or legislative history to read down the scope of section 296A in that manner.

The court concluded that without the consent of the appropriate authority—in this case, the Ministry of Defence—the council lacked jurisdiction to bring the proceedings or apply for an injunction under section 187B against Crown land.

Because the court found that jurisdiction was lacking, it did not address the substantive issue of whether the development fell within permitted development rights under Class Q. The court also declined to address related issues raised in the respondent’s notice and by interveners, considering such determinations premature and potentially prejudicial to ongoing proceedings.

Holding and Implications

The appeal is dismissed.

The court held that the High Court does not have jurisdiction to grant an injunction under section 187B of the 1990 Act to restrain breaches of planning control on Crown land without the consent of the appropriate authority, pursuant to section 296A(2). Consequently, the council's application for an injunction was correctly struck out for lack of jurisdiction.

This decision directly affects the parties by precluding the local planning authority from seeking injunctive relief against the Crown in these circumstances without prior consent. The ruling does not establish new precedent on the substantive merits of the proposed development or on the application of Class Q permitted development rights, leaving those issues to be determined in separate proceedings.